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rather the conclusion reached before the ban was even considered.

In short, we must see the treaty for what it is, a very limited agreement. It has two important advantages that outweigh the, to my mind, hypothetical and never successfully proved disadvantages. These are, first, the end to radioactive fallout. Although this menace may indeed be exaggerated, there seems little doubt that increased radioactivity in the atmosphere could eventually have a serious effect. No one can be certain that additional cancers or birth deformities have not resulted from higher levels of fallout. The fact of the matter is that as long as we do not know precisely what causes a birth deformity or what makes a cancer grow, it is the better part of wisdom to end the contamination of the air that has, by statistical study, at least, contributed to them.

Recent studies have very clearly pinpointed the increased incidence of childhood cancer in cases of prebirth X-rays. Although we do not know nearly as much as we would like to about birth deformities, and in fact about the many and subtle ways in which radiation can affect living and future generations, the fact remains that no one has been able to show any benefits from a general increase in radiation levels, and medical studies are indicating, with increasing impact, the possible dangers.

So I look upon this as the first basis for support of the treaty.

Secondly, the treaty is important in hampering—though not, of course, fully preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons—atmospheric testing on the part of other nations. Although this treaty clearly does not prevent other nations from proceeding if they are ready to undertake underground tests, the inconvenience and expense may well apply a brake, a brake which would be in the interest of the Soviet Union as well as the United States. In short, the treaty represents a limited effort to reduce what has been one of the most conspicuous, if perhaps not actually one of the most serious, threats to world peace in the postwar decade. It is a limited vehicle to achieve a limited, but certainly desirable, result.

For that reason, I believe it would be a very serious mistake to attach to the treaty any of the reservations or understandings that have been proposed to date. There is nothing I personally would welcome more, and nothing I feel would be more in the national interest at this time, than the withdrawal by their sponsors of each and every one of these reservations or understandings.

One of the understandings, for instance, provides that U.S. participation in the treaty does not involve any degree of recognition of the East German Government. What about North Korea and North Vietnam, if they should ever desire to accede? What about Outer Mongolia, which we do not recognize but which has acceded? Should they not also be specifically mentioned? To raise this issue formally as an understanding to the treaty adds nothing substantive to our determinations on East Germany, but it might well confuse the situation

with regard to other countries. And a vote of rejection of such an understanding would cloud the East German issue.

Another understanding, with regard to U.S. right of withdrawal immediately in the event of Soviet violation, has been thoroughly clarified by the Secretary of State. We would abrogate the treaty, we have made it clear, if the Soviets cheat.

Another understanding with regard to peaceful nuclear explosions brings a wholly new element into the actual treaty, and in my view could open a loophole for Soviet and other testing that we might later regret. In any case, in my judgment, it deserves a lot more study and attention before being incorporated in this document.

The issue of use of nuclear weapons in the case of armed hostilities has similarly been clarified beyond doubt.

Also, the desire to insure that any and all amendments to this treaty be submitted to the Senate is important and worthwhile. Such a requirement is basic constitutional law. The President and Secretary of State have already assured the Senate they would comply with such a requirement. If the Senate voted to add specific language to this treaty to that end, it might seriously imply that amendments could be made to other treaties, in which such language does not appear, without the advice and consent of the Senate. If the Senate voted not to add specific language, it would leave the issue as regards this particular treaty, up in the air. It is my hope, therefore, that the assurances of the President will be accepted and no effort made to complicate the situation by such an amendment of the resolution of ratification.

Every one of these points has been answered satisfactorily time and again by the President, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense. To include them in the treaty would add nothing but confusion and ill feeling for other signatories. To vote not to include them might leave these very questions up in the air. It seems to me it would be very unwise for the Senate to be put in the position of having to vote on any of these points, which to my mind are perfectly clear now and would only be confused by a Senate vote.

Another reservation recently introduced would require that the treaty not come into effect until all the delinquent Soviet assessments to the United Nations are paid. Nothing, it seems to me could be more extraneous to the subject matter of the treaty, and in fact, no more germane than would be a reservation postponing the effective date of the treaty until the United States balances its budget. Needless to say, I favor a balanced budget for the United States, and for the United Nations, and I favor all nations paying their debts and obligations, but I do not see what that really has to do with a limited test ban agreement.

Certainly we are right to be concerned about Soviet delinquency in the United Nations and to do everything we appropriately can to encourage them to pay

up. Soviet actions in this session of the United Nations, including the question of paying their share, will be a good test of how much the Soviets really mean in their new peace offensive. It will be a good indication of what we can expect in the future, but it is no test at all of the validity of a ban on atmospheric nuclear explosions. It would be extremely unfortunate if the Senate were to meander down this byway and lose sight of what we are really here to ratify and secure.

Finally, with respect to the reservation that Soviet military personnel be required to leave Cuba before the treaty comes into effect, I doubt there is any Member of Congress that has for so long expressed greater concern than I have over the Cuban situation. If I thought such a reservation would encourage the Soviets to withdraw from Cuba, I would back it, but I am not such an optimist as to believe that this is a constructive move toward getting the Russians out of the Caribbean.

They are going to leave Cuba, and other points only when we make things so tough for them, by economic and political and other pressures that it does not pay them to remain there any longer. We are not going to talk them out of Cuba—any more than we talked them out by passing a tough resolution last September, a resolution to which the Soviets paid no attention and which the executive branch has largely ignored.

It is surprising to me that anyone in this country expects mere negotiations to get the Russians out of Cuba. It is even more surprising that those who advocate this course—at least among my constituents—are the same people who warn that we cannot trust the Russians in any treaty. If that is so, I do not see any value whatsoever in bringing in additional complication into the treaty which we would not expect the Russians to abide by and in which it would be a lot harder to discover and confirm cheating than in some purely scientific area such as nuclear fallout.

In my view, it would be a most serious mistake for the Senate to accept any of the unnecessary or extraneous proposals that have been offered as additions to the resolution of ratification.

With the clear understanding then that this treaty is a limited commitment, that it does not even bind the United States to further negotiations of any sort on any issue that we would not otherwise wish to discuss, and that it is interpreted by the United States in accordance with the points that are made in the report of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, I support the treaty. What the treaty provides is in our interest and that of the whole free world. What it does not provide, both good or bad, should not be the object of present decisions, and should not be brought into the discussion to mislead or alarm our citizens.

Mr. KUCHEL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. KEATING. I yield to the Senator from California.

Mr. KUCHEL. The Senator makes an excellent point in indicating to the

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Senate that the treaty should be voted up or down on its merits, with no extraneous material being attached to it, by way of reservations, which are printed and are lying on our desks.

My recollection is that approximately 2 years ago the distinguished Senator from New York was one of the successful sponsors of an amendment to pending legislation with respect to interdicting trade with Cuba. Cuba remains a problem. The question before the Senate is whether an agreement to prohibit testing by way of nuclear explosions, except underground, is in the interest of the American people and in the interest of the people of the world.

I commend the Senator for stressing the fact that in his opinion, and in my opinion, the treaty merits the support of the Senate and of the people of this country, but that no extraneous material ought to be attached to it when the Senate votes on it next Tuesday. I hope it will vote overwhelmingly in favor of it. I congratulate the Senator for the points he has made.

Mr. KEATING. I thank the Senator for his statement. It is extremely important not to complicate the situation by attaching reservations or amendments which might or might not require renegotiation, but certainly would require notice to the other signatories to the treaty.

People have written to me to ask, "Why do you want to be for a treaty that helps the Soviet Union?"

That is not the question. The question is, Does it help the United States? Does it help to prevent the continued pollution of the atmosphere? Does it help to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons by other countries? Certainly its ratification is in the interest of the people of both nations. If, incidentally, it also helps the Soviet Union, certainly we should not be against it for that reason. I do not believe that the fact that it provides incidental benefits for the Soviet Union should be a basis for opposing the treaty.

Mr. KUCHEL. The Senator is correct. Human beings, black or white, free or slave, whether they live in America or on the other side of the Iron Curtain, breathe the same air.

Competent scientists who testified before the committee stated that at one point in the testing of nuclear explosions in the atmosphere the danger to mankind becomes inevitable, regardless of the level at which that point is reached.

In my opinion, the Senator is also completely correct with respect to the problem of the proliferation of nuclear nations, about which we read in the press several weeks ago. The Senator from New York made some comments in the Senate to the effect that the United Arab Republic, having obtained some scientific brainpower, was on its way to creating a rocket arsenal, one step away from being a nuclear power in the Middle East. Think of the hazard to the peace of the world that would occur from countries in the Middle East being nuclear powers. Such an event could plunge the whole world into an abyss.

As the Senator from New York speaks in support of the test ban treaty, on which the Senate will vote next Tuesday, what a wonderful thing it is that 100 nations all around the globe, in every hemisphere, have said, "We want to join in this agreement."

The Senator's points are well taken. In my judgment, he speaks with impeccable logic.

Mr. KEATING. I am grateful to the Senator from California.

ANNIVERSARY OF 1962 CUBA RESOLUTION

Mr. KEATING. Mr. President, I should like to refresh the memory of Senators that today marks an anniversary. One year ago today the Senate passed, with only one dissenting vote, a resolution expressing the determination of the Congress and the country with regard to the presence of a Soviet military establishment in Cuba. The resolution was signed by the President on October 3, 1962.

The controlling language of the resolution after the preamble provided as follows—and I stress that it was adopted with only one vote against it:

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the United States is determined—

(a) to prevent by whatever means may be necessary including the use of arms, the Marxist-Leninist regime in Cuba from extending, by force or the threat of force, its aggressive or subversive activities to any part of this hemisphere;

(b) to prevent in Cuba the creation or use of an externally supported military capability endangering the security of the United States; and

(c) to work with the Organization of American States and with freedom-loving Cubans to support the aspirations of the Cuban people for self-determination.

We all remember that the resolution was worded with great care. A number of resolutions were introduced, but this is the one that was adopted. It was the expression of determination by the United States in formal language stated by Congress.

Now, a year later, the Marxist-Leninist regime in Cuba has extended its subversive activities to every corner of the hemisphere and is working 24 hours a day in the effort to overthrow existing governments throughout Latin America. That relates to paragraph (a).

Although there is no threat to the territory of the United States itself right now, there is a very real threat to our continued hemispheric security in the efforts Castroist forces are making to overturn the Governments of Venezuela, Peru, and Colombia and to infiltrate through the Jagan regime in British Guiana directly into Brazil. Surely the threat to U.S. security is just as real and a great deal closer than the threat in South Vietnam, where we are spending \$1½ million a day to defeat communism.

As to paragraph (c), it is true that the United States has worked with the Organization of American States.

Instead of working with freedom-loving Cubans to achieve self-determination

for Cuba we have thwarted their efforts at many points. A State Department spokesman, in fact, recently told the American Legion Convention, in Miami, that the Cuba question was basically one that had to be solved by the Cubans—ignoring the thousands of Soviets in Cuba who are forcibly keeping the Cubans from doing just that.

In short, not one point of this resolution, which was debated and favorably reported by two Senate committees—the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services held joint hearings—passed with near unanimous approval by both Houses of Congress, has been effectively implemented in the last year. Today, 1 year from that time, the resolution is virtually unimplemented, except for the fact that the United States has been working with the Organization of American States. Meanwhile there is mounting evidence of Latin American concern over the Castro regime and over Castro's deliberate campaign to incite insurrection and violence in other countries.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed, following my remarks, a series of newspaper articles written by reliable reporters to document this trend of the increase in the inciting of insurrection and violence in other Latin American countries.

There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the Record. (See exhibit 1.)

Mr. KEATING. Mr. President, the memories of some of us are short. The resolution passed by the Senate exactly a year ago today should serve to remind us all of the very wide gap that still exists between our objectives, our stated policies, our adopted resolution, and the hard realities in Cuba. There is still, as there was last fall, a pressing need to enforce policies we have already enunciated, before we find not only a Communist Cuba, but also a Communist Guiana, a Communist Haiti, a Communist Brazil, a Communist Colombia, a Communist Venezuela, or other Communist countries on our very doorsteps.

EXHIBIT 1

[From the Washington (D.C.) Post, Sept. 20, 1963]

FEAR OF MILITARY COUP ALARMS VENEZUELAN (By George Matanson)

CARACAS, September 19.—The threat of an imminent military uprising hangs heavily over Venezuela. People in the streets talk of little else and Caracas publications are expressing their concern with banner headlines.

Terrorist activity has mounted steadily in recent weeks. The armed forces, angered at the Government's apparent inability to halt the attacks, is widely believed to be planning to take matters into its own hands.

This view was bolstered today when the pro-Castro terrorists attacked an American-owned factory in downtown Caracas.

Six men armed with submachineguns, who identified themselves as members of the Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN), destroyed by fire the plant and warehouses of the Du Pont Co. in an area ringed by other business houses.

EIGHT ESCAPE PRISON

Earlier in the week the Government proudly announced the capture of two FALN

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leaders, but this was quickly offset by the escape of eight FALN figures from a maximum security prison.

The escape, together with a daring FALN attempt on the life of Venezuela's defense minister, 2 weeks ago, is said to have infuriated the military.

Until recently the armed forces had stayed out of politics, but now they are thought to be considering steps to rid the country of terrorism.

In the process, it is felt, they would take over the Government.

Ranking Venezuelan military officers have held several closed meetings. After one of these it was confirmed that the military had met with President Betancourt. Newspapers reported Betancourt had been given an ultimatum to act strongly against the terrorists or accept the consequences.

The Government admitted that Betancourt had conferred with the officers but only on "routine matters." It also has said that Betancourt will soon address the country, spelling out strict measures to hold the terrorists in check. To date, however, there has been no speech.

NO DANGER

Meanwhile, the Minister of Defense declared that there is no danger. He said that although the military had resolved to protect democratic processes, it would take no steps that would threaten the upcoming elections.

The statement is being received with reservations. Observers admit that many officers wish to remain outside political activities. But they feel that a group of younger officers is putting pressure on their superiors to take action.

It is believed that if the FALN continues its attacks on military installations, the armed forces will move.

UNDECLARED WAR

Joyito Villalba, a leading opposition presidential candidate, said today that Venezuela is in "a state of undeclared war," and that the threat of a military uprising cannot be overlooked.

"Venezuela is too young a democracy," Villalba said. "We are only 5 years old in this respect and we have no traditions to help carry us through this trying period."

Villalba, who heads the far-left Republican Democratic Union Party (URD), said "I have called upon all political parties, including the Communists, to join in signing a mutual pact to condemn terrorism," he said.

But observers point out that it is the Communists who are the prime movers behind the terrorism.

The Reds hope to provoke a coup, a military one would suffice, after which the moderates would be forced to join the extreme left to regain control. From here the relatively small extreme left wing would move from a position of influence to complete power.

[From the New York Times, Sept. 18, 1963]

LATINS AT U.N. DISTURBED AS CUBA INCREASES EFFORTS TO SPUR REVOLT

(By Henry Raymont)

UNITED NATIONS, N.Y., September 17.—Latin American delegates to the General Assembly are disturbed over what they describe as a new impetus in Cuba's efforts to incite a hemisphere-wide Communist revolution.

The belief is that never before has the regime of Premier Fidel Castro been so blatant in promoting armed uprisings in Latin American countries, most of which are politically and socially restive.

The chief Cuban delegate, Dr. Carlos M. Lechuga, said in an interview that Dr. Castro and other leaders who recently spoke out in favor of greater revolutionary militancy in Latin America were merely expressing their

political beliefs, "and surely there is no law against that."

WASHINGTON POLICY BLAMED

The more aggressive tone of the Cuban statements, he contended, was "a direct result" of what he termed Washington's "policy of subversion and harassment" against Cuba.

Many Latin American representatives here, especially those from the nations of Central America and the Caribbean area, which are most exposed to Cuban propaganda, are eager to determine if the new situation poses any threat to their security that may require collective action by the inter-American system.

Daniel Oduber Quirós, Foreign Minister of Costa Rica, suggested that the heads of the Latin American delegations meet during the Assembly session to discuss Communist subversion and propaganda emanating from Cuba.

One difficulty the inter-American system has encountered in dealing with Cuba has been the absence of substantial evidence that Cuba was shipping arms to support insurrections in other Latin American countries.

Lately, however, some diplomats have become convinced that the Organization of American States should take more forceful action to deal with Cuban subversion.

Juan Bautista de Lavalle, Peruvian delegate to the Organization of American States and an international jurist, has been working on a formula that envisions collective sanctions against the Castro regime for inciting and encouraging violence in other countries.

"In criminal law a man who inspires someone else into committing a crime is as guilty as the person who fires the weapon," the Peruvian diplomat said recently. "There is no reason why this principle should not apply in international law to governments inciting insurrection and violence in other countries."

Dr. Castro and his aids have been giving unceasing encouragement to rebel movements in Latin America, especially to the pro-Communist underground in Venezuela, the Armed Forces for National Liberation.

REBELS URGED TO CONTINUE

In a recent speech, the Cuban Premier urged the Venezuelan rebels to continue their struggle against the left-of-center government of President Romulo Betancourt. He said Cuba did not need to ship them weapons because they were imitating the tactics he used to overthrow President Fulgencio Batista—equipping his forces with weapons seized from the regular army.

One Cuban statement that particularly alarmed some Latin American diplomats was an article by Maj. Ernesto Guevara urging other countries to engage in the same guerrilla tactics that proved successful in Cuba. The article, which appeared in the monthly Cuba Socialist, was broadcast September 9 over the Peiping radio.

Its basic premise was that U.S. efforts to isolate Cuba had made other revolutions in Latin America necessary.

[From the Christian Science Monitor, Sept. 16, 1963]

CARACAS: TERROR STEP-UP TRACED

(By Bertram B. Johansson)

The extent to which Venezuelan Castro-Communist terrorists have taken matters into their own hands is demonstrated by their executing four of their own number recently in disciplinary sessions in the hills.

The men were executed by the pro-Communist mountain guerrillas after they had tried to desert, according to a fifth guerrilla who escaped and reported the executions to officials at Barquisimeto.

A Venezuelan news agency said the fifth guerrilla told authorities the four men were

lined up before a firing squad in the mountains of Lara State about 2 weeks ago.

The executions coincide with a marked increase in terroristic violence in several areas of Venezuela, aimed at three targets:

1. The downfall of the Betancourt government before it leaves office constitutionally early next year.

2. Prevention of the December 1 presidential elections which would insure constitutional succession in the Presidency for the first time in decades.

PUBLICITY SOUGHT

3. Laying the groundwork for a development of chaos in Venezuela in which, as in Cuba, Communists would be ready to step in or take advantage of any openings that might develop toward a greater concentration of power in Castro-Communist hands.

Within the past few days Castro-Communist fomenters of violence attacked the home of a presidential guard captain, killing one soldier and wounding another; attacked a Maracaibo police post; and perpetrated two bomb blasts at east coast oil pipelines.

Last week the terrorists captured Alfredo di Stefano, an international soccer star, and held him for 56 hours before releasing him.

Through such stunts, stealing valuable French paintings recently, and hijacking ships, the terrorists seek to obtain maximum publicity for their cause and to embarrass Venezuelan police forces.

LEADER IDENTIFIED

The problem of the Venezuelan police is that they are not highly trained. Most of them had to be changed when the Marcos Pérez Jiménez dictatorship fell, and it is only in recent months that professional police instructors have been teaching Caracas police in crime detection and prevention methods.

Leader of the Castro-Communist terrorists has now been identified by the Interior Ministry as Máximo Canales, a Cuban Communist, who engineered the spectacular hijacking of the Venezuelan freighter *Anzoátegui* last February.

Venezuelan authorities consider the most recent flurry of violence and terrorism as a sign of desperation, but Caracas citizens are concerned about the apparent ineffectiveness of police to handle these political juvenile delinquents.

[From the Panama City (Fla.) News, Aug. 21, 1963]

THE MEANING OF AGUILA KEY

(By Seymour Freidin)

The arrogant Castro Cuban raid on a little Bahama islet the other day was a dry run for bigger combined operations to come. It involves a future Soviet technique aimed at all underdeveloped areas and tempting soft spots.

Actually, it is based on the most mammoth intelligence program in history. Organized carefully, plotted cogently, the Russian aim is to pick off the immense potential in the markets of the underdeveloped world.

They cannot achieve—so they have apparently decided—dominance in these markets with the euphemism of competitive co-existence. In short, their policymakers have decided that the vast and cumbersome Soviet heavy industrial machine cannot compete with that of the United States. Therefore, the answer is planned upheaval, directed by highly skilled agents who build up the apparatus for a takeover in a given territory.

This is not the synthesis of some exile committee, bitter and burdened psychologically with no futures. It is the hard-headed assessment, based on what they claim are indisputable fact, statistic, and operation, of important men who try to advise on the course of policy for this government.

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Nobody, including the dedicated men involved, can pretend to say whether their unemotional, surgical presentations can affect the present course of U.S. policy. This is an epoch, somewhat schizoid, in which the quest for power accommodation with the Russians has become obsessive. The plangent bells of caution keep the pace, at least outwardly, rather dignified and measured.

Soviet policy isn't deferred by our approach. It has been made up and implemented abroad for some time now. Let's get down to a few cases, as the men who make these assessments would say dryly. Take the wretched episode at Aguilla Key. Castro gunboats sealed off and invaded the heat-seared British-administered islet.

Our planes watched. Under orders, they did nothing. Onto Aguilla Key stormed a landing party. Their comrades trained anti-aircraft guns on watching U.S. aircraft. They even sent in a helicopter from one of the little warships.

So, 19 exiles from Cuba were forcibly repatriated after a bald invasion of foreign territory. The incident—so melancholy in its utter insensitivity to human dignity and right—was Soviet conceived. The U.S.S.R., around the world, never ceases to try and bring back citizens who fled and want no more of the Soviet system.

The act at Aguilla Key, while successful from the Soviet operational point of view, was small potatoes. It proved one most useful point, though, to the vast and recast Soviet intelligence methods: that Cuba under its present regime is of untold value as a jumping-off spot for Latin America.

The biggest, proportionately, Soviet intelligence operation abroad is in Cuba today. Access is easier and more direct, as a result, with Soviet missions throughout Latin America. Every Russian mission in Latin America today is headed by a highly experienced intelligence officer.

The grim, old joke that the chauffeur in a Russian Embassy really ran the show has long since been interred with Stalin. Instead of using intelligence agents in covert and lower echelon levels, deliberate Soviet decision has placed them in No. 1 spots.

And not just in Latin America. This is now true in most of Asia and Africa. The objective is the same: seizing by subversion the regimes and, thereby, the markets of new countries. An underground apparatus and disaffected, ambitious politicians are all pay-dirt in the targets marked out by Soviet policy.

Some ultrasophisticated people may say, loftily, that it doesn't sound very new. Well, it is and had better be recognized, because the Russians never before used intelligence operations on such a high level to strike for a given objective.

Maybe this remark from a highly gifted man, who holds glittering credentials, has a little impact:

"It's a life-and-death competition for the markets," he said, dry-smoking a filter cigarette. "There ought to be a lot more said about it. But that's not up to me."

Obviously, it's up to the top to see and shed some light on this deadly phase of co-existence.

[From the Christian Science Monitor, Aug. 6, 1963]

JAGAN CALLS CONFERENCE TURNING POINT (By Bertram B. Johansson)

British Guiana's Prime Minister Cheddi Jagan, with a wide-ranging ambivalence, is warning Britain his colony must soon obtain independence—or else.

The self-admitted Marxist Prime Minister told a press conference this past weekend that the territory conference expected to be held in London in October—where British Guiana independence may be considered—will determine whether the colony goes "a

la Khrushchev, a la Mao Tse-tung, a la Castro, or a la Jagan."

CUBAN INCLUDED

Prime Minister Jagan is already showing a great attachment for Cuba's Premier Fidel Castro, who last week said the duty of revolutionaries is to "make" revolution all over Latin America.

Mr. Jagan told a press conference in Georgetown Saturday it was unrealistic for West Indian leaders to think of Caribbean unity without including Cuba, the biggest country in the region. "Such a large area cannot be ignored for long," he said.

On July 24, the Jagan government borrowed \$1,700,000 from the Guiana Import-Export Corp., a business concern which recently has done a brisk trade with Cuba and other Communist countries.

Government officials, according to Reuters, refused to comment on the purpose of the loan, as have officers of the corporation, which is dominated by Marxist Prime Minister Jagan's People's Progressive Party.

Sir Ralph Grey, British Guiana Governor, inspected the balance sheets of the corporation to ascertain its financial position after the Jagan government ignored his suggestion it first await possible British Government aid.

SOVIET GOODS IMPORTED

During the recent 11-week general strike staged by the Labor Confederation against a bill Mr. Jagan was trying to push through Parliament, the Prime Minister began importing Soviet oil from Cuba, on Soviet tankers, and Cuban rice. Much propaganda was made about the commodities saving British Guiana from chaos.

During the strike, two Cuban student organizers, of the type that have been deported from several Latin American countries, were extremely active in the Georgetown area among student groups.

Just as the strike was ending, 18 more Cubans, identified as aviation experts and technicians arrived to render what was termed assistance to widen activity of British Guiana Airways, which is alleged to have one 7-passenger plane.

There is concern in Washington circles about the possibility British Guiana may become a sluice gate for Castroite subversive traffic into South America and the rest of the hemisphere.

Havana radio has announced British Guiana has given landing rights to Cuban planes. The announcement followed shortly after the United States had complained to Britain about Cuban planes unloading potential subversive agents in the British-owned Grand Cayman Islands, 200 miles south of Cuba, for transfer to other airlines proceeding to Latin American points.

[From the New York Times, July 27, 1963]
CASTRO PLEDGES SOVIET SUPPORT FOR REVOLTS
IN LATIN AMERICA

HAVANA, July 26.—Premier Fidel Castro called today for Cuban-style revolutions in Latin America.

"What has happened in Cuba could happen exactly the same way in many Latin American countries," he told a mass rally in Havana on the 10th anniversary of the attack on the Mowcoda Barracks that ultimately put him into power in 1959.

He asserted that "all peoples who do what Cuba has done will have the support of the Soviet Union and Socialist [Communist] countries."

"More and better things which have been done in Cuba, can be done in Latin America," he added. "A million workers and peasants look to Cuba for hope and encouragement."

PEACE IS RULED OUT

Premier Castro asserted that Latin American revolutionaries insisted that "revolution could not be made by peaceful means."

He stressed that the way to revolution

"will not be opened by itself" and that revolutionaries themselves must open the way.

"Revolutionaries must not only learn theory," he advised. The Cuban leader attacked the United States-sponsored Alliance for Progress program of aid to Latin America, calling it "an aggressive instrument against Cuba destined to fall from the beginning."

He mentioned insistently Argentina, Peru, Colombia, and Guatemala as countries ripe for revolution. He described as a farce the recent election in Argentina and sent "a fraternal message of admiration to Venezuelan patriots who are fighting against reaction."

Dr. Castro called President Romulo Betancourt of Venezuela "an imperialistic puppet" and predicted victory for the pro-Castro forces in Venezuela "sooner or later, as in Algeria."

He proclaimed also "our fraternal salute" for pro-Castro groups in Guatemala.

However, Dr. Castro denied—as he has in the past—that Cuba was exporting its revolution.

In the case of Venezuela, he asserted, "when patriots needed money and arms they took them away from the soldiers and imperialists."

He added that ideas cannot be stopped and that Cuba was a "source of light for Latin American Indians and peasants."

UNITED STATES ACCUSED OF RENEGING

MIAMI, July 26.—Premier Fidel Castro charged today that the United States had reneged in the deal to obtain the freedom of the Bay of Pigs invasion prisoners.

"We accuse the American Government of not complying with its agreement and that it owes us \$10 million," the Cuban Premier told a mass rally in Havana.

Dr. Castro said in a broadcast heard here that the price agreed upon for the more than 1,000 prisoners taken in the 1961 invasion was \$53 million but that only \$43 million in goods had been paid.

The final installment was delivered to Cuba last month by the American Red Cross. The U.S. Government approved the deal but did not sponsor it.

[From the Citizens Committee for a Free Cuba, July 20, 1963 (Free Cuba News)]

COLOMBIA RIVALS VENEZUELA AS CASTRO TARGET

Colombia appears to be rivaling Venezuela as an embattled target of Castro-Communist subversion, judging by increasing guerrilla activity in that Andean country.

On July 15, a group of Colombians who had recently returned from indoctrination courses in Cuba launched guerrilla attacks at Jamundi and El Cerrito, Department of Valle. A Colombian Army patrol engaged the guerrillas, killed five and wounded two, and confiscated considerable material of a revealing character.

Included in the confiscated matter were "Che" Guevara's guerrilla warfare manual; a mimeographed "10 Commandments of Guerrilla Warfare" abbreviated from the manual; instructions for making bombs capable of destroying bridges and trains; and a rubber stamp with the legend, "Chief of Staff of the Revolutionary Army. Victory or Death." Also found were Cuban newspapers; Colombian pro-Castro magazines; a book called "We Organize the Revolution in Colombia," by the Communist Party head, Gilberto Viera White; and maps of western Colombia and other regions (where new guerrilla actions are evidently planned).

[From the Christian Science Monitor, July 12, 1963]

CUBAN FRICTIONS RUB UNITED STATES, BRITAIN (By Bertram B. Johansson)

There is a fascinating bit of byplay in the Caribbean involving United States-British relations.

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Cuban subversives and British Guiana are two points of friction.

The United States Wednesday asked Britain publicly to stop allowing "potential subversives" from Cuba to land on Grand Cayman Island, a British island north of Cuba.

Richard I. Phillips, State Department press officer, said some 15 to 20 persons had landed in Grand Cayman in three Soviet-made Ilyushin planes, and immediately transferred to other lines taking them to points in the Caribbean and Central America.

The British Government Thursday conceded that Fidel Castro's Cuba may be using the British-owned island to get subversives into Latin American countries, and said authorities were investigating.

PURPOSE CLOUDED

It is difficult at this stage to determine whether the United States made the Grand Cayman announcement to chide the British in public for alleged laxity with Cuban "subversives," or simply to demonstrate that U.S. intelligence services were well aware of the movement of subversives around the Caribbean.

The issues would appear to boil down to U.S. impatience with Britain over issues of Marxism and communism in the Caribbean.

The U.S. announcement followed by only a few days the earlier statement that the Kennedy administration was refusing financial aid to Marxist Prime Minister Cheddi Jagan in British Guiana on South America's northern coast, sandwiched between Venezuela, Dutch Guiana, and Brazil.

LEADERS CONSULTED

On Thursday in London, the Daily Herald, a Labor newspaper, declared that President Kennedy "is not being helpful over British Guiana. If the British Government takes their line from him, the same mistakes will be made in this strife-torn colony that the Americans made in Cuba.

"British Guiana desperately needs foreign aid. Only America is in a position to give it on a massive scale. She has refused," the Daily Herald continued.

"Why? Because the Americans suspect that Dr. Jagan, the Premier of British Guiana, is following Castro's example and drifting into the Communist camp. But the best way to make sure that the drift goes on is to leave British Guiana to stew in her own juice. If the West will not help, the Communists will. It is as simple as that," the Daily Herald said.

CONTRASTING MOVES

Duncan Sandys, British Commonwealth and Colonial Secretary, is in British Guiana now, conferring with government and opposition leaders. He waited before going there until the 80-day general strike concluded last week.

Two weeks ago, the diplomatic correspondent of The Times (London) wrote, in its June 29 issue, apparently after a Foreign Office briefing, that "it is understood that the U.S. Government has been urging the British Government to suspend the constitution under which British Guiana enjoys internal self-government and revert to direct colonial government, while British ministers are asking for a substantial increase in economic aid for British Guiana from the United States.

"The critical situation in British Guiana, which, according to several reports, is on the brink of civil war, has arisen from the strike."

[From the Christian Science Monitor, June 20, 1963]

CASTRO BROADENS WESTERN TARGETS

(By Bertram B. Johansson)

Premier Fidel Castro's warning to the French and British not to allow their Caribbean islands to be used for Cuban exile attack bases is being weighed in Washington

in the light of a new cockiness the Cuban leader has shown since his Soviet visit.

While there is a tendency to discount his remarks as mere bravado—they were made June 18 at the dedication of a new fleet of Soviet and other fishing vessels at Cardenas—there are indications the Cuban leader is broadening his attack on imperialism to include countries other than the United States.

Premier Castro referred to reports that Cuban exiles allegedly were negotiating with President de Gaulle of France for deploying from French islands in the Caribbean. He warned that he would seek whatever means necessary to defend Cuba. This was taken to mean further Soviet aid.

HAITIAN DETOUR?

There have been reports, also, that French-speaking Haitian exiles have offered to join forces with Cuban exiles in destroying the Duvalier dictatorship and then taking on Cuba, using Haiti as a base.

Ever since the Cuban leader's return from his 40-day trip in the Soviet Union, he has displayed new confidence in his "secure" position.

His June 4 radio and television interview in Havana, texts of which are not available, are most revealing of this confidence of complete Soviet backing, his assertion that Cuba was the victor in the October 1962, missile confrontation, his conviction of the economic superiority of the Socialist camp, and his high impression of Premier Khrushchev as a political and economic genius.

Referring to the possibility of talks with the United States to "normalize" Cuban-United States relations, Premier Castro says he will accept no preconditions to the talks but would set several himself, because, after all, he asserted, the United States was the loser in October and November.

"They [the United States] prepared subversions," he said in his June 4 interviews, "and we combated them. We crushed them. They prepared counterrevolutionary bands supplied with arsenals of weapons; and we put them out of action. They prepared invasions, and they have been obliged to pay a modest indemnity for all that [in the prisoner exchange].

SOVIET IMPRESSIONS

"They persisted in their plans for aggression, and they found themselves on the brink of destruction as a result. Discredit, headaches, and now hundreds of millions in currency [in higher sugar prices that must be paid by Americans] as a result of their aggressions against us.

"Is their policy not bankrupt? Yes, it is. Who failed? They have. Who won? We have won. Ah. The defeated are going to impose conditions on the victors. What a policy."

Premier Castro, engaged in constructing a monolithic Communist Party in Cuba, was impressed with the unity which the party instilled in the Soviet Union.

He was impressed with Soviet subways and said "I know the New York subway, and really it does not even approach the Kiev subway."

ON PEACEFUL SIDE

He was impressed with Soviet development of its "immense resources of Siberia. But," he adds, "they are not developing it as the United States West was developed—by cowboys, shots, dead people, assaults, and dead Indians. No, they are developing with extraordinary order. These are not people killing others, but closely united and organized."

Premier Castro observed that organization in Cuba was in the "toddler stage."

Asked about what conditions might be like when all political revolutions were finished, Premier Castro told his interviewers:

"At times I wonder what I would like to be

if I were not a revolutionary, or even while being a revolutionary, what I would like to be. I would like to be an investigator [or researcher]. Why? Because one can revolutionize nature, and to a small degree create a variety of plants, animals, anything in the field of agriculture, and also in the field of physics and chemistry. A perpetual revolution must be waged by man in all matters. * * *

For Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev, the Cuban Premier reserved special praise.

He said he had a "magnificent impression" of him.

PERSONAL VIEW

"In reality," said Premier Castro, "Comrade Khrushchev dedicated an amount of time to us that can be said were the full 40 days we were there [in the Soviet Union].

* * * His was a special attention, affectionate toward our entire delegation. * * * The thing that impressed me most was the extraordinarily human character of Comrade Khrushchev. * * * He has an extraordinary mental energy, and a complete, complete, complete, mental lucidity. He is without doubt one of the most brilliant intellects that I have ever known. That is the opinion I formed after entire days spent conversing and discussing with him. * * * He showed a great preoccupation for all the problems connected with today's situation, the domestic tasks in the Soviet Union, the national problems, and politics and the international Communist movement. I can say that I saw Khrushchev really preoccupied, really worried about all the problems related to the problems of the unity of the Socialist camp * * * great leader and a serious adversary of imperialism.

[From the Miami (Fla.) News, June 3, 1962]

CUBA SHIPS ARMS FOR LATIN REVOLTS

(By Hal Hendrix)

Communist Cuba has established a secret weapons arsenal in Matanzas Province and is exporting surplus U.S. arms from it to guerrilla forces in Central and South America, President Kennedy has been advised in a hard intelligence report.

Weeks of probing, including undetected cloak-and-dagger surveillance of one recent shipment of weapons smuggled from Cuba into Nicaragua, went into preparation of the report, the Miami News learned yesterday.

The highly classified document, written especially for President Kennedy, pinpointed clandestine movements of rifles, pistols, and automatic weapons and ammunition from four Cuban dispersal centers to nine Latin American nations—Nicaragua, Honduras, Venezuela, Brazil, Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, Paraguay, and Bolivia.

Accompanying the smuggled arms have been hundreds of copies of a manual written by Maj. Ernesto (Che) Guevara, entitled "La Guerra de Guerrillas," a handbook on Communist-style guerrilla warfare.

The Argentine-born Guevara is a key strategist for international communism in Cuba.

The presidential intelligence report noted that the arsenal in Matanzas was set up last February on orders of Guevara.

Its sole mission was to serve as a collection center and reconditioning depot for surplus U.S.-made weapons in Cuba, and shipping point for Latin American subversion.

Since the depot-arsenal began operations nearly all the U.S.-made weapons and ammunition Fidel Castro inherited from the Batista regime have been moved into the facility for reconditioning and packing for shipment to pro-Castro elements abroad.

ALSO GET BRITISH, DOMINICAN GUNS

Along with the U.S. armaments, the Castro forces have rounded up all available weapons of British manufacture and rifles from the San Cristobal arms factory in the Do-

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minican Republic and processed them through the closely guarded arsenal.

Batista's armed forces operated almost entirely with U.S.-made weapons. During Castro's 2-year hit-and-run guerrilla war against the Batista forces, most of his rebel arms also came from the United States.

When the Batista regime was toppled, his weapons warehouses are reported to have contained about 9,000 M-1 Garand rifles, 2,500 Thompson submachineguns, 1,500 carbines, 8,000 automatic pistols (.45 caliber), 1,000 Dominican San Cristobal rifles and a relatively small number of British Enfield rifles.

Cuba got the U.S. weapons under hemispheric mutual defense pacts, supervised by the Inter-American Defense Board.

The United States formerly maintained a military mission in Cuba to instruct the armed forces in uses of the armaments. The mission was withdrawn at Castro's request shortly after he came to power in January 1959.

Until Castro received large shipments of rifles from Belgium in 1959 and subsequent heavy supplies of Soviet bloc arms, particularly automatic weapons from Czechoslovakia, the U.S. weapons that fell in his hands were used by his armed forces and early militia units.

Cuba's military muscle now has been standardized with all Soviet and Czech firepower, functioning under a Czech-style table of organization created late last year with the guidance of an imported Spanish-born Communist military strategist, "Gen." Enrique Lister.

NEXT TO ARSENAL FOR INSPECTION

Upon completion of the standardization, Castro and Guevara ordered all "foreign" weapons delivered to the new Matanzas Arsenal for "repairs, inspection, and storage." The word "foreign" in Cuba today is synonymous with the United States.

The storage phase of the directive has been brief, according to the intelligence findings.

From the arsenal-depot the revitalized U.S. weapons are shipped directly to other Latin America points or moved first to terminals in Havana, Cienfuegos and Santiago.

Oceangoing launches are the principal means of transportation for the weapons destined for Castro's subversive agents. Some have gone by air.

Shipments usually are small, sometimes packed carefully among general cargo and hidden between bags of exported sugar.

U.S. Navy destroyers and destroyer escorts still maintain an arms smuggling patrol off the Caribbean coast of Central America.

Some of Castro's smuggling boats are known to have eluded the patrol. A few others have been allowed to "escape" for surveillance purposes.

Last month U.S. intelligence agents observed one shipment of U.S. weapons from Cuba secreted into a secluded Pacific coast area of Nicaragua.

A Cuban ship in the 3,500-ton class, working its way down Mexican west coast ports with general cargo, one dark night slipped into the Gulf of Fonseca, a deepwater harbor which touches the coasts of Honduras, El Salvador, and Nicaragua.

Three small motorboats drifted alongside the Cuban ship and boxes were lowered into them. The shipments weighed close to a ton. Each small boat eased away bearing loads weighing between 600 and 700 pounds.

Manning the small unlighted boats were fishermen from the tiny Salvadorean island of Meanguera, where the Cuban packages were hidden until colleagues set up transfer of the weapons to the Nicaraguan coastal town of Chinandega.

Once in Chinandega the shipment was taken over by about 20 men who smuggled

it into the mountains for distribution to peasant supporters.

Intelligence sources learned that this particular shipment, typical of others reaching the Central American area from the Matanzas Arsenal, was about 100 U.S. M-1 rifles, a small number of .45-caliber automatic pistols and submachineguns, a substantial number of boxes of .30- and .45-caliber ammunition, and an undetermined number of cases of grenades.

In Central America, as elsewhere along the Castro subversion path, the idea appears to be that the U.S.-made weapons provide an almost perfect cover from detection by Latin American authorities.

Smuggling of Cuba's Czech-made arms would be a certain giveaway to the source of supply.

On the Caribbean side of the Central American coastline, the report notes that the most probable relay point for the Cuban smuggling is a tiny key near the Island of Cozumel, just south of the eastern tip of Mexico's Yucatan peninsula.

PERU INFILTRATED WITH SMALL ARMS

U.S. intelligence also has gathered information about clandestine shipments of small arms into Peru recently by way of Bolivia and Brazil smuggling networks.

Close study is being given to reports reaching the intelligence analysts that occasional small arms shipments are being delivered by Soviet bloc ships putting in at Mexican, Colombian, Ecuadoran and Brazilian ports and at Georgetown, British Guiana, after sailing from Havana.

So far there has not been a hard confirmation of the Soviet involvement.

The violent but short-lived rebellion against the Venezuelan Government of President Romulo Betancourt last month at Carupano was linked to Castro's spreading subversion operations.

It is believed by Venezuelan and United States intelligence that the weapons used by the pro-Castro-Communist forces against the Betancourt regime probably came from the Matanzas arsenal. The anti-Betancourt forces were well stocked with U.S.-made weapons.

Guerrilla forces operating in southern and eastern Venezuela also are believed to have been supplied with armaments from Castro's "surplus" stockpile.

Some of the weapons are said to have been smuggled into Venezuela from Cuba by way of British Guiana, whose Premier Cheddi Jagan is an ardent supporter of Castro and Communist Cuba.

Also linked to the Cuban arms exporting activities are guerrilla fighters harassing the backlands of Colombia.

[From the Christian Science Monitor, May 31, 1963]

CASTRO THESIS: REDS TUG AMERICAS

(By Bertram B. Johansson)

An increasing Communist threat to Latin America is ominously indicated as an end result of Premier Fidel Castro's visit to the Soviet Union, now coming to a close.

Texts of speeches and communiques now available disclose specifically how the two Communist countries intend to support so-called national liberation movements in Latin America.

An examination of Premier Castro's speeches in the Soviet Union indicates he has been completely won over to the thesis, if he had not been before, that communism is in the ascendancy in the world today and that capitalism's decay is inevitable.

Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev, dilating on the theme, promised military weapons to such "liberation" movements.

In his May 23 speech in Moscow, the Soviet Premier said that "the Soviet Union and all socialist countries see their international duty in rendering all-out support and

comprehensive help to the national liberation movement.

ATTEMPTS REPORTED

"What does it mean to render help to the national liberation movement?" Premier Khrushchev asks proceeding then to answer his own question.

"It means, first of all, to struggle against the interference of imperialism in the internal affairs of peoples of the liberated countries, to lend all-out support, including supply of arms, to the peoples who are waging a just struggle against the foreign yoke. Second, it means to oppose any form of neo-colonialism, to help the peoples of the young states develop the economy of their countries, to lend all-out support to these countries in the international arena."

As an indication this has already begun, there have been three reports by correspondents on the scene in the Dominican Republic of insistent and persistent attempts by Communists to infiltrate the democratically oriented government of President Bosch.

One correspondent asserts that some of these attempts may, indeed, have already succeeded, though others report that rightists have been supporting Communist strikes and then charging the Bosch government has been too tolerant of such strikes.

STRIKE CALLED

In Peru this month, a group of young revolutionaries, including Javier Heraud Pérez, a promising poet from a wealthy family, who had all been trained in Cuba in subversive guerrilla techniques, infiltrated back into Peru with weapons, funds, and guerrilla supplies.

When they attempted to shoot their way through a hotel lobby in the jungle village of Puerto Maldonado near the Bolivian border, two were killed and the others captured and killed in the next few days.

In British Guiana where Marxist Prime Minister Cheddi Jagan has attempted to rush through legislation giving the government the power to choose labor unions that would negotiate with employers, democratically oriented labor unions have called a general strike which now enters its seventh week.

PRISONER ESCAPES

Thus far, Prime Minister Jagan has shown no signs of yielding on the issue. Garbage has begun to pile up in the streets of Georgetown, the mails are going awry, foodstuffs are in short supply, and the British Marines are on hand to head off torrid riots such as occurred there last year.

In Caracas, Venezuela, where Communist terrorists have carried on a campaign to destroy confidence in the Betancourt government, another instance of what police have to deal with occurred Tuesday.

Winston Bermudez Machado, a pro-Communist student, held for stealing \$500,000 worth of French impressionist paintings from a French Government exhibit in Caracas, obtained permission to enter a courthouse bathroom, before his trial, disguised himself there as a woman, and calmly walked out past his guards to freedom.

[From the Christian Science Monitor, Mar. 8, 1963]

CASTRO STIRS REVOLUTION

HAVANA.—Cuba's leaders are predicting that all Latin America will fall under the red banner of communism before long. For one, they believe the days of President Betancourt of Venezuela are numbered.

But their course of action has run into resistance from other Latin-American Communists who prefer peaceful coexistence for the moment.

In the words of the Cuban leaders, the times call for action, not theories. As Premier Fidel Castro's newspaper *Revolución* put it:

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"The situation (in the hemisphere) is not for sitting to ruminate brilliant concepts, but to make revolutions."

ACTION URGED

It was commenting on a speech by Premier Castro, urging more action and less talk in the drive for revolution. He also asked his admirers to "create subjective conditions" which would trigger the upheavals in Latin America, which he feels is ripe for them.

Marxist-Leninist theoreticians claim the working classes of a nation will eventually overthrow their exploiters and establish a dictatorship of the proletariat. These creeds were developed in the days of the European industrial revolution, giving little or no thought to Latin America.

There being no large proletariat in Latin America, the shortest way to a Red future is revolution, Cuban leaders feel.

BETANCOURT ASSAILED

Most followers of Premier Castro appear confident President Betancourt soon will fall. The armed forays of the "National Liberation Front" of Venezuela are prominently featured in the Havana press. The reader is left wondering what keeps President Betancourt in power.

Deputy Premier Raúl Castro has said "the Cuban revolution is the revolution of 200 million Latin Americans."

What Cuba is doing to export revolution in Latin America was indicated in a statement by John A. McCone, head of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, made public in Washington last week. Mr. McCone said from 1,000 to 1,500 went to Cuba in 1962 for training as guerrillas and more went this year. Mr. McCone said most came from Venezuela, Uruguay, Peru, Ecuador, Argentina, and Bolivia.

Many Western diplomats believe the Cuban leaders have told Communist parties in Latin America: either share Havana's revolution view and count on Cuban support or fall back on peaceful coexistence and lose Premier Castro's favor.

Premier Castro has already censured some unnamed parties who ignored his "Second Declaration of Havana," a document described as the "Castro-Communist manifesto of the Americas."

A diplomat illustrated it this way: "The future of the Cuban revolution depends on the fact that Cuba, 'first socialist country in the Americas, does not become the last one.'"

CAUTION INDICATED

Another one said that although voicing admiration for his movement, not many Latin American Communist Parties feel like following the Castro example. They prefer to live in peaceful coexistence with other parties, frequently forming "popular fronts."

It was noted last week that while Brazilian Peasant League leader, Francisco Julião, said there was "no other exit but armed struggle" in Latin America, Luis Prestes, secretary of Brazil's Communist Party, also in Havana at the time, chose to remain silent.

CALLED ANARCHISTS

Said a visiting Communist: "Since Stalin's death the Communist Parties in the Americas have worked to attain a political respectability. Most have been successful. Why change now?"

He mentioned the Venezuelan case, saying the Communists there stood in danger of being outlawed because of their identification with terrorists. He added quickly: "The Venezuelan party is not really Communist but anarchist. It lacks leadership."

Premier Castro was at odds with the Soviet Union on the handling of the Cuban crisis. The Russians could now be trying to avoid a collision on a question which could be discussed further on.

"Communists obey Moscow, and with their 40 years of experience in political matters will not follow blindly Havana's ism," said a visiting South American lawyer.

[From the Miami (Fla.) Herald, Jan. 13, 1963]

HALT GUERRILLAS, HONDURAS ASKED

MANAGUA, NICARAGUA.—The Government of Nicaragua has informally called on Honduras to eliminate what it described as a Castro guerrilla force there awaiting a chance to invade.

Nicaragua made no formal demand, but the statement reminded Honduras of its obligation. The communique said the Castro groups are distributing antigovernment propaganda in Nicaragua and using a small plane to sabotage canefields in Carazo Province.

Meanwhile, the head of the political party opposing the government criticized U.S. support of dictators such as President Luis Somoza, of Nicaragua.

Dr. Fernando Aguero said such support is partly to blame for the leftist inclinations of many university students.

Earlier this week, the Inter-American Human Rights Commission of the Organization of American States issued a statement which said it deplores Nicaragua's refusal to let the commission meet there this month.

The commission message added that it intended to determine whether human rights are being violated in Nicaragua, and that it particularly would keep an eye on the February elections.

[From Cuban Newsletter]

Castro is sending arms to the frontier regions of Brazil and Venezuela, for delivery to Red guerrillas, according to Scripps-Howard Editor Richard Boyce. The dispatch, datelined Georgetown, British Guiana, said 18 known airfields were receiving the hardware from Cuba, and many more are scattered in recondite jungle areas. American submachineguns, issued to Batista forces in 1958, showed up in the recent disturbances in British Guiana. They could only come from Cuba. This is precisely what President Kennedy said that the United States would not tolerate in the hemisphere. But there he is, tolerating.

TRIBUTE TO SENATOR KEATING

Mr. JORDAN of Idaho. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. KEATING. I yield.

Mr. JORDAN of Idaho. I congratulate the distinguished junior Senator from New York for his clear, concise statement in support of the ratification of the treaty.

I also wish to congratulate him on the anniversary, today, of the passage by Congress of the joint resolution on Cuba. We are all aware of the diligence and persistence with which the junior Senator from New York pursued this subject until the purpose was accomplished.

I also wish to commend him for ably filling the role of Chaplain yesterday morning, when he opened the Senate with prayer. The Senator from New York is an outstanding and worthwhile statesman.

Mr. KEATING. I am most grateful to my dear colleague for his kind remarks. They mean much to me.

FOREIGN SHIPMENTS TO CUBA

Mr. MAGNUSON. Mr. President, I have spoken several times since the beginning of this session of Congress about our problems in this hemisphere as they relate to shipments to the island of Cuba. At one time, the U.S. Government enforced a strong blockade, following the October 1962, incident with Cuba. Then

there was a relaxation, and an attempt was made to discourage ships of the free world from trading with Cuba. I must suggest it has been a serious attempt, with some progress made on the part of the administration, the Department of State, and the President. In many cases, the contracts for delivery had previously been made, and the ships were making deliveries.

The United States has notified the governments of the free world which allow their ships to enter Cuba that those ships would not be allowed to enter American ports and discharge or load American cargo.

This has had an effect on some nations and on some of the ships that had been entering Cuba. However, it does not affect all of them, because in many cases the ships do not come, or do not care to come, to United States ports. Some nations have joined with the United States in the attempt to discourage shipping to Cuba, and there has been a gradual enclosure of maritime activities into and out of the island by the nations of the free world, although not sufficient, so far as I personally am concerned, in accordance with my views. In all fairness, however, I must say that some progress has been made.

In many cases, the nations involved have little or no control over the ships that may be flying their flags. Sometimes a ship may fly the flag of Panama, of Greece, or of another country, yet never touch any of the ports of the country whose flag they fly or the country in which the ship is registered. So there are complexities.

However, I am hopeful that the nations of the free world will continue their efforts to discourage such shipping to the point where there will be a complete economic blockade, with perhaps only the rare exception of a shipment of medical supplies or similar shipments.

Some of the unions and union leaders, whom I mentioned in previous remarks concerning agreements that have been made for future relations in the maritime industry, have been urging their fellow workers in other parts of the world not to load ships destined for Cuba. There have been some memorable examples of refusal to load such ships. Nevertheless, the practice is still occurring.

Occasionally, I have placed in the Record, when the information has been made available to me, lists of ships from the free world that have been plying into and out of Cuba. I have listed the names of the ships, their gross tonnage, and the flags they fly. This information has been supplied not only for the benefit of Congress and the American people, but also for the benefit of representatives of those countries in Washington. Our hope has been that much more might be done to improve the situation than is being done.

Today I wish to place in the Record a list of free world and Polish-flag ships that have entered and departed from Cuba since January 1, 1963. The list contains the names of the ships, their tonnage, and their flag registry.

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The total number of ships, of all flags, is 175. Great Britain leads the field with 53. Greek-flag ships are right behind, with 52. Ships flying the Lebanese flag are not far behind, their number being 31.

Italian-flag ships numbered 10, Polish-flag ships 8, Yugoslavia ships 6, Norwegian-flag ships 5, Spanish-flag ships 3, Moroccan-flag ships 2, Swedish-flag ships 2, Finnish-flag ships 1, French-flag ships 1, and Japanese-flag ships 1.

Thus it can be seen that flags flying the British, Greek, and Lebanese flags account for more than 90 percent of all the ships that are trading with the Communist country of Cuba.

I ask unanimous consent that the statement entitled "List of Free World and Polish Flag Vessels Arriving in Cuba Since January 1, 1963," be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From Department of Commerce, Maritime Administration, Report No. 16]

LIST OF FREE WORLD- AND POLISH-FLAG VESSELS ARRIVING IN CUBA SINCE JANUARY 1, 1963

SECTION 1. Pursuant to the national security action memorandum No. 220, dated February 5, 1963, addressed to the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; the Secretary of Agriculture; the Secretary of Commerce; the Administrator, Agency for International Development; and the Administrator, General Services Administration, concerning U.S. Government shipments by foreign-flag vessels in the Cuban trade, the Maritime Administration is making available to the appropriate Departments the following list of vessels which have arrived in Cuba since January 1, 1963, based on information received through September 6, 1963, exclusive of those vessels that called at Cuba on U.S. Government-approved noncommercial voyages and those listed in section 2:

Flag of registry and name of ship

	Gross tonnage
Total, all flags (175 ships) -	1,391,301
British (53 ships) -	400,273
Ardgem	6,981
Ardmore	4,664
Ardowan	7,300
Arlington Court	9,662
Athelcrown (tanker)	11,149
Athelduke (tanker)	9,089
Athelmere (tanker)	7,524
Athelmonarch (tanker)	11,182
Athelsultan (tanker)	9,149
Avisfaith	7,868
Baxtergate	8,813
Cedar Hill	7,156
Chipbee	7,271
Dalren ¹	4,939
East Breeze	8,708
Fir Hill	7,119
Grosvenor Mariner	7,026
Hazelmoor	7,907
Ho Fung	7,121
Inchstaffa	5,255
Ivy Fair (now Cosmo Trader)	7,201
Kirriemoor	5,923
Linkmoor	8,236
London Confidence (tanker)	21,699
London Glory (tanker)	10,081
London Harmony (tanker)	13,157
London Independence (tanker)	22,643
London Majesty (tanker)	12,132
London Pride (tanker)	10,776
London Spirit (tanker) ¹	10,176
London Splendour (tanker)	16,195

Footnotes at end of table.

Flag of registry and name of ship—Continued

	Gross tonnage
British—Continued	
London Valour (tanker) ¹	16,268
London Victory (tanker)	12,132
Lord Gladstone	11,299
Maratha Enterprise	7,166
Oceantramp	6,186
Oceantravel	10,477
Overseas Explorer (tanker)	16,267
Overseas Pioneer (tanker)	16,267
Redbrook	7,388
Shienfoon	7,127
Silverforce	8,058
Silverlake	8,058
Stanwear ¹	8,108
Suva Breeze	4,970
Thames Breeze	7,878
Tulse Hill	7,120
Vercharmian	7,265
Vermont	7,381
West Breeze	8,718
Yungfutary	5,388
Yunglutaton	5,414
Zela M.	7,237

Greek (52 ships) - 403,577

Aegalon	7,239
Agios Therapon	5,617
Akastos	7,331
Aldebaran (tanker)	12,897
Alice	7,189
Americana	7,104
Anacreon	7,359
Antonia	5,171
Apollon	9,744
Armathia	7,091
Athanassios K.	7,216
Barbarino	7,084
Calliopi Michalos	7,249
Capetan Petros	7,291
Despolina	5,006
Efcharis	7,249
Eftychia	7,223
Embassy	8,418
Everest	7,031
Flora M ¹	7,244
Gallini	7,266
Gloria	7,128
Hydratos III	5,239
Istros II	7,275
Katingo	7,349
Kostis ¹	7,264
Kyra Hariklia	6,888
Maria de Lourdes	7,219
Maria Santa	7,217
Maria Theresa	7,245
Maroudio	7,369
Mastro-Stellios II	7,282
Nicholaos Frangistas	7,199
North Empress	10,904
North Queen	9,341
Pamit	3,929
Pantanassa	7,131
Paxoi	7,144
Penelope	6,712
Perseus (tanker)	15,852
Polaris	9,603
Pollux	9,956
Polyxeni	7,143
Propontis	7,128
Redestos	5,911
Selrios	7,239
Sirius (tanker)	16,241
Styllanos N. Vlassopoulos	7,244
Timios Stavros	5,269
Tina	7,362
Vassiliki (tanker) ¹	10,507
Western Trader	9,268

Lebanese (31 ships) - 209,222

Aiolos II	7,266
Akamas	7,285
Alaska	6,989
Anthas	7,044
Antonis	6,259
Areti ¹	7,176
Astir	5,324
Aristeif	6,995

Flag of registry and name of ship—Continued

	Gross tonnage
Lebanese—Continued	
Carnation	4,884
Dimos	7,187
Giorgos Tsakiroglou	7,240
Granikos	7,282
Ilena	5,925
Ioannis Aspiotis	7,297
Kalliope D. Lemos	5,103
Malou	7,145
Mantric	7,255
Mersinidi	6,782
Mousse	6,984
Noelle	7,251
Noemi	7,070
Olga	7,199
Panagos	7,133
Parmarina	6,721
Razani	7,253
St. Anthony	5,349
St. Nicholas	7,165
San John	5,172
San Spyridon	7,260
Tertric	7,045
Vassiliki	7,192

Italian (10 ships) - 76,816

Achille	6,950
Airon	6,969
Annalisa	2,479
Arenella	7,183
Aspromonte ¹	7,154
Cannaregio	7,184
Linda Giovanna (tanker)	9,985
Nazareno	7,173
San Nicola (tanker)	12,461
Santa Lucia ¹	9,278

Italian (10 ships) - 76,816

Baltyk	6,963
Bialystok	7,173
Bytom	5,967
Chopin	6,987
Chorzow	7,237
Kopalnia Miechowice	7,223
Kopalnia Slernianowice	7,165
Piast	3,184

Yugoslav (6 ships) - 42,810

Bar	7,233
Cavtat	7,266
Cetinje	7,200
Dugi Otok	6,997
Promina	6,960
Trebinjica	7,145

Norwegian (5 ships) - 54,502

Kongsgaard (tanker)	19,999
Lovdal (tanker)	12,764
Ole Bratt	5,252
Polycipper (tanker)	11,737
Tine (now Jezrell)	4,750

Spanish (3 ships) - 5,564

Castillo Ampudia	3,566
Sierra Madre	999
Sierra Maria	999

Moroccan (2 ships) - 19,140

Atlas	10,392
Toubkal	8,748

Swedish (2 ships) - 14,295

Dagmar	6,490
Atlantic Friend	7,805

Finnish (1 ship): Valny (tanker)	11,691
French (1 ship): Circe ¹	2,874
Japanese (1 ship): Meishun Maru	8,647

¹ Added to report No. 15 appearing in the Federal Register issue of August 30, 1963.

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SEC. 2. In accordance with the provisions of national security action memorandum No. 220 of February 5, 1963, the following vessels which called at Cuba after January 1, 1963, have reacquired eligibility to carry U.S. Government-financed cargoes from the United States by virtue of the persons who control the vessels having given satisfactory certification, and assurance that no ships under their control will, thenceforth, be employed in the Cuba trade so long as it remains the policy of the U.S. Government to discourage such trade:

- (a) Since last report: None.
(b) Previous reports:

Flag of registry:	Number of ships
British.....	2
Danish.....	1
German (West).....	1
Greek.....	1
Norwegian.....	1

SEC. 3. The ships listed in sections 1 and 2 have made the following number of trips to Cuba in 1963, based on information received through September 6, 1963:

Flag of registry	Number of trips									
	Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May	June	July	Aug.	Sept.	Total
British.....	5	8	8	17	13	15	14	11	1	92
Greek.....	4	6	8	8	17	12	17	6		78
Lebanese.....	1		2	8	8	9	8	3	1	40
Norwegian.....		2	4		1	2	1	2		12
Italian.....	1	1	1	2	3	2	2	1		13
Yugoslav.....		2		1	1		1	1		8
Spanish.....			2				1	1		4
Danish.....			1							1
Finnish.....						1				1
French.....									1	1
German (West).....					1					1
Japanese.....	1									1
Moroccan.....			1			1	1	1		4
Swedish.....				1		1		1		3
Subtotal.....	12	19	29	37	44	43	45	27	3	259
Polish.....	2	1	1	2	2	2	1	1		12
Grand total.....	14	20	30	39	46	45	46	28	3	271

NOTE.—Trip totals in this section exceed ship totals in sections 1 and 2 because some of the ships made more than one trip to Cuba.

Dated: September 10, 1963.

GEORGE R. GRIFFITHS,

Acting Deputy Maritime Administrator.

THE NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY

The Senate resumed the consideration of Executive M (88th Cong., 1st sess.), the treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and underwater.

Mr. JORDAN of Idaho. Mr. President, I rise today to take myself out of the ranks of the "uncommitted," with reference to the question of Senate approval of the test ban treaty, and to announce that I intend to vote "nay" on this question.

I take this position with great reluctance, because I have sincerely hoped that in good conscience I could support the treaty. No one is more eager than I for a relaxation of world tensions and for a step—however small—toward peace with honor. And I would gladly vote for approval of this treaty if it provided for adequate inspection.

Even though the vote, as always, will be determined by the yeas and nays, the doubts and the uncertainties and the hopes and the prayers do not lend themselves to a clearcut decision. All we can hope for is that the weight of the decision will best be borne by each Senator as his own conscience dictates. Even though this issue divides us, our common objective is an enduring peace.

For more than a week the Senate has been engaged in debate on the question of Senate approval of this treaty—perhaps the most important and far-reaching question to be before this body since World War II. Both the proponents and the opponents of the treaty have

been heard; many speeches have been made, and many pledges, either for or against the treaty, have been given.

Many Senators who have taken the Senate floor to speak either for or against the treaty have eminently more knowledge than I have about the present military posture of our country, how it compares with that of the Soviet Union, and the effect the treaty could have on its future.

Not having served on any Senate committee which dealt directly with the treaty, I found myself in a position comparable in many ways to that of a layman who would be called upon to make a decision as to how to cast his vote. To compensate for this, I have done what I am sure all other Senators have done—read all the testimony available to me; spoken at length with men such as Ambassador Averell Harriman, an avid supporter of treaty; and talked as much as possible with men such as Dr. Edward Teller, a dedicated and sincere opponent of the treaty in its present form.

Because I always like to approach a problem positively, I began making a list of all the reasons why this country should, with the advice and consent of the Senate, become a party to this treaty. That was—and still is—an almost impossible job, although not for the reason some may think—namely, that the list is long and involved with many explanations. On the contrary, the list is extremely short; and the advantages involved almost defy definition in plain English, and are qualified time after time. For the most part, even those who espouse these reasons seem to have grave doubts about their credibility.

My list was gleaned primarily from the testimony given before the Foreign Relations Committee. Incidentally, I would venture to guess that out of some 1010 pages of testimony and statements,

not more than 75 widely-scattered pages are devoted to reasons why we should approve this treaty. All the rest deal with refuting, examining, explaining away, and delineating the many disadvantages that could accrue to this country. This fact alone is quite significant. We have had no problem of finding out what the treaty does not do; the problem has been in pinpointing just what it does do.

Here is my list of the things its proponents say it does:

First. The treaty will help contain the spread of nuclear weapons.

Second. The treaty will help slow down the arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Third. The treaty will ease tension in the world and create a better atmosphere that would be conducive to the establishment of peace, in contrast to a nuclear war; or—as stated differently by some proponents, but essentially the same thing—the treaty will open up new paths toward future agreements between the free world and the Communist world.

Fourth. The treaty must be approved by the Senate, because its rejection at this point would cause world opinion to turn violently against the United States. It is practically impossible to find this reason stated in plain language by any backers of the treaty. But, in my opinion, it is one of the most important of all the threads which run throughout all the proponents' thinking.

Fifth. The treaty will reduce the radioactive pollution of the planet.

Mr. President, let us examine, one by one, the five points put forward by the proponents.

I ask my colleagues to bear in mind that each time I shall quote a statement in regard to these five points, it will be a statement made by a proponent of the treaty. If I had wanted to refute these five points, I could have found many statements to do that. I could have turned to what the distinguished senior Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL] has said. As the highly respected and eminently capable chairman of the Armed Services Committee for many years, his opinion in U.S. military matters is seldom challenged. Or I could have quoted another great Senator, the junior Senator from Mississippi [Mr. STENNIS], who, as chairman of the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee, has for many months been holding hearings on the whole realm of a test ban treaty. Also, I could have leaned on the many sound statements made by a member of my own political party, the Senator from Arizona [Mr. GOLDWATER], who, as a major general in the Air Force Reserve, is also knowledgeable in such matters.

I did not do this.

My intent is to be as objective as possible. So I turned to the testimony of high-ranking officials, competent scientists, and dedicated military leaders who, I knew, favored this test ban treaty. I wanted to see what they thought the treaty really would do—what they listed on the "pro" side of the ledger. I shall now proceed to state what some of these proponents say in reference to the five things the treaty is purported to do:

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The first argument of the proponents is that the treaty will help contain the spread of nuclear weapons.

Mr. President, let us examine the record.

Secretary Rusk said:

We cannot guarantee it. Most of the countries with the capacity and the incentive to develop nuclear weapons over the next decade or so have already announced that they will accept the self-denying ordinance of the treaty. These countries do not include, by the way, mainland China or France.

Mr. Rusk was evidently not completely convinced.

Secretary McNamara said:

The treaty does not cover the subject of proliferation. That is clear. The treaty relates to nuclear tests and certain prohibited environments.

If the treaty does not cover the subject of proliferation of nuclear weapons, how could it even begin to deal effectively with this problem?

General LeMay said, in answer to a question about what influence the treaty would have on the stoppage of a proliferation of nuclear weapons:

I think it possibly would, among the countries that have no serious programs on them. I don't think it is going to stop the Chinese from going on with their program. Certainly it is not going to stop the French from going on with their program.

So I believe this interpretation to be something less than wholehearted support on a most significant point.

Other articulate proponents of the treaty have said they believed the role of the treaty in inhibiting proliferation has been generally overestimated. They have pointed out that most of the countries who have signed the test ban have neither the capacity nor the desire to develop nuclear weapons.

My conclusion on this point had to be that if, indeed, the treaty would have any effect on the further proliferation of nuclear weapons, such an effect would be so small as to be almost negligible—so small that the proponents had not been able to support the statement beyond reasonable doubt.

The second argument of the proponents is that the treaty will help slow down the arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Mr. President, if that is true, this indeed would be an admirable objective.

Secretary Rusk said:

This treaty itself does not reduce weapons in being or prevent their further production. This treaty is aimed only at the question of nuclear explosions. I regret myself that it has not been possible to make greater headway in some actual physical disarmament measures consistent with our own security.

But this treaty is not a step in that direction—this treaty is not itself dealing with that problem. It may turn out to be one small step that opens up some possibilities in this field but that has not yet become apparent.

Secretary McNamara said, in almost the same breath when he was talking about more money for defense and the continued military preparedness of our country:

This treaty . . . will not reduce the existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons. It

will not halt the production of nuclear weapons. It will not prevent qualitative weapons improvement of many kinds.

The testimony on this point leaves little more than a slender hope.

The third argument of the proponents is that the treaty will ease tension in the world and create a better atmosphere that would be conducive to the establishment of peace in contrast to a nuclear war; or, stated differently by some proponents, this treaty will open up new paths toward future agreements between the free world and the Communist world.

Secretary Rusk, this Nation's highest ranking diplomat, said:

If it should work to reduce those tensions, as I think that it well might, and if it makes it possible to consider additional points of agreement carefully considered and thoughtfully worked out on both sides, then I think that there could be a reduction in the real danger of nuclear war. But I do want to say, sir, that we are not over the divide on this, and anything that we say on this could be wrong tomorrow morning at 9 o'clock.

Again, later in his testimony, he said:

But I might have misled the committee a little bit in my earlier remarks, because when I said that I thought they [the Russians] were ready to explore the possibility of agreement on other points, that still is subject to the great reservation: On what terms.

And I must say that I do not see ahead of us in the immediate future agreements on some of these major and dangerous issues on terms that could really be agreed by the two sides . . .

The gap is very wide.

General LeMay, in answer to whether or not we would be closer to or further from nuclear war if the treaty were not ratified, said:

I don't think we are any farther or any closer to a nuclear war with or without the test ban treaty.

Later, the general continued:

If it leads to additional steps to reduce tension, then I think you would have to say that we withdraw from the possibilities of war.

But in itself alone, I don't think it is enough of weight to say it has changed the situation at all.

Again, I find the testimony hanging on a thread of hope.

We do not create the tensions. The Soviets do. They have taken not even one small step to relax tensions. It is even possible that, under the treaty, tensions might be increased rather than diminished. Are we not pledged to continue the perfection of our weapons system under limitations imposed on us by the treaty—not knowing when or where other signers—or nonsigners—will, by their deceit or aggression, force us to withdraw?

The fourth point of the proponents is as follows: This treaty must be ratified by the Senate because its rejection at this point would cause world opinion to turn violently against the United States.

Secretary Rusk said:

I think there would be very great regret if this treaty were to collapse.

But, on the other hand, where we are dealing with a security matter that goes to the life of our own country, I do not believe

that world opinion can play a decisive role. We must do what has to be done, and I believe that the rest of the world will understand. . . .

I think that there would be general understanding, even if with great regret, there would be general understanding if we came to the conclusion that this treaty was not working and that our security required us to resume testing.

General Wheeler, in response to a question as to whether or not his decision to back the treaty had been influenced by the fact the treaty had already been signed, said:

It undoubtedly introduces a new factor. On the other hand, insofar as affecting the overall military security of the United States, it has no bearing whatsoever. And the primary concern of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is to point out dangers to our security—those which are acceptable, and those which are not.

In later testimony, he took a slightly different tack:

I would agree that world opinion has built up to the point where there would be very sizable political implications if the United States were to dash these hopes. I am not prepared to say exactly what the effect of those political implications or the political effect would be, but I do not think it would be good.

General LeMay had a somewhat different opinion about the importance of what the rest of the world thought regarding ratification. This evidently had colored his own ultimate decision on the test ban treaty. At this point, so that it cannot be said that I am quoting the general out of context in any way, I would like to repeat a dialog between him and the able Senator from South Carolina [Mr. THURMOND]:

Senator THURMOND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General LeMay, Senator GOLDWATER asked a question similar to one I propounded in the Preparedness Subcommittee. That is this: If the proposed treaty had not already been signed, but was being considered in a proposal stage, would you recommend that the United States sign the treaty?

General LEMAY. I haven't given any thought to the subject, Senator. I said I would—I thought I would not be in favor of it. But I wouldn't even want to give an unqualified "No" until I spent some time on it. Certainly this was a factor that influenced me in recommending that we ratify it. How much weight I would give to it—I would want to spend a considerable amount of time on this, and I have not done so.

Senator THURMOND. I believe your answer in the subcommittee, and I quote, was this: "I think that if we were in a proposal stage that I would not recommend—that I would recommend against it."

That is correct, is it not?

General LEMAY. I think I would. That is correct.

I do not like the suggestion of outside pressures. My feelings on this are expressed for me much better than I myself can do by a recent column written by David Lawrence entitled "Too Late for Senate To Advise."

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have this article included in the Record at this point in my remarks.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

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[From the Evening Star, Washington, D.C.,
Aug. 20, 1963]

TOO LATE FOR SENATE TO ADVISE
(By David Lawrence)

The Constitution says the President "shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties."

There is no evidence that the text of the limited nuclear test ban treaty signed in Moscow recently was ever submitted in advance to the Senate so that it could tender its advice before the document was signed.

There is no evidence, either, that the text was shown to all the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff before it was initialed and then signed at Moscow. Gen. Curtis LeMay, Chief of the U.S. Air Force, told a Senate committee yesterday that "I think I would have been against" the treaty if it had not already been signed. He added that "the fact that it has been signed had an effect on me, yes," because "there might be some political disadvantage if we don't ratify it."

This frank observation indicates clearly that, once the signature of the executive branch of the Government has been affixed to a treaty, there is really no opportunity to render advice. The Senate, for instance, can only ratify or reject. There is no chance to amend or modify the terms except by a new negotiation, which, of course, is difficult and often impractical.

So Senator BARRY GOLDWATER, of Arizona, Republican, was right in his speech last Friday night at the University of Wisconsin when he characterized the support of the Joint Chiefs for the nuclear treaty as a political evaluation. He said:

"And what they [the Joint Chiefs of Staff] have to say, and have said, must be weighed independent of the political decision which guided the formal statement of the Joint Chiefs. Why do I say that a political decision guided that statement? Aren't the Joint Chiefs supposed to be free of political pressure? I submit, in answer, the summation of their own report. It flatly says: 'There are military disadvantages to the treaty.' But they conclude by saying that 'the risks inherent in this treaty can be accepted in order to seek the important gains which may be achieved through a stabilization of international relations and a move toward a peaceful environment in which to seek resolution of our differences.'"

"The mention of risks, I say, is a conscientious military evaluation. The decision that the risks are acceptable is not. It is an echo of a State Department evaluation and not of one that necessarily sounds very deeply the real evaluations of our professional military men."

The official statement of the Joint Chiefs of Staff says pointedly that the risks inherent in the treaty can be accepted "if adequate safeguards are established." Now the debate has begun as to what the "safeguards" are and where the responsibility for providing them is to be placed. General LeMay testified that no one has said as yet what safeguards would be provided. Two Senate committees have asked that the administration provide a "bill of particulars."

Senator RICHARD RUSSELL, of Georgia, chairman of the Armed Services Committee, also asked the chiefs of the Army, the Navy, and the Marine Corps whether they would have approved the treaty "in the absence of these safeguards," and each replied that he would not have done so. In answer to a question from Senator BOURKE HICKENLOOPER, of Iowa, Republican, General LeMay said that "if you automatically cut off the political factors, there are net disadvantages from a military standpoint" to the United States.

While the Joint Chiefs are reported to have been kept informed in a general way from time to time about the course of the

test ban negotiations, General LeMay testified that he was surprised at the administration's speed in hastening the final agreement toward the end. As for voicing objections, General LeMay declared that once the pact was initialed or about to be, he doubted very much "that any of us would have gone to the President at that stage of the game."

Secretary of State Rusk, at a news conference last Friday, was asked whether there wasn't "an unresolved difference in this Government" on the treaty, and he replied: "I'm not sure that I would call such a difference unresolved. After all, the executive branch is headed by the President of the United States."

This is tantamount to saying that, despite the military expertness of the members of the Joint Chiefs in their respective fields, they can be and are overruled by the President and by his civilian advisers who can place political experimentalism in international affairs above the necessary safeguards against nuclear advances by an adversary state.

The Senate is today presented with a "take it or leave it" proposition. The upper House of Congress, which is a joint partner with the President in treaty-making, wasn't afforded an opportunity to give its advice before the treaty was signed. Now the treaty will have to be ratified, or else the Senate will be placed in the position of taking full responsibility for the consequences in the field of diplomacy. If, on the other hand, Russia chooses to cheat or abrogate—as General LeMay says might happen—it will be too late to argue about political factors or net military disadvantages of a treaty which may have put the United States behind in the nuclear-arms race.

Mr. JORDAN of Idaho. The next point of the proponents is as follows: This treaty will reduce the radioactive pollution of the planet.

This consideration weighs heavily on my mind and conscience. This is the real purpose of the test ban treaty, at least as far as our country and the free world is concerned.

Mr. President, I want the record clear on this one point. For many years I have been concerned about the question of fallout, as have people all over the world. One thought I have always had in mind is this: It is bad enough that we might possibly endanger the lives of our own future generations here in America with our atmospheric nuclear testing, but what is worse is the fact that we, at the same time, could be endangering the lives of future generations in other countries which have no control over what the United States does. Somehow, this has never seemed quite fair to me, and it still does not seem equitable.

This is quite a consideration to weigh on any pair of scales—even if it is being balanced against all the risks involved in our entering into this test ban treaty.

I agree that the most compelling argument of the proponents is this contention that radioactive fallout will be reduced by the treaty. With six grandchildren under 7 years of age, how could I fail to be moved by this argument? I readily admit a deep and abiding concern on this issue.

My one reservation here—and it is very grave—is this:

In order to obtain a temporary relief from fallout, are we jeopardizing the

perfection of a weapons system that will prevent the surprise attack?

Are we jeopardizing the perfection of a weapons system that all the world will recognize as one which could survive such an attack to retaliate with the complete annihilation of our attacker?

The essence of the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee interim report is very significant. It is:

No safeguards can provide the benefits of testing where testing is not permitted, nor can they assure that this Nation will acquire the highest quality weapons systems of which it is capable when the means for achieving that objective are denied.

Mr. President, on Wednesday of last week, after we had listened to the distinguished minority leader [Mr. DIRKSEN] make a most persuasive and, as always, eloquent speech, in favor of ratification, the Senator from Nebraska [Mr. CURTIS] posed this question to the Senator from Illinois:

The Senator asked, would "it not be possible for another Senator to attend the same meetings, hear the same testimony, read the same documents, possess an equal sincerity of purpose, and yet arrive at a different conclusion from that reached by" another Senator?

The distinguished Senator from Illinois answered thusly:

Absolutely. That is what makes the world the great world that it is. We can listen to testimony, come to different conclusions about it, and do so honestly and sincerely.

During this week, a great deal of the debate here in the Senate has centered on this one situation—that two Senators can take the same facts and come up with opposite conclusions. The positions taken by the seven members of the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee are examples of this situation. Three of those seven Senators have declared against the treaty; three others have declared in favor of it; and if my facts are still accurate, the seventh is still uncommitted.

In all the testimony that has been heard and in all the speeches that have been made—

First. No responsible official has based his recommendations on the view that basic Soviet purposes have changed. To the contrary, we have heard constant references to statements by Khrushchev that he will bury us, and even the President has warned that this treaty should in no way make us think that the goal of communism has changed.

Genuine fear has been expressed that the so-called rift between the Soviet Union and Red China may be, by and large, a hoax. As our beloved minority leader said earlier when the treaty was first initialed in Moscow, "What has Khrushchev done besides smile?" He has not withdrawn his troops from Cuba; he has not relaxed the Berlin situation; he has not made concessions toward free elections in satellite countries like Hungary and Poland.

Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. JORDAN of Idaho. I yield to the Senator from Wyoming.

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Mr. SIMPSON. I should like to ask the distinguished Senator from Idaho a question with respect to the so-called rift between the Soviet Union and China, which may be a hoax, to which he has addressed himself in his last remark. The Senator said, referring to Khrushchev:

He has not withdrawn his troops from Cuba; he has not relaxed the Berlin situation; he has not made concessions toward free elections in satellite countries like Hungary and Poland.

Is it not true, in spite of all this, that Russia has maintained its aggressiveness, even in the form of this treaty?

Mr. JORDAN of Idaho. It has. It has increased tension, rather than relieved it.

Mr. SIMPSON. Does the Senator agree that the Russian Government has kept its aggressiveness and has not lost any of its activity with the people of the world, so far as the image of Russia is concerned?

Mr. JORDAN of Idaho. I fully agree with my distinguished colleague. I thank him for his question.

Mr. President, we are talking about Khrushchev.

What has he done?

He has boasted to his friend Tito that this treaty is a victory for the Communists. Perhaps we are entering a new era of togetherness, but the goals of communism have not changed. How, then, can a victory for the Communists be at the same time victory for the United States? I do not think it can.

Second. No responsible official has disputed the view that in the future, as in the past, our national security will depend on, among other things, a favorable military position. And with whom does the responsibility lie for assuring this Nation a favorable military position?

Not with Russia; not with Great Britain; not with any other country in the world. If we are to maintain a favorable military position, it is the responsibility of only our Government and our country. If we do not look after ourselves, surely none of us, in our weakest or most optimistic moments, would expect anyone else to look out for us.

Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. JORDAN of Idaho. I am happy to yield again to the Senator from Wyoming.

Mr. SIMPSON. I invite the attention of the Senator from Idaho to the fact that we have depended upon our military strength, throughout all the years since the inception of what I call the "United Slave States of Russia." We have depended on our military superiority and our military experts to keep us free from communism and to prevent the domination of the world by communism.

Does the Senator feel that the treaty would do that, in the light of the testimony by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and many others that there are military disadvantages involved in it?

Mr. JORDAN of Idaho. I wish I could say that I believe the treaty offers that solace and that protection, but I regret that I cannot say it about this treaty.

Mr. SIMPSON. I have arrived at the same conclusion. It seems fantastic that we should disregard the entire history of military preparedness and military containment of the Communist threat to the whole world, in a matter of such importance as this, by suddenly deciding that the political advantages outweigh the military advantages. To me that is arriving at the wrong conclusion. How does the Senator feel about it?

Mr. JORDAN of Idaho. I agree. I could not agree more with my distinguished friend. I have arrived at the same conclusion.

Mr. SIMPSON. I thank the Senator. Mr. JORDAN of Idaho. Mr. President, I continue my remarks.

Third. No responsible official has rested the case for the treaty on a belief that the Soviet Government can be trusted. Senator after Senator has taken the floor to point out the number of times treaties with the Soviet Union have been broken by the Soviets when it best served their purposes to do so. How can anyone believe that, in this one isolated instance, the Soviet Union can be trusted to keep its word?

Are we not all, deep down in our hearts, approaching this treaty with one thought in mind—the treaty will only be in effect until the time comes when the Russians find it to their advantage to break it? Is there really a man in this Senate Chamber who does not feel that it will be the Russians—in their own good time—who will finally abrogate this treaty? And when they do, what will be our military posture at that time?

Fourth. Secretary of Defense McNamara and the Joint Chiefs have testified that the balance of military power is in our favor at the present time. This is the consensus. Would we have it any other way?

Would we ever put our Nation in the position of being second to Russia—or second to any other nation—in military power? Or would we ever even put our Nation in a position where this could possibly happen? I do not think that, knowingly, any of us would.

Pearl Harbors do not happen to nation which are prepared.

Pearl Harbors do not happen to nations which are vigilant.

Pearl Harbors happen to nations which have allowed themselves to be lulled into a false complacency.

Time was on our side then. The 18 months required to tool up our great industrial plants to an all-out war effort will not be available to us in this modern age.

More than likely, this 18 months will have shrunk to 18 minutes or less.

It is a good thing—it is a vital thing—that both opponents and proponents of this treaty, almost down to the very man, have chosen to warn us of that newly recognized state known as "euphoria."

Fifth. When we come to the question of what effects the treaty will have on the future balance of military power—I repeat: on the future balance of military power—there we enter a more controversial area. Secretary McNamara assures us that nothing in the treaty will shift the present balance. However, the

Joint Chiefs are on record as seeing net military disadvantages—but in the long run none so serious as to render the treaty unacceptable.

How disadvantageous does a disadvantage have to be before it is "unacceptable"?

Mr. RUSSELL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. JORDAN of Idaho. I am happy to yield to the distinguished Senator from Georgia.

Mr. RUSSELL. I shall be compelled to leave the Chamber soon. If the Senator will permit, I wish to extend to him my hearty commendations on his decision and on his very able explanation of his reasons for reaching that decision.

It takes a high degree of moral and political courage to breast the stampede which is taking place in this country today, led by practically all the leaders of both political parties who are nationally known.

It not only is led by those officials and former officials whose names are recognized in every household, but it has the support of most of the commentators, columnists, and newspaper editorialists of the great metropolitan press.

I share the Senator's feeling when he says he hopes events will prove that he is in error. I hope and pray that the future will show that I have been in error in taking the position that has placed me with the small group with which the Senator from Idaho has aligned himself today.

I could not but be concerned with the fact that yesterday in the United Nations Mr. Gromyko again brought forth his program for disarmament, with self-inspection, reducing and finally abolishing all nuclear weapons, without suggesting any way of inspection to establish performance. The Russians have not changed their position. We become exhausted and gradually accept theirs.

It is sad to reflect that in 1946 we had a complete monopoly in atomic material and nuclear weapons, and we offered all of those weapons, the results of all of the great expenditures we had incurred in their production into the hands of an international agency, if the other nations of the earth would agree not to make atomic weapons and would agree to a system of inspection.

Seventeen years later, we have not only lost our monopoly but the Senate is considering a treaty that would tie our hands to achieve equality that surrenders any pretense of inspection within the confines of our potential enemy that has already surpassed us in many aspects of the development of nuclear weapons, and sets the stage for the final tragedy of disarmament by agreement without any inspection, and depending alone on the good faith of nations to monitor themselves.

It is a sad commentary on the statesmanship of this country that within these few years we have fallen from a complete monopoly to the point where we now see a national stampede to accept a treaty that does not even provide for any inspection, but gives to our only dangerous potential enemy, the only nation we have to fear, and freezes for it,

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the advantages that nation has over us, and enables that nation to carry on programs to overcome the slight advantages we have over it in the area of tactical weapons.

I hope and pray that the Senator from Idaho and the Senator from Georgia are completely in error; but my study of history, my knowledge of human nature; and what I know about the aims of international communism, all lead me to the sorrowful conclusion that the minority in this body today will be proved to be right in the future.

I commend the Senator for his fine statement.

Mr. JORDAN of Idaho. I thank the eminent and distinguished Senator, the chairman of the Armed Services Committee, a man who no doubt commands as high a regard as any Member of this body, if not a higher regard. I am pleased indeed to have the Senator's gracious remarks. I am in full accord with the statement he has just made and with the very comprehensive argument he presented on the floor of the Senate several days ago.

IN SUMMARY

In summary—and anything I would say at this time would be an anticlimax after listening to the very fine statement of the senior Senator from Georgia—I wish to say that in the scales of global affairs, our Nation must function with certain political handicaps which are widely acclaimed throughout the world:

First. We will not strike the first blow.

Second. We do not break treaties for expediency.

Third. It is well known to other nations that ours is an open society. On the contrary, the Iron Curtain protects a closed society.

To counterbalance these political handicaps, I must conclude:

First. Test bans or armament reduction negotiations can only be acceptable to us under full inspection guarantees.

Second. Without full inspection our best chance for survival as a Nation is to maintain a competent weapons superiority and a national determination to annihilate any aggressor who dares to strike the first blow.

Third. This military competence and this national will must be understood by all the world. This message must go out to them loud and unmistakably clear.

I can only hope and pray that, with the passage of time, the doubts and apprehensions that impel me to vote "No" on this treaty will prove to be groundless and unwarranted.

Mr. CURTIS. Mr. President, will the distinguished Senator from Idaho yield?

Mr. JORDAN of Idaho. I yield to the Senator from Nebraska.

Mr. CURTIS. I want to say to the Senator from Idaho that never in my almost 25 years in the Congress of the United States have I heard a better and more reasoned speech. The Senator has approached this matter objectively and with an open mind. He has quoted the testimony of the proponents in a light that is fair to them and that truly reflects their statements and he has concluded not to support the treaty.

In a sense, this is a unique speech. I read it, and I listened to every word. It is a convincing speech. It is a clear demonstration of the qualities of mind and character of the Senator from Idaho in approaching this question with one paramount desire, and that is to arrive at the right answer.

I congratulate the Senator on the position he has taken and his position on the vote on the treaty. I think he has resolved all doubts in favor of the United States. He is right. He should be commended for it. I question nobody else's motives, but that is the only question at stake in this whole proceeding—What is best for our own country?

I congratulate the Senator on his statement.

Mr. JORDAN of Idaho. I thank the Senator. His words are more than I deserve. His own remarks at an earlier time have been a most constructive feature of the debate on this issue.

Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. JORDAN of Idaho. I yield to the Senator from Wyoming.

Mr. SIMPSON. I wish to associate myself with the remarks of the distinguished Senator from Nebraska [Mr. CURTIS]. The speech of the Senator from Idaho is one of the outstanding speeches that have been delivered in the Senate during this debate.

We have been told by the military that we have a so-called second-strike concept in America and have rested secure in this knowledge over the years. As the Senator so ably pointed out, we are committed to no aggression and to not making the first strike, ourselves. We have been told for many years, under the tutelage of the military, which has protected us from the threat of communism abroad, that we have had a second-strike capability. In other words, if Russia should loose upon us nuclear weapons, we would counterattack and hit before she could deliver a second strike, and we could annihilate her before she could get in a second strike, and have enough left over to annihilate Red China, too.

Does the Senator believe that under this treaty we are jeopardizing the second-strike concept?

Mr. JORDAN of Idaho. I fully agree with the Senator that we are jeopardizing the second-strike concept.

I think there is a danger about which I did not speak in my prepared address.

There is the danger that the first strike might be of such a nature as to immobilize our ability to retaliate.

Mr. SIMPSON. The Senator is entirely correct. Does the Senator recall reading an article published in "Rockets and Missiles," wherein experts revealed to us that the so-called electromagnetic pulse or EMP could paralyze or deactivate all of our Minutemen and Titan and other missiles in one massive strike?

Mr. JORDAN of Idaho. I recall the article. It was so frightening that I did not feel competent to enter into a discussion in that scientific field.

Mr. SIMPSON. I was interested in the remark of the Senator from Georgia

when he said that he hoped he was wrong. I join him and the Senator from Idaho in that hope. I believe that the Senator from Idaho and I are undoubtedly two of the closest personal friends in the Senate. I join in the prayerful hope that we are entirely mistaken. It would be little solace to us if we were proved to be right, because no history may survive to record our being right. I would not want to be recorded right under those circumstances. I hope we are wrong. I share the misgivings of the Senator from Idaho, and I share his fear of entering into a treaty into which no safeguards have been written.

The Senator knows that the preamble to the treaty calls for total demobilization or disarmament. That statement is contained in the preamble itself.

I am discouraged by the prospect of our entering into such a treaty, with no safeguards of the kind that should be written into it.

I commend the Senator for the very able address he has delivered. He has not challenged the right of any other Senator to disagree with him. He and I are in the minority, as the Senator from Georgia has said. I share the Senator's misgivings, and I again compliment him on the ringing warning he has delivered to the people of America.

Mr. JORDAN of Idaho. I thank the distinguished Senator from Wyoming for his statement and for the contribution he has made to the debate in two excellent speeches against the ratification of the treaty.

Mr. THURMOND subsequently said: Mr. President, I wish to commend the able Senator from Idaho [Mr. JORDAN] for the outstanding address he has delivered on the nuclear test ban treaty. The Senator from Idaho has a penetrating mind. He has listened carefully to the debate. He has spoken with opponents and proponents of the treaty and has been classed in the so-called uncommitted group.

After much consideration and careful deliberation, he has concluded that the treaty is not in the best interests of this Nation and has decided to vote against its ratification.

In this connection, I wish also to commend the able Senator from Ohio [Mr. LAUSCHE], a member of the Committee on Foreign Relations, which reported the treaty. The Senator from Ohio has listened to the debate and has studied the record carefully. After reading the testimony, he has concluded, since the reporting of the treaty by the Committee on Foreign Relations, that the treaty is not in the best interests of the Nation, and yesterday made an excellent address opposing its ratification.

Both the Senator from Idaho and the Senator from Ohio are objective; learned scholars. I am sure their position is well worth noting by Members of the Senate. Their addresses are well worth reading by Senators. I especially commend a reading of the addresses by Senators who did not hear them delivered. These addresses are logical and practical and contain much wisdom.

Mr. MAGNUSON. Mr. President, I support and will vote for ratification of

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this treaty as one small step toward fulfillment of a universal hope for eventual arms control and peace.

This hope has been nourished by leaders of both parties through two administrations.

This hope was expressed in both 1960 party platforms.

As stated in the Democratic platform: "A fragile power balance sustained by mutual nuclear terror does not—constitute peace."

Our platform declared it a primary task "to develop responsible proposals that will help break the deadlock on arms control," and that "such proposals should include means for ending nuclear tests under workable safeguards."

Scientists advise us that atmospheric, surface, and underwater tests—which are those tests included in the treaty—can now readily be detected.

The Republican platform states specifically, and I quote:

We advocate an early agreement by all nations to forego nuclear tests in the atmosphere, and the suspension of other tests as verification techniques permit.

Failure to ratify the treaty would, as the Baltimore Evening Sun stated Monday in a lead editorial "be a repudiation of hope that it is within the power of this generation to bring about a limitation or control of armaments."

Mr. President, such hope does exist.

Eighty-five nations have to date signed the treaty. Three of these nations, the United States, Great Britain, and Soviet Russia are nuclear powers. Eighty-two of the nations do not have nuclear weapons and have no expectation of becoming nuclear powers. Yet these 82 nations have the hope, and they must also have faith, that the 3 nations which do have vast arsenals of nuclear weapons, either in inventory or available, will abide to the provisions of the treaty, at least during the immediate future.

Otherwise there would have been no reason for them to sign the treaty. The treaty itself, as long as it is observed, will bring a respite from the fears and dread that will increasingly afflict the peoples of the world if atmospheric and underwater testing are continued.

Two nations which have not signed the treaty have aspirations to become nuclear powers, Red China and France. France already has made a small beginning in the field. Red China has not yet achieved a nuclear device.

Red China and France have isolated themselves from the world accord in approving this initial step in the cause of peace; from the consensus of world opinion.

The United States will be similarly isolated if this treaty is not ratified.

Inevitably the good relations which we have developed throughout the free world, in diplomacy, in trade, in educational and economic development, would in some degree be replaced by misgivings and apprehension.

Our failure to agree to this treaty could not but provide an incentive to our principal competitor in the nuclear field to resume testing. It would further speed Red China's effort to develop nuclear weapons of her own, and in my opinion

it would impel France to expedite her nuclear program for what she would consider self-protection.

Further atmospheric testing by any nation will inevitably add to the dangerous pollution and add to the cumulative threat against the health of peoples throughout the world. Underwater nuclear explosions pose a similar threat to pollution of the oceans.

A nuclear war, we are told, could exterminate the human race.

Unchecked nuclear testing could in time bring about humanity's slow suicide.

Mr. President, I shall vote for ratification of this treaty as a step to uphold our Nation's just influence on the world.

I waited to digest every bit of testimony before speaking on this matter before committees.

I wanted to be sure that this would not in any way weaken our defense, now or in the future.

We need to be the strongest military power in the world—this is our great weapon against communism.

Mr. FONG. Mr. President, I regret very much that I was not present in the Chamber to hear the entire speech of the distinguished Senator from Idaho [Mr. JORDAN] who spoke against approval of the test ban treaty. I was able to hear only the conclusion of his remarks. I felt that it was very well reasoned.

Although I have some misgivings about the test ban treaty, I do not have as many misgivings about it as does the distinguished and able Senator from Idaho; and I will vote for approval of the treaty.

I hope that the many misgivings of the Senator from Idaho will not materialize; for, if they do, we may find ourselves in serious difficulty.

Although I disagree with the distinguished and able Senator from Idaho, I respect him for his very sincere stand and for the excellent reasons he has advanced for the position he has taken.

Mr. President, for the past few weeks I have carefully studied all aspects of the treaty suspending thermonuclear testing in the atmosphere, in outer space, and underwater.

I have read carefully the extensive testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee, and also the Committee's report. I have also read the interim report of the Armed Services Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee. I have studied all of the President's messages, and have followed the speeches Senators have made and the debate on this very, very important matter.

While I have long advocated a moratorium on atmospheric nuclear testing, and while I have been favorably inclined toward the treaty from the time when it was first negotiated, I have withheld final judgment until I have carefully studied all the evidence and all the views of our Nation's most knowledgeable persons.

In arriving at my decision, I have been impelled by one paramount consideration, and one consideration only: Is this treaty in the best interests of America?

Many factors—military, diplomatic, economic, scientific, sociological, med-

ical, and others—enter into the decision as to what constitutes the best interests of America. After evaluating all these factors and after weighing their relative importance, each Senator must render his own judgment and must make his own decision in the light of his knowledge, his own experience, and his background.

As a representative of our Nation's mid-Pacific Island State, whose people are, perhaps more than the citizens of any other State, acutely sensitive to the frightening dangers of nuclear holocaust and the increase of radioactive fallout, I have long been deeply concerned that means be devised to halt atmospheric and underwater nuclear tests.

It was in the Pacific basin, in 1945, that two atomic bombs were dropped—the first, on the inhabitants of the city of Hiroshima; the second, on Nagasaki. Because of our geographical proximity to, and our close cultural relationships with, the people of these two cities, the swath of destruction and the terrible toll of lives caused by these two atomic bombs left an indelible imprint on the people of Hawaii.

Since then, more than 100 thermonuclear devices have been tested near Hawaii. Between 1946 and 1962, in the Bikini, Eniwetok, Johnston, and Christmas Island areas, the United States conducted a series of 92 thermonuclear explosions in the atmosphere and 6 thermonuclear explosions under water. In addition, between 1953 and 1958 the British tested 21 thermonuclear devices—all of them in the atmosphere—in their South Pacific proving grounds. Altogether, 118 thermonuclear devices were tested in the air or under water between 1946 and 1962, in the South Pacific area near Hawaii.

As a result of these Pacific tests and tests conducted by other nations during the same time, worldwide radioactive fallout has increased.

During the 1954 experimental high-yield detonations, when a 15-megaton device was exploded on the ground at the Bikini test site, unexpected shifts in the Pacific wind patterns caused heavy radioactive fallout to irradiate the inhabited Marshall Island atolls, just a few hundred miles downwind from the detonation. Two hundred and sixty-seven Marshallese were seriously injured by nearly fatal doses of radiation exposure. Fortunately, all 267 survived, although the long-term ill effects will not be known for several generations.

But 23 fishermen aboard the Japanese fishing trawler *Lucky Dragon* were not so fortunate. The vessel accidentally sailed within 100 miles of the thermonuclear explosion. As a result of the heavy fallout which blanketed the vessel, all 23 of the Japanese fishermen suffered serious injuries, and were hospitalized. One fisherman died as a result of irradiation.

The 1954 test resulted in other economic and social dislocations. First, the injured Marshallese could not be returned to their home islands until radiation subsided—over 3 years later. Second, the Japanese seafood market suffered a sharp depression, after it became known that 16,500 pounds of tuna and

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shark aboard the *Lucky Dragon* had been exposed to radioactive fallout.

Then, on August 1, 1958, the first high-altitude American test of a missile carrying a thermonuclear warhead of undisclosed megaton range was launched from the Johnston Island area, just 800 miles east southeast of Honolulu. Detonated at night, without forewarning or preannouncement, the missile exploded in a fireball so intense and brilliant that it alarmed and thoroughly frightened the people of Hawaii, when it bathed the entire State in light as bright as daylight.

During the United States 1962 test series, on July 9, Hawaii was again bathed in awesome light, when a 110,000-pound Thor booster rocket, with a thermonuclear warhead capable of an explosive force of between 1 and 2 million tons of TNT, was launched, at night, from Johnston Island.

In addition to these detonations, the Russians have been test-firing their long-range missiles into the Pacific. Some of these missiles, launched from the area of the Aral Sea, near Iran, landed in an impact area southwest of Honolulu—only 1,200 miles away.

The destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the thermonuclear tests conducted at our back door, the Marshall Islands and *Lucky Dragon* fallout casualties, the two fireball explosions bathing Hawaii, in the night, in awesome nuclear light, the Soviet test-firing of missiles into the Pacific, and the increase in radioactive fallout in our atmosphere—all these have made the people of Hawaii acutely sensitive to the dangers of radioactive fallout, and have given them an understanding of the vast, destructive power of thermonuclear explosions.

We in Hawaii also know that, with our vital and strategic military installations at Pearl Harbor Naval Base and Shipyard, Schofield Barracks, Hickam Field, Kaneohe Air Base, and with many other military establishments, Hawaii—like many other important areas elsewhere in the United States—is a primary target for enemy missiles with thermonuclear warheads.

Acutely sensitive as we are to these dangers, we in Hawaii are also acutely mindful that American superiority in thermonuclear weapons and delivery systems has successfully deterred nuclear war. I am confident that the people of Hawaii strongly support the President and the Congress in their determination to maintain nuclear superiority.

Nevertheless, it is most natural that the people of Hawaii, like their fellow Americans everywhere, desire a lessening of radioactive fallout; and hope that, some day, mankind will be delivered from the threat of a nuclear holocaust.

Mr. President (Mr. McGovern in the chair), it is clear to all that this limited test ban treaty will not lessen the danger of nuclear war. But it is also clear that this limited test ban treaty will lessen radioactive fallout.

According to the Atomic Energy Commission and the Federal Radiation Council, radioactive fallout is composed of three primary chemical elements—strontium 90, a deadly radioactive ele-

ment, which is highly injurious to bone and bone marrow; cesium 137, another fallout product, which can cause serious genetic damage; and iodine 131, a radioactive element which attacks the thyroid.

Figures released by the Atomic Energy Commission, the Federal Radiation Council, the U.S. Weather Bureau, and the Agriculture Department, who have conducted joint studies of radioactive fallout, estimate that the fallout levels of these products of thermonuclear fission would increase about 90 percent over 1963 levels by 1965, if thermonuclear testing were continued at 1962 rates.

The same Federal agencies have estimated that the accumulated deposition of strontium 90 in Hawaii is now well over 100 millicuries per square mile. A millicurie is a measurement showing the degree of human exposure to beta and gamma radiation. The deposition of cesium 137 in Hawaii is about 170 millicuries per square mile. These figures are far above the natural levels for Hawaii but are not considered dangerous by experts in the Atomic Energy Commission. They show, however, that Hawaii is one of the prime fallout areas in the world. They also reflect a steep escalation of radiation fallout since the 1962 American tests and the heavy Russian testing of many high-yield thermonuclear devices in 1961 and 1962.

The precise level at which fallout radiation is injurious to human life is a question not yet settled. Studies are still being conducted by scientists the world over to determine whether or not the threshold of injury to human life can be pinpointed.

The noted scientists who prepared the 1962 report of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation expressed their deep apprehension of the somatic and genetic damage growing out of the fallout from tests already conducted. The overwhelming weight of the world's scientific opinion has also expressed this deep concern.

These scientists point out that the devastating effects of fallout on human life "may not be fully manifested for several decades in the case of somatic disease, and for many generations in the case of genetic damage."

Dr. Herman J. Miller, winner of the Nobel Prize in 1946 for discovering that X-rays cause changes in our genes, has figured that the fallout radiation resulting from aboveground testing of a single 100-megaton bomb would be likely to induce more than 100,000 cases of leukemia, bone cancer, and other fatal illnesses to the present world population and a million harmful mutations in the next generation.

If this were true, it would be a staggering toll, especially considering that it does not even take into account the threat of damage to the genetic integrity of the human family through the generations to come.

The possibility that suspension of atmospheric thermonuclear testing would greatly diminish this hazard renders ratification of the treaty an affirmative gain of the most significant consequences to the human race.

Apart from genetic considerations, the reduction of radioactive fallout from the suspension of atmospheric thermonuclear testing would still render ratification of the treaty an affirmative gain, since we know from our experiences with the casualties of Hiroshima, Nagasaki, the Marshall Islands and the *Lucky Dragon* that an overdose of radioactive fallout is harmful to human health.

I have no illusions about the limitations and risks of the treaty. Nor have I any illusions as to the trustworthiness of its chief cosigner, the Soviet Union, whose long history of treaty violations hardly evokes our faith and trust. Our approach to the Soviet Union is imbued with caution, wariness and watchfulness.

The treaty is not a panacea to the problems of the cold war. It will not patch up American-Soviet differences. It will not end the threat of Communist aggression. It will not necessarily usher in a new era of lasting world peace.

It will not even bring about a complete cessation of atmospheric or underwater thermonuclear testing. Nonsignatory nations such as France will not be bound by the treaty. Under the terms of the treaty, underground testing is permitted and is expected to continue.

The weight of military, scientific, and diplomatic authority, balancing the risks against the benefits to be gained from the treaty, favors ratification. Some military authorities have urged strong safeguards so as to render the military risk acceptable.

Senate ratification of the treaty will not, we are assured, bring on a euphoric relaxation of our defensive strength and our vigilance.

Our Nation's Commander in Chief, the President, has issued a list of safeguards to protect America against the risks involved in the treaty.

Our "posture of readiness" will be maintained and indeed strengthened.

We will carry forward a vigorous program of underground testing and continue to maintain strong weapons laboratories.

The United States would withdraw from the treaty if our interests are seriously jeopardized.

Our detection facilities for possible clandestine violations of the treaty will be "expanded and improved."

The treaty does not alter our relationship with regimes we do not recognize.

It "in no way limits the authority of the Commander in Chief to use nuclear weapons of the defense of the United States and its allies" if the situation so required.

We will "take all the necessary steps to safeguard our national security," including the resumption of atmospheric testing, if the treaty is violated.

These safeguards, we are assured, will render acceptable the risks that first, the alleged Soviet lead in knowledge of radiation and blackout effects on communications and missile control systems may be widened; second, our lead in tactical nuclear weapon technology may be wiped out by the Soviets; third, we will not have a chance to test the effectiveness of an antimissile defense system we may develop; and fourth, the Soviets may

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have superior know-how to immobilize the delivery capability of our missile sites and systems.

I am satisfied that, in the light of all these firm assurances, America's defense posture and military strength will be maintained and our security safeguarded.

With these assurances, I support the treaty because I believe it will help safeguard the people of the world against harmful radioactive fallout.

I support the treaty because it forbids the testing of thermonuclear devices in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water.

I support the treaty because, on balance, it is good for my country, good for my State, and good for all the people of the world.

This is surely a far cry from settling East-West tensions. But to me, it may be a tentative first step to the easing of world tensions. Though it does nothing to inhibit the manufacture of thermonuclear weapons, the treaty is an imperative preliminary step without which we could not go on to anything else.

The limited test ban is in a sense an experiment in trust which might produce sufficient mutual confidence to lead eventually to a total ban on all forms of thermonuclear testing with adequate inspection and other safeguards, and we hope some day to a limitation of the thermonuclear arms race.

Because I believe the treaty will lessen thermonuclear radioactive fallout and may prove to be a faint step toward the road to peace for the common good of the world, I am willing to give it that chance.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. President, I commend the able Senator from Hawaii for a fine and forceful presentation. He has made one of the best, most concise presentations heard during the course of the debate.

Mr. FONG. I thank the Senator from Alabama.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that further proceedings under the quorum call may be dispensed with.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. President, when the nuclear test ban treaty was ordered favorably reported to the Senate by the Foreign Relations Committee on August 29, I cast the single vote against reporting the treaty.

I do not want my lone vote at that time nor my subsequent expressions on the subject to convey any sense of disrespect for the other members of the Foreign Relations Committee.

On the contrary, I have the greatest admiration for my fellow committee members. I feel privileged to serve on this important committee with truly outstanding Members of the Senate under the distinguished leadership of the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. Fulbright]. I

believe the decisions of the committee members in favor of this treaty have been motivated, without exception, by deep and sincere convictions that what they have done is right. However, my respect for their position does not alter the course I feel I must take.

This is a decision that could spell our doom. If that is overly pessimistic, then let me go a step further and say that this is one of a very few mistakes which almost certainly would mean the end of our independence as a nation, the end of freedom as we have known it, and the end of the lives of most of us.

To show the problem, it is necessary for me to work from certain assumptions to their conclusions.

Suppose that the Soviets in their last series of tests were able to assure themselves that they have the information necessary to mount an attack on this country which could destroy much of our offensive capabilities and so disorganize our retaliatory power that better than 80 percent of our offensive power could never be hurled at our opponent.

Suppose that our adversary has acquired the information which would enable him to devise and construct almost foolproof defenses against our bombers and our missiles.

Suppose further that he knows that we do not have the information, the knowledge that we need to offer more than moderately effective resistance to his attack and that we are badly lacking in the means to penetrate his defenses, as a result of our inability to test our offensive weapons against the kind of defenses that they will encounter.

We know that our adversary plans to control and dominate this planet.

Then suppose our adversary signed a treaty with us which would preclude us from testing our radar against the blackouts which would result from atomic explosions created by our own defensive missiles as well as those created by our enemy's missiles.

Suppose the treaty would prevent us from determining what the atomic explosions would do to our communications on which our continued defense as well as much of our retaliation would depend.

Let us suppose further that our adversary had learned how he could prevent us from striking back from our missiles presently resting in hardened sites, possibly by blasting the area near the sites sufficiently close with atomic weapons.

Let us suppose that our adversary could effectively predict the positions of a substantial portion of our Polaris submarines, and depend upon limiting the damage to be expected from such submarine missiles as he could not destroy in home ports or elsewhere.

Then would not the following course be logical: First, he would develop his weapons and produce them in large numbers. This would take several years. Second, he would break the test ban to be sure that they worked. Third, he would embark upon a course of international conduct which would compel us to gradually surrender to his overwhelming power or start a war which we could not hope to win if we permitted him to strike first. In the latter event, would

he not plan to strike you the moment he concluded that we had elected that we would rather take our chances fighting than surrender?

It is my judgment that each of the assumptions that I have made cannot be dismissed. Some of them are already true. Others are reasonable probabilities.

Thus far, this Nation has been safe because it has been so strong that it could face any showdown with a confidence that we could rain so much more destruction upon an enemy than he could hurl at us that only a madman would persist in engaging our Nation in an all-out war.

This overwhelming preponderance has preserved large and small nations in the era which we choose to call the Pax America, or the era of world peace protected by America. Since Nagasaki, atomic weapons have not been used for purposes of warfare. They have been used only to maintain peace and as a threat to potential aggressors.

But the balance is shifting. The Soviets have gone ahead in space. They are abreast of us in atomic weapons. Under the proposed treaty, the Soviets could continue underground testing in areas of relatively small nuclear explosions where we feel we are ahead. We would be barred from testing in the high-yield ranges where they are ahead.

We fear that the Russians have learned much that we do not know in testing atomic weapons and the effects of explosions on the radar, the communications, and the warheads themselves which would be a part of an intercontinental ballistic missile system on the one hand and as the various components of an effective defensive antiballistic missile on the other hand.

If this should prove true, then time is running out on us rapidly. If Russia is ahead of us in the knowledge necessary for both the offense and the defense of tomorrow, then this treaty may prove to be national suicide.

Under this treaty, America will be prevented from building an efficient missile defense. It is said that we can design around our areas of ignorance. This is like planning to kill elephants with sticks because a treaty prevents us from developing an elephant gun.

Under this treaty, America will be prevented from developing weapons as large as the Soviets'. It is said that we do not need them. That is like saying that we do not need large cannons, because two smaller shells can do what one large one will do.

Under this treaty, we will be prevented from testing weapons that we already have in inventory, weapons that may prove to be billions of dollars of goose feathers so far as our offensive power is concerned.

Let it be remembered that during the first year of World War II the Americans were fighting with torpedoes that would not work, while the Japanese were fighting with torpedoes that did work. They sank most of our Pacific Fleet with torpedoes that had been tested against ships, while we bounced harmlessly against Japanese hulls torpedoes that

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had been tested only under simulated test runs.

If I may be pardoned a personal example, this Senator would not be here today if a projectile fired by a large Nazi railroad gun had not failed to explode.

For all we know, 75 percent of our ballistic missile power may prove to be duds for the reason of a minor adjustment which would be discovered under a live test. When we ratify this treaty, we tie our hands and bind ourselves not to conduct the tests which would prove that our weapons either work or do not work. As a matter of fact, it is criminal folly to enter into this treaty without at least testing the missiles already in inventory. Surely our adversary has done at least that much.

When we ratify this treaty we bind ourselves to a code of moral conduct by which our adversary will not abide. That we will not cheat is clear from our record. That the adversary will cheat is as obvious as the fact that a cat will scratch. We will be in a contest with one hand tied behind us.

Why do we do these things?

The best I can make of it is that this kind of thing results from impractical, well-meaning people—some of them magnificently educated. There are many sincere patriotic and religious people whose hearts instantly surge to the thought that we may someday capture the Communists with Christian love and forbearance. In other lands there are many more such Christians in their graves who nourished the same hope. It is Communist teaching that this element of devotion to the glory of God and the good of mankind is one of the weak points among capitalists which Communists must never overlook an opportunity to exploit.

There are people who like to think that the Communist leaders at heart are not a lot different from our own leaders. The principal difference is that Communist leaders will not abide by the results of a free election; our difference therefore becomes irreconcilable. No other answer remains except war, or stalemate until one can overthrow the other by subversion or revolution unless with time there can be a gradual acceptance of the views of one by the other.

Some of our best people are convinced that the Russian Communist leaders want peace. The Soviets do in fact want peace on terms which surrender the world to their absolute control. No other terms will suffice.

Many of our people are worried about pollution in the atmosphere. This worried me greatly until I learned that I have been exposed to radiation all my life as a result of cosmic rays, mineral deposits, X-rays, phosphorescent wrist-watches, television tubes, and other such devices.

If a person is living in Denver, he is exposed to 70 percent more radiation than at Washington. In the State of Kerala, India, people are exposed to 1,000 percent more radiation than in Washington, and nobody ever thought much about it.

The explosions of nuclear devices by all nations have increased radiation by

10 percent, and that increase will gradually decay and dissipate itself. Furthermore, the nuclear devices are becoming much cleaner.

A real danger to America, I regret to say, can be those people in the Disarmament Agency and elsewhere in Government and out of Government who believe genuinely in disarmament, either partially or totally, on a unilateral basis. When I voted for the Disarmament Agency, I did not fully realize the danger.

A man like William Foster is a hard-headed, practical person, but his views are necessarily affected by the one-worlders, Quakers, and "peace-at-any-price" types who gravitate toward such an agency. If these people cannot make an impression on Bill Foster, then they will impress at least some persons in the Senate, the House, the White House, the great universities, the press, or at some other point where they may influence our national decisions. I fear that these people are making headway in all of these places—the Congress, the White House, the universities, the press. The Pentagon can properly be expected to be the last bastion to fall prey to the siren song of disarmament, but the key to that fortress is held at the White House. The President is the Commander-in-Chief. He makes and breaks both the civilians and the brass who run the Pentagon.

Now the so-called military support of this treaty should be measured against the facts of life. The defense policy of the United States is set by the President, with the advice of the Security Council, with the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with the advice of the Members of the Congress or whomever he may choose to consult, but, in the last analysis, by the President.

The President may, and frequently does, make decisions that are a disadvantage militarily when he believes that other advantages should prevail.

The decisions in Korea not to use atomic weapons, not to bomb beyond the Yalu, not to engage in hot pursuit of enemy planes, not to bomb near the Russian border, not to use troops of Chiang Kai-shek, to dismiss General MacArthur, were all debatable, to say the least, from the military point of view.

It should be noted that concerning our strategy in Korea hardly a word of criticism—none comes to my mind—came to the surface from an officer on active duty, save General MacArthur himself who was being relieved of command and who felt such deep resentment and disagreement that he was willing to risk court martial if the President had dared to go so far with a popular national idol.

When General MacArthur closed his speech before the joint session of Congress, there was not a dry eye in the military, yet not a responsible officer in charge of the Military Establishment rose to criticize the President nor the restraints that had been imposed upon General MacArthur.

In the thousands of pages of testimony that occurred during the investigation, the Joint Chiefs backed the President implicitly and other officers were no more critical than merely to point out that, when military and political decisions are

mixed, the decision is not theirs to decide. In the closeness of his fireside, an officer on active duty will sometimes give a confidential friend an answer which utterly devastates the logic of the executive decision; however, he will not do that in public.

Those whom the President chooses for his Chiefs of Staff have always appeared to me to move from a sense of duty to support the President's decision as their own once he has made it. In fact, it has always appeared to me that this was the unwritten code of general officers.

Now when Curtis LeMay stated that he would not have recommended signing this test ban treaty, it seemed to me as one who has been on committees hearing such men testify for 15 years, that General LeMay was going as far as the rules of the game would permit even with the so-called clearance that had been granted by the executive.

When General Power, Chief of the Strategic Air Command, General LeMay's choice for the Chief's old job, said that he would not advise ratification of a treaty signed by the President, he was all but turning in his uniform and offering to sacrifice himself for national survival as he saw it. That is what this testimony meant to me, regardless of what kind of clearance this man was supposed to have.

Before anyone leaps to the conclusion that General LeMay advises this treaty, let him note that the Secretary of the Air Force cancelled the Secretary's acceptance at a mere social event given by the Air Force Association out of resentment that the Association had resolved as General Power recommended and as General LeMay said he would have recommended except for the fact that the executive had already approved the treaty.

No, the fact is that for these officers to have gone any farther against this treaty would have required that they consider offering their resignations first, no matter what kind of clearance they were supposed to have had.

If this Nation should perish, it will be because we will not listen to these men who have gone as far as their positions and circumstances will permit to advise us to rely upon the best weapons we can acquire and to let nothing prevent us from being best in weaponry if we care to survive.

In the past these men have advised that we proceed with missiles while others were dragging their feet. They have advised even faster, better aircraft, better equipment. Had we listened to them, we would have been in far better shape to face every crisis from the first Berlin blockade to the Cuban threat today.

Some years ago, I served on the Select Committee on Disarmament and on the Disarmament Subcommittee of the Committee of Foreign Relations. These were forerunners to the Disarmament Agency, and, in some respects, forerunners of this treaty. Let me say that my colleague, the Senator from Minnesota [Mr. HUMPHREY], is as devoted a patriot as any man in this Chamber, although our views on this treaty are as different as night and day. He was chairman of

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that select committee and that subcommittee.

When we were serving on the Disarmament Committee, the Joint Chiefs told us that, if we wanted to disarm, we should arm first because their resources had been cut back until they had nothing that they could afford to give up. This was under the Eisenhower administration.

Subsequently, we did proceed to arm this country under President Kennedy. Today we are in position to talk disarmament because we are very strong. But we should not talk disarmament without foolproof inspection. Until our adversary is ready to disarm and let us inspect to see for ourselves, we should continue to build and maintain great strength. This is the only way that we will ever have an honorable peace with freedom. However long it takes, this we must insist upon.

Now, Mr. President, one of the biggest dangers in this treaty, in my opinion, is the fact that Red China is not bound by it. I think that the distinguished Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL] and many others have indicated their great apprehension over this fact.

All have indicated the fear that in years to come Russia will use Chinese territory to conduct clandestine tests in the atmosphere. It is all too easy for some to discount this possibility at this particular time because of the alleged poor relations between Russia and China. But who is to say that these relations might not take a very sudden turn for the better—just as they took a sudden turn for the worse during these past 3 or 4 months. Who is to say that Mao Tse-tung, who is well into his seventies, might not die the very next week after next and that his successor might not bring China back under Russia's wing. Or who is to say that in any number of ways China and Russia might not suddenly become true allies once more—even under their present leadership.

I remember only too well, Mr. President, the conclusion on this very subject reached only 3 or 4 years ago by the Subcommittee on Disarmament of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. I and several others who are still members of the Foreign Relations Committee served on that subcommittee, which in a number of ways led us to establish the present Disarmament Agency.

For some time we studied the matter of nuclear test bans and came up with numerous conclusions on this subject and others.

During that period, in August 1958—5 years ago—my friend from Minnesota brought to us a document warning that no disarmament agreement with Russia would be in this Nation's interest unless subscribed to fully by Communist China. The possibility of Communist perfidy by way of using China as a tool or as cover for a Russian operation was specifically spelled out in the subcommittee's report. It reads as follows:

Communist China is still a formidable military power and every indication is that this power is being augmented. As the subcommittee has evaluated events in the area of China and within China itself which are directly related to disarmament, it has con-

cluded that there is a real possibility that the exclusion of China from a first step disarmament agreement might provide the Soviet Union a significant loophole through which to evade such an agreement. Obviously, whether this loophole would exist would depend on the nature of the agreement. The subcommittee notes in this connection that an agreement which involved the suspension of nuclear weapons tests with inspection and which did not include inspection in Communist China might present an opportunity for evasions on the part of the Soviet bloc. The United States must not contemplate signing a disarmament agreement which would permit its security to be jeopardized. The subcommittee is of the opinion, therefore, that greater attention must be paid to the question of including Communist China in any disarmament agreement which would provide for the suspension of nuclear weapons tests with inspection.

This subcommittee included a number of the Senators who voted to favorably report this measure to the Senate.

Now we are presented a treaty that drops the requirement of inspection. I am advised that it will be impossible to prove cheating under all circumstances, even in Russia or at sea. For example, when an explosion occurs in the south Pacific, how will anyone know who created that explosion at sea? No one except those who were there would know. The south Pacific is the high sea; it is available to everyone. The treaty certainly does not block the cheating with China as the cover.

If we make this treaty minus inspection, I predict that we will never persuade Russia to agree to foolproof inspection in all other respects. This will be the precedent. It will be said among Communists that if we will agree to a treaty so clearly against our security interests as this one, we will eventually seal off whatever chance we have of prevailing on this earth by agreeing to disarm under circumstances wherein our adversary will remain armed to the teeth.

In the Cuban crisis, only last year, these selfsame Communists—in fact, one of them also initiated this treaty—lied to us about missiles in Cuba until they were almost in position to blast us from this planet with Cuba as the base before we finally moved. Even now we do not know whether the missiles are in Cuba or not. The inspection to which Russia agreed at the showdown never came to pass because our leadership softened its resolve when the immediate crisis passed.

I respect our President as a person, a former naval officer, a former Senator, and as an able Chief Executive. He says that this treaty enables all people to be free from fears of radioactive fallout. I say that you had better be worried about the fallout from the bombs aimed at you if you are lucky enough to escape the blast, more than the infinitesimal amount of radiation from tests conducted under conditions carefully arranged to protect life and health. Insofar as this treaty frees you from fear, it is a sense of false security.

Our President says this treaty furnishes a small hope that war can be averted. I say that this treaty dashes that hope in that it will shift the relative

power of the two great protagonists in favor of the one which refuses to renounce world domination under police state rule as the only answer.

This treaty will help to shift military superiority from the law-abiding God-fearing, peace-loving, truth-telling Government that is the United States. This treaty will serve to retard the development of our defenses and our offensive power. This treaty will limit but slightly the development of the military might of our adversary and he will cheat whenever he finds the restraint to be important.

This treaty will result in a stronger Communist military power compared to that of the United States and the free world. This treaty will hasten the day when Soviet Russia and Communist China will be ready to risk war with us.

Many years ago, Patrick Henry said:

Gentlemen may cry peace, peace, but there is no peace. What is it that gentlemen wish? What would they have? Is life so dear, or peace so sweet, as to be purchased at the price of chains and slavery? Forbid it, Almighty God. I know not what course others may take, but, as for me, give me liberty, or give me death.

Many of the arguments that have been made for this treaty would place our lives, our safety, our hope for better health and cleaner air ahead of our love of liberty. This treaty would do just that. I do not care to survive to a day when this Nation is no longer free, and I am prepared to pay the price of a free America whatever that price may be. The price of preparedness is small indeed compared to the consequences of defeat.

This treaty should be rejected and I shall so vote.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I yield.

Mr. THURMOND. I presume the Senator from Louisiana has read in the news today that Mr. Gromyko, the man who initiated the treaty on behalf of the U.S.S.R., the man who was at the White House and talked to President Kennedy last fall concerning the missiles in Cuba, and denied there were any missiles there, at the very time President Kennedy had pictures in his desk showing they were there, is now stating that he wants to have a disarmament meeting with the President in Moscow next year. I presume the Senator read those news accounts.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. What the Russians have in mind for us, in my judgment, is exactly what they had last time. Mr. Gromyko is going to meet the President and propose that the United States and Russia both disarm, on a self-inspection basis. That is a fine proposal for one nation that does not believe in truth to make to another nation that does. If this country made such an agreement, we would be bound to disarm. Mr. Gromyko went before President Kennedy and said, "You can depend on it, Mr. President, that there are no Russian missiles in Cuba"—at the very time the President had in his desk pictures of missiles in Cuba. If we do business with those people, and disarm, all they have to do is lie to us that

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they are disarming and in that way destroy our country. One thing can be said for this treaty—we would not have to fear war, because we would not be able to fight if we wanted to.

Mr. THURMOND. The distinguished Senator has brought out the question of disarmament. As President Kennedy has said, this is the first step. Mr. Rusk has also said it. Now it looks as though Mr. Gromyko is getting ready to skip several steps and go on to an agreement on disarmament.

I commend the Senator for the penetrating attention and care he has given to this question, and the soundness with which he has approached it and arrived at his conclusion. He is making a very able and fine address, and I extend my hearty commendations to him.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I thank the Senator. I appreciate his compliment. I listened with great interest to the speech of the Senator from South Carolina. The Senator brought to me much good, solid thought, knowledge, and information that he had learned, both as a general in the armed services and as a member of the Armed Services Committee, when he spelled out, in chapter and verse, information that was not before the Foreign Relations Committee when it voted on the question—not that it would have changed the votes, but the information the Senator had made available to me made a compelling case as to why the treaty should not be ratified. I said so at the time.

Mr. THURMOND. I thank the Senator. I congratulate him for his courage in being the only member of the Foreign Relations Committee to vote against reporting the treaty favorably to the Senate floor. Since that time the Senator from Ohio [Mr. LAUSCHE] has given earnest study and consideration to this matter, and I was pleased to learn yesterday that he has decided to vote against the treaty. I likewise commend him for his dedicated study and his courage in deciding to stand with our small band of opponents.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. As the Senator well knows, at the time the Foreign Relations Committee met, it did not have available to it the information that was presented to the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services. The Senator from South Carolina is a member of the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee. He is also a member of the Committee on Armed Services.

The Senator from Ohio [Mr. LAUSCHE] wanted to wait until the Armed Services Committee, through its Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee, could give us the information it now has made available. There is no doubt in my mind that if the Senator from Ohio [Mr. LAUSCHE] had had such information available to him when members of the Foreign Relations Committee insisted on voting on this matter, he would not have voted as he did. If he had had an opportunity to study this information, some of it which was based on the most responsible type of courageous testimony by persons who have a direct responsibility

to defend this country in the event of atomic war—information that was not made available to the Foreign Relations Committee—I have no doubt that the Senator from Ohio would have voted just as I did. If the Senator from Louisiana had had such information at that time, there would have been no doubt about his vote, whereas at the time he had some doubt as to whether he should vote for or against the treaty.

Mr. THURMOND. I feel confident that the Senator from Ohio would have voted just as the Senator from Louisiana said he would have voted if that information had been made available to him. I regret that the Foreign Relations Committee acted before the Senator from Ohio and other members of the committee had the opportunity to study the report of the Preparedness Subcommittee. I also believe that the Senator from Ohio or another member of the committee requested that General Power be allowed to testify before the Foreign Relations Committee, and that that request was denied.

I am sorry that General Power was not permitted to appear before the committee, because he is the one man who would have to press the button to have the bombers take off and have the missiles fired in the event an exchange should occur. He has been giving a great deal of attention to this subject as chairman of the strategic targeting group. He is an expert on nuclear weapons and an expert on planes, including bombers. Merely because he is a military man induces some people to feel that perhaps he is not a scientist, and therefore should not go into these matters, or that he does not know anything about these subjects. He does. General Power has given a great deal of attention and study to these matters. No one could have heard the testimony of General Power before the Preparedness Subcommittee and not be convinced that he knows what he is talking about—that this dedicated officer knows his job and the enemy we face in the cold war.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I do not know whether General Power requested that he be heard before the Foreign Relations Committee.

Mr. THURMOND. He did not request that he be heard, but I believe the Senator from Ohio or another member of the Foreign Relations Committee told me that he had requested that General Power be allowed to appear before the committee.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. President, if I had had to vote for or against the treaty when it was first brought to the Senate and before I had heard the witnesses, particularly before I had heard Dr. Teller on this subject, I would have voted for the treaty. I was prepared to go along and approve the treaty, feeling that to do so would be in the interest of my country. However, after I had heard what Dr. Teller had to say about it, after I had had made available to me the testimony of General Power, after I could read what the Senator from South Carolina had developed on the subject, after I had heard the statement of the

man who in my judgment is the best authority on the floor of the Senate on the problem of defending America, the Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL], I changed my mind. The Senator from Georgia has been a member of the Armed Services Committee and the predecessor committee from the day he came to the Senate, probably 24 or 26 years ago. Many consider him to be the best qualified man to be President.

I supported him for President at the Democratic Convention, but refused to walk out of the convention when a majority of the Louisiana delegation wanted to walk out, on the theory that we came to support a Senator from Georgia, and that we should remain and fight for him. In the opinion of former President Truman he was the best qualified man to be President of the United States. When he made the compelling case against the treaty that he made, I was left with no alternative but to vote to reject the treaty, as he had said he was left in no doubt about rejecting the treaty, because it fails to protect the survival of this country.

The treaty could be the key to our destruction, or our demise as an independent nation. I cannot vote for it knowing that that might be the result.

Mr. THURMOND. The announcement by Mr. Gromyko, which was published in the papers today, bears out the prediction of the Senator from Louisiana, the senior Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL], and other Senators that the nuclear test ban treaty is the first step to disarmament.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. The prophetic judgment of the Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL] about the treaty being a step that is in the wrong direction from the standpoint of this Nation's interest, included a prediction by the Senator from Georgia that some other nation, among the community of nations, would propose that now that we have agreed to cease atmospheric testing and testing in space and testing under water, we should now agree to stop all underground testing.

Today, within a week of when the Senator from Georgia made his speech, a delegate from Brazil in the United Nations has proposed that the smaller nations should take the lead in seeking to make us agree that we will not do any underground testing.

The Senator knows that Communist China can serve as the testing ground for the Soviet Union. The only real argument between the Communists in China and the Communists in Russia is how better to destroy us. Communist China say, "Let us use these weapons to do it." Russia says, "No, let us not do it that way. If we use them, they might use them back on us."

The question is whether they should cheat, should lie, should deceive and force us to our knees in abject surrender by any means short of destruction. Those two nations do not disagree about anything else. They can resolve their differences tomorrow if they wish to. Russia could resume testing in Red China if it wished to do so. The only

difference between them is as to what the best way is of destroying us.

Mr. THURMOND. Does not the Senator from Louisiana feel that the only thing that has prevented a war with Russia since World War II, in view of her goal of world domination and enslavement, has been the overwhelming nuclear power of the United States?

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. It is my judgment that that is what has maintained the peace. Some may disagree with me, of course. They say the Russians do not want war. I am sure they do not want war, provided it fits in with their terms, which means that they would dominate the world, including the United States. There is no doubt in my mind that it has been the nuclear deterrent of the United States which has been maintaining the peace over the years since World War II. Incidentally, Winston Churchill, one of the greatest statesmen of our time, at Fulton, Mo., made that statement a few years ago, on the occasion of his visit to President Truman.

Mr. THURMOND. I thank the Senator.

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, the Senate will soon act to fulfill an important constitutional responsibility which it shares with the President of the United States. We have been asked by the President to approve ratification of the test ban treaty, and thus to share with him this responsibility. The Constitution requires, for the ratification of any treaty, the advice of the Senate and the consent of two-thirds of the Senators who are present and voting. In a formal sense, it is the Members of the Senate who offer the advice to the President; but, in a broader sense, the Senate is the medium through which the whole country should be expected to give its advice.

In the same manner, the vote of the Senate will be the means by which the country will give its consent.

Oftentimes, the advice given in regard to a treaty is highly technical, and the consent which is given involves a limited or confined scientific or rational judgment. But the advice and consent with reference to this particular treaty involve much more than that. They involve our advice based on the general judgment of the Senate and—if the Senate speaks for the country—the judgment of the people of this country. So our decision also involves a moral commitment, in connection with which we rely on the intellect and the will of people of this land when we act either to affirm or to reject the treaty—as a result of which we shall be subject to the interpretation of historical judgment as to the movement of events in the year 1963.

Mr. President, neither advice nor the consent of the Senate on matters as serious as those involved in this test ban treaty should be given lightly. The Senate has proceeded most cautiously and most carefully. It has sought the advice of representatives of the President, principally the Secretary of State. It has sought the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and of other military experts.

It has sought the advice of former Presidents and former public officials experienced in international affairs. It has sought the advice of scientists and historians, and has heard from the general public.

In considering the test ban treaty, the Senate has conducted a thorough review of our military policy and our foreign policy, and has considered both our strength and our weaknesses. It has examined carefully the language of the treaty itself, and has attempted to weigh the immediate implications and the immediate significance of the treaty.

The Senate has also judged the treaty against the background of history and the movement of history, and has considered both the discouraging record of the past and the risks and the uncertainties of the future.

Most treaties are instruments of limited objective and also limited achievement. Sometimes their declared purposes are relatively limited and almost trivial. Sometimes their declared purposes have expressed hopes beyond the reasonable expectations of prudent men. Some treaties have been formed and drawn in good faith; and others have been designed to deceive. Some treaties have been signed and ratified as instruments of mutual defense; others, as a seal of mutual aggression. The record of performance on treaties is as mixed as the history of mankind.

This test ban treaty is one of limited objectives. The heart of it is the agreement that each of the parties will undertake the following:

1. Prohibit, to prevent, and not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion at any place under its jurisdiction or control;

(a) In the atmosphere, beyond its limits, including outer space, or underwater, including territorial waters or high seas; or

(b) In any other environment if such explosion causes radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the State under whose jurisdiction or control such explosion is conducted. It is understood, in this connection, that the provisions of this subparagraph are without prejudice to the conclusion of a treaty resulting in the permanent banning of all nuclear test explosions, including all such explosions underground, the conclusions of which, as the parties have stated in the preamble to this treaty, they seek to achieve.

2. Each of the parties to this treaty undertakes furthermore to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in, the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion anywhere, which would take place in any of the environments described, or have the effect referred to in paragraph 1 of this article.

The rest of the articles of the treaty deal with procedures for ratification, the admission of additional signatories, and within—in article IV—the conditions and terms under which the parties may repudiate and withdraw from the treaty arrangement.

Some Senators have criticized the treaty because it will not establish universal peace and full victory for the United States and for the free world. These are some of the questions that have been asked about it:

First. Will the treaty get the Russian troops out of Cuba?

Second. Will the treaty rid Cuba of the despotism of Communist domination?

Third. Will the treaty stop the sabotage in Venezuela?

Fourth. Will the treaty eliminate the Communist subversion and espionage in Peru and Ecuador?

Fifth. Will the treaty stop Communist agitation in Africa?

Sixth. Will the treaty free any of the people now enslaved in eastern European countries? How many?

Seventh. Will the treaty tear down the Berlin wall, so that more people may express with their feet their antagonism to Communist despotism?

Eighth. Will the treaty cause the Soviets to abandon their espionage rings in any free world nation?

Ninth. Will the treaty end the constant irritations on the Korean truce line, or prevent future killings of American troops?

Tenth. Will the treaty prevent the shelling of Quemoy and Matsu in the future?

Eleventh. Will the treaty cause the Communists to cease their attacks on non-Communists in Laos, or to mitigate their efforts to take over that country?

Twelfth. Will the treaty cause the North Vietnamese and the Chinese to cease trying to take over Vietnam?

These are questions to which answers have been demanded.

Obviously, the answers must be in the negative. One could recite a long list of other questions. Some persons would seem to demand that the treaty somehow solve all the problems which face the United States, both at home and abroad. This would be to demand much more of this treaty—or any treaty—than anyone has a right to demand.

Some Senators have charged that the treaty is the first step in a series which may lead to general and complete disarmament, involving total surrender of the sovereignty of the United States. This, too, of course, is to charge more or to promise more or to prophesy more than is warranted by the limited text of the treaty itself.

In dealing with the test ban treaty, we cannot act upon the fears and the apprehensions of some Members of the Senate or of any Member of the Senate, because to do so would preclude action by the Senate on this issue, as well as on most of the other controversial issues which come before this body.

We cannot act on the basis of the prophecies—for many things said about the treaty have been in the area of prophecy, even though the speakers have denied that they possess prophetic gifts.

The record of treaties in relation to their stated objectives is a mixed one. We cannot expect absolute certainty of success, even with reference to the limited objectives set forth in this treaty. On the other hand, we should not be wholly pessimistic—by assuming that the terms of the treaty will in no way be respected or honored.

A treaty is an instrument of foreign policy and—like all such instruments—

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it operates without the full support of power that can be used when the full sovereignty of one's country is being exercised.

The declarations of the administration and the very record made in the course of the Senate committees' inquiries have demonstrated clearly that no one is being falsely optimistic about the possibilities of the treaty. On the other hand, the possible good that may come from the treaty has not been exaggerated.

No one can know with absolute certainty what interests motivated the Soviet Union in signing the test ban treaty at this time, although some have suggested rather strongly what that motivation may be. We do not have any guarantee that the Soviet Union will not break the treaty, even without cause, in the future. We are not proceeding, however, as though we had these absolute guarantees. There are no intentions on the part of the United States to proceed with any kind of unilateral disarmament, once the treaty is signed. We have been assured by the Joint Chiefs of Staff that although testing in the atmosphere would be useful in developing our military power, the restrictions which the treaty would set up would not be such as to prevent adequate development of our defenses.

We retain our freedom to continue underground tests without violation of the treaty, and we intend to pursue such testing.

We are free—and are resolved to remain prepared to do so—to resume nuclear testing in the atmosphere if the treaty is violated.

We shall go on continuing to improve our system and methods for detecting all kinds of nuclear testing, and to develop our own anti-ballistic-missile program.

There is every reason to believe that our nuclear laboratory facilities will continue to develop and attract the best scientists in the free world.

The treaty would ban certain forms of testing but it will not outlaw use of nuclear weapons. It involves no compromise in the ideological war with communism, nor does it bear upon the general cold war with communism, nor does it bear directly upon the limited small wars between Communists and anti-Communists that go on today.

It does not change the fact that both we and the Soviet Union have a stockpile of nuclear weapons. It may prevent some nations from entering the nuclear arms race, but it has not yet been accepted by France and Red China, the two nations which are pressing the hardest in the effort to develop their own nuclear weapons.

The treaty cannot properly be described as a step forward, nor as a step backward, but rather as a kind of halt.

It is enough to judge the treaty for what it clearly is—an agreement to prohibit nuclear weapons testing in the atmosphere, outer space and under water. This is an achievement to be judged in its own right. It may turn out to be the first of many steps toward the objectives of peace and justice. Whether it will or not remains unknown.

If the treaty is honored, in my opinion, it should open the possibility of further action to reduce the threat of nuclear war or to limit the use of nuclear weapons.

It is a fact that agreements and understandings regarding poison gas seem to have been successful in the 20th century. In any case, this destructive power has not been used, whatever the reason may be.

Leaving out all consideration of the use of nuclear weapons in time of war, the limited consideration of the contamination of the environment by radioactive materials alone is one deserving serious international attention.

The testing of nuclear weapons brings risks to all the people of the world. The uninvolved and uncommitted citizens of the other nations, as well as those citizens of the major powers producing and controlling nuclear arms. It creates risks not only for people living, but risks for those who are yet unborn. The effects on the health of citizens and the genetic effects of radioactive materials are not fully known or understood. But it is generally known and accepted that radioactive materials can cause a serious hazard to health and to life.

Because the dangers both in war and in peace arising from nuclear power are great, we must be willing to take some limited risks within prudential limits.

This test ban treaty involves limited risks. Its ratification is dictated by prudent consideration. It should therefore be ratified by the Senate.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, the debate on the test ban treaty has now been in progress in the Senate for 2 weeks.

I have listened with utmost care to the intense debate that has been waged in the U.S. Senate over whether or not we should ratify the test ban treaty. This treaty ratification has given me great concern because of the charges and countercharges concerning the possible effect that this treaty might have upon the security of our Nation. As in most matters which have come before this body, this treaty has received neither unanimous approval nor objection by the Senate. As in most proposals that I have faced in the Senate during my 19 years of service, the contents of this treaty are not unanimously acceptable to me. There are weaknesses in the treaty which I disapprove of but there are many strong points—points upon which the very future of civilized life as we know it on this planet may hinge. We ought to realize that any amendment to the treaty would necessitate negotiation of a new treaty by all of the 89 countries that have already signed the treaty.

Whether we realize it or not, the test ban treaty debate is one of three great debates of our century. The first great debate concerned the involvement of the United States in the League of Nations. The second great debate of the 20th century concerned our participation in the United Nations.

I look back to the years following the creation of the League of Nations, when

the United States as the most powerful nation on earth stood outside of the League, voiceless and helpless to stop the world from spinning recklessly into World War II, even after thousands of Americans had died in World War I, the war to end all wars. We were powerlessly isolated, because of the failure of the U.S. Senate to endorse Woodrow Wilson's program to make the United States a part of the League of Nations.

We saved no money; we saved no face; and we saved no lives. We merely weakened our Nation instead of providing it with security as some Senators had hoped. When World War II came, we found ourselves again playing the role of savior of the free world—a job we were pitifully unprepared to do. World War II bitterly taught us the lessons of the futility of isolation. As a result we became a part of the United Nations, perhaps reluctantly because of the possibilities of losing our national identity in a world organization. Again, in that great debate, the security of our Nation versus the hopes of peace became the issue. This fear of losing the identity of the United States in the bigness of a world organization still remains with many of us, but we would not withdraw the United States from the United Nations, because there still remains the hope that we can find lasting peace through this organization.

Today, we distrust the Russians, and rightfully so. However, we cannot morally permit this distrust to move us into a new form of isolation. We recognize Russia and the Communist world as the arch enemy of democracy and freedom. But we would smash into a thousand pieces the hopes of humanity for peace if we should reject this treaty. Our Nation and the world cannot afford another mistake like we made after World War I.

Mr. President, on the one hand there is the threat of nuclear extinction for the great mass of our people as well as our enemy, and quite possibly the entire world, if we reject this treaty and move into an unbridled nuclear armaments race.

In this connection, there are also increased hazards to the earth's population, not only to people who are living today but also to unborn generations.

Medical science is practically unanimous in the opinion that additional radiation from continued atmospheric nuclear testing will cause significant human suffering as a result, with increased risks of cancer and other physical deformities and mental deficiencies. It has been estimated that 50,000 children, as of this date, will be born into the world with gross mental or physical defects because of the genetic damage of fallout from nuclear tests. These defects will include such things as muscular dystrophy, cancer, blindness, dwarfism, and other major deformities. Unlimited and continuous nuclear testing in the atmosphere obviously will increase these threats to our civilization.

On the other hand, there is the possibility, if this treaty is ratified, that our enemies would not act in good faith and would violate the treaty, possibly giving them a military advantage over us.

These points constitute the very essence of this debate. It has been stated by the scientists that any nuclear test which amounts to anything would be known a few minutes thereafter. Little harm could be done by at least entering into the agreement at this time.

We must profit from the lessons and experience our past has given us and accordingly our answer to the world must be ratification of this treaty. If we reject it now, we are saying that we have given up all hope for peace and we are telling the world it must look forward only to an endless dark age of cold war and ever-threatening nuclear attack.

If possible, I should like to get rid of the cold war—or at least a part of it. I want no accusing finger of history pointing at this Senate and at me to say that we failed humanity because we rejected this treaty. Our faith in ourselves and in God Almighty must be greater than this fear or there will never be peace, and we shall never rid ourselves of the cold war.

We have lived with the cold war and within the shadow of H-bomb attacks for nearly 20 years, fruitlessly edging toward another world war. This treaty essentially changes nothing except to open the door of possibility for just and lasting peace.

As a nation we must continue to be prepared for any eventuality and to do anything necessary to preserve our Nation.

We must remain prepared at all times. In this connection, we must accept the word of our Joint Chiefs of Staff who have stated that we will not be weakened by the signing of this treaty.

In addition, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense have assured the Nation that we would be prepared to resume testing should the Soviets violate the treaty, and they have stated that the United States would be able to detect any violations having any significance or any military value. If we cannot accept their authority on this subject, what can we depend upon in our military setup? In all of this, we owe it to the Creator of mankind and the world to do everything in our power to bring peace on earth. This treaty is within our power. This treaty contains the hopes for world peace and the way to achieve this without sacrificing our honor and freedom.

Mr. President, this is why I have no other choice except to vote for the ratification of this treaty. I do so without fear and without apology. The world must emerge from the night of distrust and into the light of peace. I want the United States of America to boldly and fearlessly lead the way, by signing and becoming a part of the peace treaty now before the Senate.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. President, I commend the Senator for a clear, concise, and positive statement. It is a wonderful contribution. I commend the Senator for it.

Mr. JOHNSTON. I thank the Senator.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. JOHNSTON. I yield.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I commend the distinguished senior Senator from South California for the speech he has made this afternoon. It was to the point. I think the Senator made his position quite clear and quite understandable.

Mr. JOHNSTON. I thank both the Senator from Alabama and the majority leader for the remarks they have made. After studying the problem, this is the only way I can cast my vote.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, the Young Americans for Freedom, which is one of the finest and most patriotic organizations in the United States, has presented to me, for the Senate, a petition which bears the names of about 15,000 people, from every State in the Union, who are opposed to ratification of the nuclear test ban treaty by the Senate.

I should just like to read what the petition states:

Young Americans for Freedom, the Nation's largest conservative youth organization in the land, has presented this petition: "Whereas the U.S.S.R. has broken 50 or 52 major treaties or agreements with the United States; and

"Whereas no scientific evidence has been produced which assures the United States of detecting nuclear tests in the atmosphere by the U.S.S.R.; and

"Whereas history has recorded that disarmament proceedings by the United States have encouraged the enemy to increase aggression; and

"Whereas the treaty will maintain the Communist U.S.S.R. superiority in the field of multimegaton weapons and antimissile weapons; and

"Whereas any agreement between the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and the United States will imply our trust in the Communist leadership, thus rendering our anti-Communist efforts worthless; and

"Whereas scientific evidence concludes that radioactive fallout from testing is not a danger in the immediate or foreseeable future: Therefore be it

"Resolved, That the undersigned petition the U.S. Senate to defeat President Kennedy's nuclear test ban treaty with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics."

Following that petition are the names of the various persons who signed, from various States. As I have stated, there are petitions signed by persons from every State in the Nation.

I take this opportunity to commend the Young Americans for Freedom for their activity in this connection. I had the pleasure of addressing the Young Americans for Freedom last spring. There must have been 18,000 to 20,000 of them present in New York City at that time.

It is most encouraging to find that thousands of young people on our college campuses and elsewhere are standing so strongly for freedom and the preservation of a national defense posture to insure the maintenance of our freedoms in this country. After all, Mr. President, the future of our country belongs to our young people of today.

I feel that this organization is rendering America a great service, and I am proud that the high caliber membership contained in the organization has seen fit to oppose the nuclear test ban treaty, even though it may not be the popular thing to do, and even though the propaganda of all the networks and most of

the news media in the United States—not all, but most of them, and most of the larger ones, are taking a contrary position.

Again, I commend the Young Americans for Freedom. I congratulate them for the great service they are rendering to our country; and I especially commend them for obtaining this petition against the nuclear test ban treaty.

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, several weeks ago, after the conclusion of the hearings on the test ban treaty, I stated that I intended to vote for its ratification. The debate throughout the hearings, which I attended, in the testimony, and on the floor of the Senate has been comprehensive and, it seems to me, has examined every argument that can be adduced for or against the treaty. In speaking today, I do not intend to dwell in detail on these arguments but, rather, state the conclusions which lead me to vote for ratification of the treaty.

I know that the treaty represents the culmination of efforts that have been made in various forms since World War II, beginning in a very broad way under the administration of President Truman. Under the administration of President Eisenhower negotiations were aimed directly toward a ban upon nuclear tests. These efforts have been continued under the administration of President Kennedy. The result of all these negotiations and efforts is manifested in the treaty before the Senate.

I am glad also that this effort has been truly nonpartisan. The effort has been made by Democratic and Republican administrations and Members of both parties, and in particular, Senators who serve on important committees, such as the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, the Foreign Relations Committee, and the Armed Services Committee, have made great contributions.

The minority leader of the Senate, Senator DIRKSEN, and the ranking member of the Republican Party in the Senate, Senator AIKEN, have referred in their speeches favoring the treaty to the provision of the Republican platform of 1960 expressing the position of the party on this subject. This part of the plank reads:

We are similarly ready to negotiate and to institute realistic methods and safeguards for disarmament, and for the suspension of nuclear tests. We advocate an early agreement by all nations to forego nuclear tests in the atmosphere, and the suspension of other tests as verification techniques permit. We support the President in any decision he may make to reevaluate the question of resumption of underground nuclear explosions testing, if the Geneva Conference fails to produce a satisfactory agreement. We have deep concern about the mounting nuclear arms race. This concern leads us to seek disarmament and nuclear agreements. And an equal concern to protect all peoples from nuclear danger, leads us to insist that such agreements have adequate safeguards.

I had the honor to serve as the chairman of the subcommittee on foreign policy of the platform committee at the 1960 convention. Our subcommittee consulted with leaders at the convention. I talked to Secretary of State Herter to make certain that this plank represented the policy of President Eisenhower's ad-

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ministration. I consulted with President Eisenhower by telephone about certain of its clauses. Our subcommittee then approved this section of the platform, and it was adopted by the full platform committee and the convention.

I point these facts out not to say that the circumstances under which we adopted our plank at Chicago in 1960 were the same as today, or that the treaty before us is in exact accord, nor to attempt to say what the position of President Eisenhower or former Secretary of State Herter would be on this treaty—but simply to point out that the administration of President Eisenhower and the Republican Party had as their policy negotiations toward a safeguarded ban on nuclear testing.

In examining the treaty, I felt that it was my prime responsibility to determine its effect upon the security of our country. Even the fact that many nations have acceded to the treaty cannot diminish this duty, for only the United States has the power to protect its people and its free institutions.

Today I have no doubt that certain risks attend the ratification of the treaty. I do not believe that such risks can be removed by reservations, understandings, or interpretations of the treaty. The risks lie either in the provisions of the treaty itself or in external facts regarding the relative nuclear capabilities of the United States and the Soviet Union.

There is a risk that the Soviet Union may breach the treaty by clandestine testing. If it does, the testimony has indicated that any significant tests would be discovered. The United States could immediately abrogate the treaty, whether the breach of the Soviet Union was direct or indirect, through the agency of other countries.

Article IV provides that "if any extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this treaty" jeopardize the supreme interest of this country, we could withdraw after 3 months' notice. I would go further. It is my belief that if any event occurred which, in the opinion of the President or Congress, threatened the security of the United States, the United States would have the right under international law, and the duty under the obligation of self-defense, to abrogate the treaty immediately and take whatever steps might be necessary for our security. The chief risk of the treaty, as such witnesses as Dr. Teller and General Power testified, and which has been argued forcefully by respected Members of the Senate, is that the Soviet Union has acquired from recent testing information not available to the United States, information which enables it to develop an anti-ballistic-missile system, or systems, which could neutralize our communications and thus render useless our "second strike," which is the deterrent against any Soviet nuclear aggression.

In response, I point out that Dr. Harold Brown, the director of Defense Research and Engineering for the Department of Defense, and the leading scientific adviser in the present administration, who stated that he has full access to all information—military and scientific—

testified categorically that our recent tests provide information comparable to that of the Soviet Union with respect to communications blackout and anti-ballistic-missile systems.

Other leading scientists, such as Dr. York and Dr. Kistiakowsky of President Eisenhower's administration supported Dr. Brown, and testified that the United States possesses superior nuclear power and can maintain this power.

I also heard the Joint Chiefs of Staff, including General LeMay, in closed session, hold that the risks were manageable if we maintain our scientific and military capabilities, and, while raising the question of the risks, as they should do, they approved the treaty.

President Kennedy, in his message to the Senate on August 8, made this statement:

According to a comprehensive report prepared by the responsible agencies of government for the National Security Council, the tests conducted by both the Soviet Union and the United States since President Eisenhower first proposed this kind of treaty in 1959 have not resulted in any substantial alteration in the strategic balance.

I believe that the ultimate issue is whether it is a greater risk not to take this first step, whose chief purpose is to secure settlements of the situations in the world which create the danger of war, and to break the cycle of the nuclear arms race which overshadows the world, and if not halted may destroy it. President Kennedy has called the treaty a first step toward agreements which would tend to prevent the possibility of a nuclear war. President Eisenhower, in his recent letter to the Foreign Relations Committee, said:

But the greatest anticipated advantage is the hope—almost universally held by the earth's populations—that the consummation and meticulous implementation of the agreement might open the way to better relations between the cold war opponents and, by small steps, bring about enforceable agreements for the reduction of the costly armaments race and progress toward the rule of law in the world. These promises and these hopes represent the major portion of advantages of the treaty.

If we agree that the risks which we assume in ratifying this treaty are manageable—and I have made up my mind on the basis of the testimony that they are—then I believe the true test of this treaty lies ahead. For its true and explicit purpose, in my view, is that it looks forward to two things. One is the accomplishment of further agreements which will reduce the extension of the nuclear arms race, such as an enforceable ban on underground testing. This, of course, would be the necessary step along the route toward nuclear disarmament by all countries. The second purpose, it seems to me, is to create an atmosphere of some trust, in which the United States and the Soviet Union can proceed toward the just settlement of issues which the Soviet Union has created, which cause our confrontation with the Soviet Union, and produce the danger of war. I need not name all of these situations of confrontation, but two are apparent—Berlin and the presence of Soviet troops in Cuba. The presence of

Soviet troops in Cuba is an extension of the status quo which Khrushchev has contended should be maintained in Eastern Europe. It is the first extension of Soviet force in the Western Hemisphere. It gives authority to Castro's regime, and support to subversion and aggression in the hemisphere. Its danger will continue until the Soviet military presence is ended.

I give these examples to reinforce my statement that the true test is ahead. If the Soviet Union will not, after the ratification of this treaty, make any advances toward a just settlement of these situations of confrontation, such as Berlin and Cuba, if it will not come to any agreement upon an enforceable ban on underground testing, then our country will have the duty to inquire again as to the purposes of this treaty and whether it benefits our security or the security of the world. And after a reasonable time, if no advances toward true settlements are made, then I believe it would be the duty of the United States to take whatever action our security demanded. We cannot know whether these advances toward settlements, toward nuclear disarmament, are possible unless we take this first step.

Mr. President, risks are inherent in the ratification of the treaty, but they are risks which the President and most of our military and scientific leaders, charged with responsibility, have told us categorically are manageable and are less dangerous than the failure to ratify the treaty.

As long as our issues with Russia remain unresolved, we shall have to live in an armed state under the threat of war. We have never thought very much about managing our own lives, our government, and our industrial economy during a long period of such danger, for we have never lived on the brink of a thermonuclear war.

Our system is distinguished from that of the Soviet Union, for we believe in a moral order. We must maintain our defenses, and we will protect at whatever cost necessary the security and freedom of our country.

I believe this is a first step. The Senate must make the determination whether the risks, not wholly known, are as great as the refusal to take the first step—a step which may lead to other agreements—a step which may lead to ending the nuclear arms race. For the nuclear arms race always holds the possibility of nuclear war, whether planned or by mistake, in which there would be no victor—only the destruction of mankind.

Mrs. SMITH. Mr. President, this morning I received from the Secretary of Defense answers of the General Counsel of the Department of Defense to the legal questions I raised in the Senate on September 16, 1963, on the wording of the nuclear test ban treaty. Because of their striking similarity to answers of the Legal Adviser of the State Department, which I placed in the Record yesterday, I shall not comment on these answers of the chief legal officer of the Defense Department but rather will observe that the comments I made yesterday on the

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answers of the State Department's Legal Adviser apply equally to these which I now ask unanimous request be placed in the body of the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the answers were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

ANSWERS BY THE GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE TO LEGAL QUESTIONS RAISED BY THE WORDING OF THE NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY

I

Question 1: Could a party to the treaty carry out a nuclear explosion in the atmosphere above an uninhabited island not claimed by it and justify its action upon the ground that the explosion did not occur at a place under its jurisdiction or control?

Answer: No. The words "at any place under its jurisdiction or control" in the first paragraph of article I of the treaty apply only to that paragraph and are necessary as a legal matter since a party to the treaty would have no authority to prohibit or to prevent nuclear explosions at places not under its jurisdiction or control and accordingly would not be able to fulfill any treaty obligation to prohibit or to prevent nuclear explosions at such places. It should be noted, however, that a party would be construed temporarily to have control over any place where it conducted a test, and therefore paragraph 1 would prohibit a party from conducting a test in the circumstances hypothesized. In any event, the second paragraph of article I prohibits a party, itself, from conducting a nuclear test in the three environments anywhere.

Question 2: What nuclear explosions in outer space are banned by this paragraph in view of the fact that outer space, and particularly the more remote regions thereof, is not considered to be within the jurisdiction or control of any nation? If Russia explodes a nuclear device in outer space and we claim that such action is prohibited by this paragraph, are we placed in a position where we must simultaneously admit that Russia has jurisdiction over or controls the particular region of outer space in which the explosion occurs?

Answer: No. As was the case in question 1, a party is prohibited by paragraph 2 from conducting tests in the three environments without regard to the question of "jurisdiction or control," and by paragraph 1 by virtue of the temporary control.

Question 3: Would a nuclear explosion underwater in the middle of the Pacific Ocean be barred by this paragraph in view of the fact that the high seas are not considered by nations to be within the control or jurisdiction of any particular nation?

Answer: Yes. Such a test would be barred by article I for the reasons given in answers 1 and 2.

Question 4: Does the ban on "any other nuclear explosion" prevent us from operating atomic energy plants for the production of electricity, the steamship *Savannah*, or any atomic submarine, all of which are operated by means of controlled atomic explosions?

Answer: No. Atomic energy reactors, which release energy slowly, do not produce a nuclear explosion within the meaning of the treaty.

Question 5: Will we be branded as a violator of the treaty if we have an accidental explosion at one of our atomic energy plants?

Answer: No. An accidental explosion of one of our atomic energy plants would not constitute a violation of the treaty; the treaty is aimed at intentional acts.

II

Question 1: Does paragraph 2 apply to direct acts of the parties or only to indirect acts of the parties? For example, does it

apply to a nuclear explosion by Russia in the atmosphere above Russian soil or is it intended to apply only to such a situation as a nuclear explosion by the Communist Chinese regime in the atmosphere above China which is caused, encouraged, or participated in by Russia?

Answer: Paragraph 2 of article I is intended to bar a party from conducting tests itself in the three environments (direct acts) and from giving materials for use in nuclear weapons, or information relating to their design or manufacture to any other state whether or not a party, if that state was engaged in, or proposed to engage in, nuclear weapons tests in the three environments (indirect acts).

Question 2: If paragraph 2 does apply to direct acts of the parties, how do you resolve the conflict between its provisions, which are not limited by the phrase "at any place under its jurisdiction or control," and the provisions of paragraph 1, which are limited by such phrase?

Answer: As shown by the answer to the preceding questions, there is no conflict between the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2. The two paragraphs overlap to some extent. The words "jurisdiction or control" do not limit paragraph 2 because paragraph 2 does not impose an obligation to prohibit or to prevent.

III

Question: If the United States decides to withdraw from the treaty because it has irrefutable evidence that Russia has violated it, would we not be compelled to wait 3 months before resuming nuclear testing unless we were willing to risk being branded as treaty violators?

Answer: It is clear under international law that the United States would not be compelled by the treaty to wait 3 months before resuming nuclear testing if Russia violates the treaty.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE,
Washington, September 19, 1963.

HON. MARGARET CHASE SMITH,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR SMITH: As I explained to you over the telephone last evening, I am extremely sorry that I did not see your letter of September 10 relative to the 16 questions on the test ban and I am particularly sorry that I did not see or sign the outgoing letter.

I agree with the answers to your questions given by Secretary Rusk, and I am in full agreement with the statements made by the President in his letter to Senators MANSFIELD and DIRKSEN—some of which deal with matters raised by your questions. Nevertheless, I would like to take this opportunity to offer some further comment on a few of the questions which you posed on September 9. Specifically, I refer to your questions 2, 9, and 11.

Your second question was: "Are we reasonably confident and secure in the knowledge that our ballistic missile retaliatory second strike force will survive and operate in a nuclear environment?" This is of course a very important matter. You have the information concerning missile-site survivability contained in my earlier remarks, referred to by Secretary Rusk. I would like to add a few comments on the ability of our missiles to penetrate enemy defenses.

Present penetration capability, as you know, depends upon saturation of defenses—upon numbers of weapons, decoy design, salvo techniques, and nuclear technology. The limited test ban treaty does not affect the first three of these factors. It is relevant only to the last of them. Ballistic missile reentry vehicles and warheads are susceptible to both blast and radiation. The latter can be tested sufficiently underground. Although blast cannot be tested underground, we have

information from which to extrapolate blast effect and are able to build around uncertainties. Furthermore, we have every reason to believe that the Soviet Union has had no more experience in the testing of relevant blast effects than have we.

Because of the extremely large number of U.S. missiles and penetration aids available for saturating Soviet defense, I am confident that, in any event, sufficient U.S. striking power not only can survive attack but can penetrate to destroy the Soviet Union.

In your ninth question, you asked: "Can we, in fact, maintain an adequate readiness to test in those prohibited environments in the event the treaty should suddenly be abrogated?" You are familiar with the testimony on this point and with Deputy Secretary Gilpatrick's letter to Senator RUSSELL, in which he dealt with the Joint Chiefs of Staff safeguard (c). I am convinced that we can maintain a state of readiness such that we will be ready to perform proof tests within 2 months, development tests within 3 months, and (by a year from now) effects tests within 6 months. We are, now, improving test support facilities, which include preparation and maintenance of off-continent support bases and test sites. We are obtaining diagnostic aircraft, instrumented ships and aircraft, weapon drop aircraft, and sampler and other support aircraft; and we are preparing operating bases on Johnston Island and in the Hawaiian area. Also, the Atomic Energy Commission and Department of Defense test organization is being kept strong and ready.

Your 11th question was: "Will we be restrained from ever determining feasibility, developing and deploying any defense whatever against ballistic missile attack?" In my testimony, I addressed this point quite fully, but two points are worth repeating: First, we should bear in mind that, while an antiballistic missile system might be very important, it is unrealistic to expect any foreseeable antiballistic missile system to be effective enough to save a nation from great harm in the event it is attacked. Second, the non-nuclear aspects (capacity for decoy discrimination, traffic-handling capacity, reaction speed, and missile performance) dominate the problem of developing an effective antiballistic missile system. The nuclear aspects involved are warhead development and the nuclear effects problems of self-kill and blackout. The treaty, as you are aware, has no bearing on the nonnuclear features. Warhead development can continue through underground testing, and some of the important questions of self-kill can also be resolved by underground testing. Questions relating to blast, as in the case of incoming warhead kill, referred to on the previous page, cannot be solved by underground tests, but we have information from which to extrapolate blast effect and are able to build around uncertainties. And atmospheric testing would be needed to provide either side further understanding of the blackout phenomenon—a phenomenon which has been probed in different ways, with what I believe to be comparable success, by both the United States and U.S.S.R. We believe that our latest atmospheric tests revealed the approximate limits of the blackout problem. If the antiballistic missile problems unaffected by this treaty could be resolved, the uncertainties caused by gaps in our understanding of blackout could be circumvented through conservative design. Those responsible for the U.S. antiballistic missile program believe that the Nike-X system can be developed and deployed without further atmospheric testing. Moreover, it is their judgment and the judgment of those responsible for making intelligence estimates on Soviet capabilities that our efforts in developing an antiballistic missile system are comparable, if not superior, to those of the Soviets.

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Nor do I think that it is in the interest of constructive debate in which light, rather than heat, is sought to resort in answers to questions by implying that if a Senator will only take the time to read the testimony of a witness he will find the absolute truth. This is no more constructive that to imply that a Senator's thinking has been misled by the testimony of a witness, particularly if the party making the implication himself is relying upon opinion, as distinguished from facts, in offering his speculative answers.

I am deeply appreciative of the answers offered by Senator Sparkman, Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, and President Kennedy. They are helpful. But they do not remove doubts. They only partially answer questions—they only partially resolve doubts. They fall far short of making an ironclad, airtight case for ratification of the treaty. They are no more convincing to me than the arguments thus far made against ratification of the treaty.

My more detailed observations with respect to some, but not all of the answers submitted to the questions follow.

Question 1. We are certain of the Russian advantage in the high-yield weapon. Its possession by the Russians is of military significance to the United States—even though we still apparently cannot decide whether we want them in our own arsenal—in its impact upon increasing even more the uncertainties or suspected vulnerabilities in our ballistic-missile systems—whether that of launch sites or penetrating warheads over target. The blast and thermal effects were lightly touched upon but nothing was said of the probable radiation and electromagnetic phenomena associated with such a high nuclear yield. Dr. Brown does not believe that the Soviet high-yield shots were instrumented for effects data but one has to assume that whatever knowledge they gained of blast, thermal and radiation effects, it is 100 percent greater than ours and this disparity will be perpetuated once atmospheric testing is denied to us by treaty ratification.

Question 2. The survivability of a second strike force through "mix" or variety of back-up systems has merit. The theory is that if the landbased missile force should happen to be unexpectedly vulnerable to particular effects phenomena, the Polaris system or the B-52's will not be.

Yet, each has its peculiar uncertainties and vulnerabilities whether in deployment of the system or in the operation of the system. Warhead testing under dynamic conditions of reentry is as fully important as electromagnetic pulse testing for determining actual hardness of launch sites. In the absence of knowledge of what one is trying to harden against, it seems that "designing around" the unknowns is a catchy phrase which has been given too much prominence in the debate.

Question 3. Nuclear superiority for deterrence must be measured both quantitatively in terms of deployed weapons systems and qualitatively in terms of

superior scientific knowledge manifesting itself in superior weapon design. The treaty will still permit further quantitative deployment of weapons systems, but its ratification will acknowledge Soviet superiority in critically important areas of nuclear technology having military qualitative significance.

Question 4. The treaty will not prevent the spread Secretary Rusk and Mr. William Foster said that a comprehensive ban would prevent the spread of nuclear weapons but it should have the effect of retarding the rate at which other nations, apart from France and Red China, might have otherwise acquired a nuclear capability.

Question 5. Secretary Rusk and Dr. Brown would view an explosion which, although within the legal letter of the treaty, releases most of its energy into the atmosphere as a treaty violation. "Underground" has not been sufficiently defined.

Questions 6 and 7. The worry here is the fact that we cannot detect low kiloton yields in the atmosphere. According to Dr. Teller, exposure of radars and communications devices and other electronic gear could upset the nuclear balance, although these are nonnuclear devices, in discovering ways to make them operate efficiently in a nuclear environment, that is, overcoming blackout for example.

Question 8. Question 8 is related to the definition of underground. If, as is contended, we will abrogate the treaty upon detecting a test which, though shallowly buried and the radioactivity from which is confined to Soviet territorial boundaries, then there would be no need to differentiate. One can, however, visualize some heated arguments arising over the contention by the Soviets that they conformed to the letter of the treaty in whatever they did. Differentiation then, between shallow burial and atmospheric, is important.

Question 9. One can accept the data given as to time periods of readiness for different types of tests. The question is whether they are acceptable from the standpoint of national security in the face of another sudden abrogation by the Soviets. We are told that this is a large risk.

Question 10. Both laboratories and scientists deteriorated under the moratorium for lack of any testing. If the other disadvantages inherent in the treaty can be accepted, it would seem that permitted underground testing, if vigorously implemented, should prevent deterioration in nuclear weapons research.

Question 11. The discussion of an antiballistic missile defense has been confined to systems of the Nike-Zeus and Nike-X type. It may well come to pass in the years ahead that an effective ballistic missile defense will take the form of maintaining above one's country a highly charged atmosphere of rays emitted by enhanced radiation devices which will exploit the vulnerabilities and uncertainties in warhead design of penetrating reentry vehicles. Discrimination

of warhead from decoy, traffic handling, reaction and radar blackout are problems which would be eliminated by this concept and it is one of the unresolved questions concerning the sophisticated nature of the Soviets recent tests and their sudden willingness to sign the treaty.

Question 12. True, without a treaty, the Soviets could overtake our alleged advantage in low yield weapons more readily. The answers do not mention the fact that the U.S. position in high yield weapons and knowledge of their effects is committed to inferiority in comparison to the Soviets.

Question 13. The chart appearing on page 6 of the Preparedness Subcommittee's report, while more far reaching than just next year's planned test, more accurately answers the question.

Question 14. Elsewhere in the debate other facts, figures, statistical studies and opinion have appeared. The truth of the matter is—we do not know. My question was designed to emphasize in the debate that the propagandized emotionalism on this point is so highly exaggerated.

Question 15. Plowshare, despite claims to the contrary, is generally prohibited by the treaty and the administration has admitted that it must be negotiated out. Senator SPARKMAN properly introduced as part of his answer, President Kennedy's letter of September 10, 1963.

Question 16. The excerpt from the testimony of Secretary Rusk appearing on page 7 of the Foreign Relations Committee report and the State Department answer are that the answer is no and that even when asserting privileges of participating and voting on amendments, and so forth, we would reserve the right to object.

Mr. HICKENLOOPER. Mr. President, the proposed test ban treaty pending before the Senate is a remarkable document; remarkable not so much for what it does, but for the questionable hopes it may have aroused not only in this country, but throughout the world.

At the outset, I want to point out that this proposed treaty is the outgrowth of some nuclear origins. I will try to point out later how it is different from the proposals of the Eisenhower administration—but in any event the speed with which this document was accepted and signed can well promote inquiry.

It is intriguing to consider why the Russians, after 4 or 5 years of adamant refusal to get down to business on any serious discussion of the basic principles involved in this proposed agreement, suddenly, early this past summer apparently, sent word that they were ready to talk and we rushed a delegation to Moscow, went through a few ceremonies, obligingly inserted the antiplowshare provision in the treaty and initiated it with very little, if any, negotiation.

I sincerely regret that the President has seen fit in effect to claim executive privilege over the exchange of correspondence between the United States and the U.S.S.R. preliminary to the signing of this treaty. Under the Constitu-

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tion, the Senate is a coequal partner with the President in the act of making a treaty.

Even if it should be acknowledged that the claim of executive privilege might properly lie in some areas of executive-congressional relations, certainly it can not rationally be held to lie in the field of treaties, where surely the Senate is entitled to full access to all facts surrounding the negotiation of a treaty, including examination of pertinent documents, when called upon to carry out its constitutional duty of giving or withholding consent to the ratification of that treaty.

The very act of exercise of executive privilege is bound to plant seeds of suspicion and mistrust in the mind of the public and to affect public confidence. I regret that the majority of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee chose not to support the effort of members, including myself, to obtain this information regarding the test ban treaty in accordance with the constitutional powers and prerogatives of the Senate.

Although the treaty prohibits nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water, and this is significant, the President of the United States found it necessary, when he submitted the treaty to the Senate, to emphasize what the treaty does not do. He said:

It does not prohibit the United States and the Soviet Union from engaging in all nuclear tests;

It will not halt the production or reduce the existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons; It will not end the threat of nuclear war or outlaw the use of nuclear weapons;

It cannot wholly prevent the spread of nuclear arms to nations not now possessing them;

And finally he said:

It does not assure world peace.

Mr. President, I emphasize these negative aspects of the treaty because in the last 6 weeks the American people have been overwhelmed with statements, official and otherwise, which have tended to blunt our critical faculties.

Compared to the things the treaty does not do, its positive aspects are rather thin. The treaty does, as the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee stated recently, represent a small step. However, I am not sure that I agree with the distinguished chairman that the step is a positive one in the right direction. It does represent, however, some break with the past; and, as such, it may open possibilities in the future—some favorable, some perhaps unfavorable.

THE HAZARDS OF ACCEPTANCE

Approval of this treaty by the U.S. Senate will subject the security of this Nation to political, scientific, and military hazards. Among the hazards which must not be overlooked are the following:

First. There is the hazard that the Soviet Union, in its test series of 1961 and 1962 may have gained knowledge to enable the Soviet to make a great leap forward, either in the development of multimegaton bombs or the creation of an effective antiballistic missile system. We do not know how much they may

have learned and it is possible that the Soviet Union only seeks time to go into production on devices of military potential that may ultimately give the Soviet a preponderance of nuclear power.

Second. There is the hazard of clandestine testing. Although American detection devices are extremely good, the area of the Soviet is vast and techniques for secret prohibited testing may make it possible for the Soviet to increase its nuclear competence without our knowledge.

Third. There is the danger that the Soviet Union will overtake the United States in nuclear developments by underground testing which is permitted by the treaty. There is no doubt but that at the present time the United States is ahead in the field of underground testing, but since the Soviet will be permitted to test in this environment, it may be expected that in time they will learn as much in this area as we now know.

Fourth. There is the danger of a vast ruse. Suspicious as I always am of Soviet declarations of intent, there is always the possibility that the Soviet Union and Communist China have agreed to disagree—each to pursue its own path—the hard line by Peiping and the soft line by Moscow—with the assurance that when the time is right the forces of international communism will coalesce to the everlasting detriment of the free world. Certainly Soviet duplicity in the past gives us no reason in precedent to believe that the word of Khrushchev is any more reliable than the word of Stalin.

THE HAZARDS OF REJECTION

One must balance against the hazards of accepting the treaty, the hazards of rejection. Both are speculative. And in the final analysis each Member of this body must reach his own judgment as to whether he believes the national security of this Nation justifies acceptance of this agreement.

First. One of the hazards of rejection which bothers me greatly is the effect which Senate rejection would have upon our posture throughout the world. Once the President authorized Under Secretary of State Harriman to sign this agreement on behalf of the United States it became most difficult for the Senate to express its independent judgment on the treaty. Certainly, rejection of the treaty at this point would dash the hopes—many of them unjustified I believe—of the more than 90 nations which have already indicated their willingness to accept its terms.

Second. There is the hazard that rejection of this treaty might tend to heal the rift which has opened between the Chinese Communists and the Russian Communists. If this rift is real, if it has substance, then rejection of the treaty might force Khrushchev to align himself once again with Peiping and one-third of mankind would be drawn together in support of international communism.

Third. A further hazard of rejection might be a consequence of developments within the Soviet Union itself. Undoubtedly, there are those in that society who believe that the United States is not willing to risk nuclear war to defend its in-

terest. We must not forget that it was only last October that under the cloak of a deliberate and calculated falsehood Khrushchev himself was willing to challenge us in Cuba and remains ever ready to exploit our weakness there. If Khrushchev is not able to reach an agreement now on a nuclear test ban treaty, one result may well be to strengthen the hands of the most extreme elements in the Kremlin.

Fourth. There is a hazard that nuclear weapons may be proliferated if we do not accept this treaty. At least eight non-nuclear powers now have the capacity to develop weapons on their own. Rejection of this treaty might invite them to do so and thus multiply the chance of planned or accidental precipitation of nuclear exchanges. Certainly a rejection would necessitate the immediate resumption of atmospheric tests by the nuclear powers.

Mr. President, I have given careful consideration to the hazards that will face this Nation if we approve the treaty or if we reject it. On balance and in view of the whole spectrum of circumstances, it seems to me that we have no firm choices—that we must, even though with misgivings, consent to the treaty.

I listened with greatest of care to the many witnesses who appeared before the joint committees holding hearings on the treaty. It was apparent to me that many of those witnesses were torn by strong doubt. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Joint Chiefs themselves, left me with the impression that if the treaty were to be accepted or rejected solely upon the basis of its military implications, that they would have been forced to recommend its rejection. When they took into account, however, the political implications of the treaty, they were willing to accept the military dangers in the expectation of receiving overall political benefits for the United States.

I am consenting to the treaty, although I am thoroughly convinced that the Kremlin will breach it if such breach seems to its advantage. As the moment I believe the Kremlin finds certain advantages in the treaty, but we should be under no misapprehension that this treaty will be anything but a scrap of paper at any moment it serves the interest of the Soviet Union to so regard it.

The second concern I have about the consequences of approving this treaty is that I fear a gradual erosion of our determination to maintain our defenses in a state of readiness. In other words, we could be lulled into a false feeling of security and let our guard down. This Nation in the past has easily been lulled into a sense of false security. Indeed, our swings of public opinion are phenomenal. It is hard to believe that only a year ago when the Russians put missiles in Cuba and the Chinese Communists attacked India, we were concerned that international communism might make war inevitable. And yet today we find in our country a wave of propaganda suggesting that we should have confidence in the word of the very man who put missiles in Cuba a year ago, destroyed the test moratorium in 1961, and

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refused to meet with Eisenhower a few years earlier, shortly after he had come to the United States allegedly to proffer a hand of friendship.

It is essential that in subscribing to this treaty we do so, maintaining ourselves in a constant state of readiness to renew tests, determined that we will continuously modernize our detection devices, determined to keep our laboratories in operation, and that we proceed with an expanded program of underground testing.

A great deal of misinformation has been bandied about concerning this three environment test ban treaty. One frequent statement is that it is the same proposal which was submitted by President Eisenhower during his administration and which was endorsed by the Republican Party in its platform of 1960. This is definitely not true. Even without considering the change of circumstances and of the relative position of the world powers concerning nuclear technology between the date of the proposal of the Eisenhower administration and the present, the proposals are dissimilar.

To mention some of the differences, the Eisenhower proposal did not take into its purview nuclear testing in outer space where techniques had not been developed to permit verification of violations; nor did that administration propose to enable the Soviet Union to veto each and every project by the United States or any other treaty-signatory for the peaceful use of atomic devices for such purposes as diverting hurricanes, digging channels and canals; in other words, the plowshare program.

Again, the Republican platform in 1960 stated:

We are similarly ready to negotiate and to institute realistic methods and safeguards for disarmament and for the suspension of nuclear tests. We advocate an early agreement by all nations to forgo nuclear tests in the atmosphere, under the suspension of other tests as verification techniques permit. We support the President in any decision he may make to reevaluate the question of resumption of underground nuclear explosives testing if the Geneva Conference fails to produce a satisfactory agreement. We have deep concern about the mounting nuclear arms race. This concern leads us to seek disarmament and nuclear agreements. And an equal concern to protect all peoples from nuclear danger leads us to insist that such agreements have adequate safeguards.

The present treaty bans nuclear weapon tests in outer space, an environment in which verification will be very difficult because, notwithstanding anticipated and programed improvements in our verification system, the system will still possess both detection and identification thresholds below which clandestine testing will be possible with low probability of detection. Furthermore, the draft of the limited test ban treaty tabled in Geneva, August 27, 1962, by the United States and United Kingdom delegations prohibited only nuclear weapon tests and would have permitted explosion of nuclear devices for peaceful purposes; however, the present treaty, by prohibiting all nuclear explosions in the three environments, prohibits in perpetuity—unless amended—and amendment would require the unanimous con-

sent of the three major originating powers, which would give the Russians a veto over any amendment which might be proposed to the treaty—many peaceful uses of nuclear explosive devices where any radioactive debris can escape to another nation. Thus, if the treaty is ratified, nuclear devices can be used only for the pursuit of war and death, and only in a most limited way for peaceful purposes.

Although I am worried about the extension of the test ban into environments in which we have limited verification capability at this time, I have great confidence in the ability of our scientists and technicians to develop expeditiously systems which will prevent significant clandestine testing. However, I have very serious misgivings about the long-run wisdom of agreeing to prohibit in perpetuity the most promising use of explosion of nuclear devices for peaceful purposes, which will foreclose the plowshare program. I am convinced that, if Russia really wants a treaty, then continued and persistent negotiation would have achieved an agreement which would have permitted peaceful use of "clean" nuclear explosive devices subject to reasonable controls, such as prior notice to the treaty signatories and opportunity for observation, enabling science to explore fully the exciting potentials of this nuclear age and enabling the world to exploit fully its economic and humanitarian possibilities. The failure to provide for this is in my opinion the greatest demonstrable defect of the treaty.

ADVICE AND CONSENT

I should like now to discuss for a moment the question of advice and consent in connection with the treaty.

In recent years, Mr. President, we have witnessed a gradual erosion of an important article of the Constitution—article 2, section 2. That section provides that the President shall have:

Power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur.

Thus, it appears to be clear that the President has no "power" to make treaties prior to Senate action and it would therefore follow that he has no power to bind us in advance of authorization by the Senate.

However, as in the proposed test ban treaty now before us, we find that, from a practical standpoint, the President negotiates proposed treaties, and then submits them to the Senate for its advice and consent. Up to this point the document is no more than a tentative executive agreement.

I submit that this procedure involves seeking the "consent" of the Senate, but it does not technically carry out the constitutional mandate to obtain the "advice" of the Senate. It is difficult indeed, if not impracticable, to advise after the act, especially under the circumstances which we face now when we have encouraged some 90 nations to sign the proposal before we have finalized it under our constitutional process.

As a practical matter, when the President or one of his agents signs a solemn

instrument such as that now before us, it becomes most difficult for the Senate to do anything but give its consent, especially under the pressures of domestic and worldwide propaganda that have been built up. The Senate in the case now before us is not being asked to give its advice. The Senate as a practical matter can only consent to this treaty, or reject it.

There was a time when Presidents seriously sought the "advice" of the Senate prior to the negotiation of treaties.

This subject is discussed in the Foreign Relations Committee report in 1946 on acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court—Senate Report No. 1835, 79th Congress 2d session.

At that time the constitutional question was raised as to whether—and I quote from the report:

It is proper procedure to obtain the advice and consent of the Senate prior to deposit of the declaration by the President.

The answer of the committee, which deserves the most careful consideration, is as follows:

With respect to the second issue, the answer may be found in the Constitution itself. Article 2, section 2, provides that the President shall have "power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur." It is evident that the advice and consent of the Senate is equally effective whether given before, during, or after the conclusion of the treaty. In fact, President Washington approached the Senate for its advice and consent prior to the negotiation of treaties, and this practice was followed on occasion by other Presidents. While the practice of prior consultations with the Senate fell into disuse after 1816, a recent precedent may be found in the convention of 1927, extending the General Claims Commission, United States and Mexico, of 1923. The treaty was signed on August 16, 1927, pursuant to a Senate resolution of February 17, 1927. A similar example is the convention of 1929, again extending the life of the Commission. The convention was signed on August 17, 1929, pursuant to the Senate resolution of May 25, 1929.

I suggest, Mr. President, that the kinds of hazards involved in the negotiation and signing of treaties on such important subjects as that now before us makes it vitally important for the Senate, the President, and the scholars of this Nation to explore once again the feasibility of obtaining the advice and consent of the Senate prior to the signature of important treaties.

It is not enough for the executive branch of this Government to come to the Senate with general drafts of treaties, and occasional consultations. The Senate and the Committee on Foreign Relations in particular need to participate more actively in the negotiations as they near the point of consummation.

It is my recollection that at the time the North Atlantic Treaty was being negotiated the Committee on Foreign Relations had opportunity to go over semi-final drafts, article by article, and that as a result of that meticulous work a number of drafting changes were made in the treaty. The same was true with respect to the peace treaty with Japan.

I cannot help but believe that had the pending treaty been submitted to the

close scrutiny and unhurried dissection by the Committee on Foreign Relations prior to its finalization by the Executive, we would not now be confronted with such ambiguous language as that which has created serious doubts as to whether the treaty may prohibit the use of nuclear weapons in the event of hostilities and other serious questions which have been stated.

I believe the executive branch should take clear warning from the questions that have been raised during consideration of this treaty. It must rethink its approach to the Senate in connection with any future negotiations looking toward any limitation upon the defensive armaments of this country. I seriously doubt if the necessary two-thirds vote could be obtained for another treaty on this general subject if such treaty were negotiated in haste and submitted to the Senate on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, somewhat in the fashion of this treaty and the situation in which we find ourselves.

There is no reason in law or in our Constitution why the Senate should not be asked formally to give its advice and consent to a draft treaty prior to the signing ceremonies. Such a practice in the case of our most important treaties may on occasion in the future save the President not only from the embarrassment of repudiation—as happened in the case of the Treaty of Versailles—but it would protect this Nation from situations such as that with which we are now confronted—situations in which the military, scientific, and political judgments of the Senate are in danger of being warped by the argument that all we can do is to advise and consent to ratification, or we will be repudiating the President, embarrassing the Nation, and compromising our leadership.

In the last analysis, we probably find ourselves in a position where we must accept this treaty with a certain degree of cautious hope, but at the same time with the determination and increased vigilance for our own security and that of the free world. The treaty itself provides no steps for the creation of increased posture for peace or for diminishing the threat of war. I am not greatly worried about the suggestions that the treaty may bar us from using atomic weapons in case our security is acutely threatened, because I think it is inherent in the sovereign rights of nations to use whatever means are available for their protection in time of great danger. The administrative branch of our Government and the legislative branch are both committed to this philosophy irrevocably. By the same token, so is the Kremlin.

I have little patience with the argument that we must make this treaty or that we must take various other steps to establish our devotion to the cause of peace and freedom.

The whole record of the United States is one of continuous devotion of life and treasure to the cause of peace and freedom in the world. We gave much in World War I and it was our strength and sacrifice that preserved free institutions in Europe and protected them else-

where. We asked nothing from that victory except a peaceful world.

We led in the disarmament conferences of the 1920's; we constantly gave our good offices in the interest of settling international disputes. The life and treasure which we expended in World War II and the more than \$100 billion of our substance which we have poured out since to help troubled and groping nations reestablish themselves or move toward the forms of freedom surely can not be forgotten or disregarded.

Following World War II, when we were the sole possessor of the atomic bomb and the means of production, we did what no other country, to my knowledge, has done in the history of the world—we offered to turn over to the United Nations all atomic weapons, atomic materials and the means of processing them for international control, provided other countries would do the same. This was generally referred to as the Baruch plan. I say this was unique because I know of no other time in history when a nation possessing the means and the weapons to conquer any or all other nations on earth, voluntarily offered to give up this exclusive means in the interest of civilization and peace.

We have constantly conferred, attempted to negotiate and put forward countless fair and equitable proposals that would diminish the chances of war.

We have proved over and over our sympathy with and devotion to peace and human betterment.

On the other hand the Kremlin has constantly blocked every effort and refused every realistic offer that would promote peace with reasonable and mutual safeguards. Is it any wonder then that we want proof of good will by deeds on the part of international communism, and that we fear new promises which can, and no doubt will be, broken with the same cavalier attitude that we have seen so frequently in the past? It cannot be argued persuasively that Premier Khrushchev is different from Stalin, because both have been instruments of international communism and it is the voice of international communism that speaks through them, and it is the philosophy of international communism which they implement and not the personal philosophy of either of them or any one man.

If the policy of international communism says break the agreement, the previously given word of the individual means nothing.

There are many ways in which international communism could by deeds show its good faith. The Kremlin could keep its agreement for free elections in the Iron Curtain countries; it could restore freedom to the Latvian States, which it aggressively took over not much more than a year after it had made solemn treaty agreements to respect their sovereignty and freedom.

The Kremlin could remove its heel of conquest from East Germany and by action remove the threats to Berlin and the peace of Europe.

The Kremlin could cease its false propaganda and active subversive threats in Africa, Latin America, and other areas of the world.

If the Kremlin really believed in the basic rights of the people it could withdraw from the arena of international conquest and devote its energies and resources toward the betterment of the Russian people.

They know that we would welcome, with rejoicing, news of this kind that would bring proof through deeds that they were sincere in their protestations for peace, but it is in the light of past experiences that we must examine our course and future and that we must explore and determine the vigilance which we must exercise. The world knows that we have no designs hostile to any other country, but I think the world also knows that until international communism alters its adamant course away from world dominion and by action adopts policies of genuine consideration and respect for the rights of others, that our own security and that of the free nations of the world must regrettably depend upon superior strength and realism.

In closing I wish to recite a little story which was written to me the other day in a letter by a constituent from Iowa. He said that in dealing with the Russians we should always keep in mind the story of the hunter and the bear.

The hunter went to the woods one day, and deep in the woods he saw a bear approaching. The hunter raised his gun and aimed it at the bear. The bear suddenly stopped and said, "Wait, hunter. What do you want? We will negotiate." The hunter said, "I want a fur coat." The bear said, "Good. I want a good meal. Let us negotiate." So they sat down and negotiated; and, after a while, the bear walked away. The hunter had his fur coat and the bear had a good meal.

In our dealings with the Russians in the past too often the bear has walked away with a good meal and we have had a fur coat of sorts. It is a situation caused by naivete which should not be permitted to exist very long. We should bear in mind that we are dealing with a ruthless, expert group of manipulators to whom morals as we apply them do not appeal and by whom they are not accepted.

We must bear in mind that our interests and those of the free world still must rely on our constant ability to defend ourselves and the interests of freedom under all circumstances. In accepting this treaty we must recall that it is the deeds which may follow which will determine whether the treaty has a modicum of sincerity on the part of the Kremlin or whether it is a sham and a subterfuge.

I shall vote for the treaty because I think the alternative of refusal is less acceptable under all the circumstances. I shall vote for the treaty not with enthusiasm but because, on balance, and with "eternal vigilance"—which is still the price of liberty—I think it can create another opportunity under which future deeds may produce the arena for steps toward peace, which we all so earnestly desire.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record at this point a statement by the executive branch concerning ex-

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executive branch consultations with the Senate on a limited nuclear test ban.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

STATEMENT OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH ON
CONSULTATIONS WITH THE SENATE ON A
LIMITED NUCLEAR TEST BAN, SEPTEMBER
16, 1963

The Senate's advice concerning a three-environment test ban treaty was sought on repeated occasions before the treaty now before the Senate was signed by Secretary Rusk. Consultations between members of the executive branch and the Senate occurred in a variety of forms, including formal committee hearings, personal visits, written correspondence, telephone calls, and breakfast briefings.

The present nuclear test ban treaty had its genesis in the United States-United Kingdom proposal of August 27, 1962, for a ban on nuclear tests in the atmosphere, outer space, and underwater. This proposal was substantially the same as that contained in the treaty now before the Senate.

Hearings at which a three-environment ban was discussed with appropriate committees of the Senate, have occurred on frequent occasions beginning prior to the August 27, 1962, proposals. Mr. William C. Foster, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency appeared on July 23, 1962, before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, and on July 25, 1962, before the Disarmament Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations to discuss the status of the nuclear test ban negotiations then being conducted in Geneva at the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference.

The Senate's advice was sought from the outset. As stated by Mr. Foster to the Disarmament subcommittee:

"The purpose of this meeting with you, Mr. Chairman, is to put before you before the decision has been made some of the alternatives which are being considered for recommendation to the President for his decision. And that decision has not yet been taken."

Mr. Foster outlined four possible positions to both committees. One of these positions was to draft a treaty banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere, outer space and underwater. Members of the committees discussed the advantages and disadvantages of this proposal with Mr. Foster at some length. On August 2, 1962, Ambassador Arthur H. Dean, U.S. representative to the Geneva Disarmament Conference, accompanied by Mr. Foster appeared before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and the Disarmament Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations. The purpose of these appearances was to inform the committees about the contents of Ambassador Dean's instructions regarding the nuclear test ban prior to his return to the negotiations at Geneva. Both the comprehensive test ban proposals and those for a ban on tests in the atmosphere, outer space and underwater were discussed.

On September 17, 1962, the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee initiated a series of hearings focused on the nuclear test ban. On that day, Mr. Foster and Mr. Paul H. Nitze, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs appeared before the subcommittee. On September 18, discussions with Mr. Foster continued and on September 19 the subcommittee heard testimony from Secretary of State Dean Rusk.

During the course of this series of hearings a wide range of arms control and disarmament matters were discussed, including the status of the August 27, 1962, proposal for a limited nuclear test ban.

Between March 5 and March 12, 1963, the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy held hearings on developments in technical capabilities for detecting and identifying nuclear weapons tests (Project Vela). During the course of these hearings, U.S. detection and identification capabilities relative to nuclear tests in the atmosphere, outer space, and underwater, in addition to underground, were discussed in detail. The August 27, 1962, proposal for a limited treaty was also referred to and its status discussed. Officials of various executive branch agencies including Mr. Foster and Dr. Franklin A. Long of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Mr. Jack P. Ruina, Director of the Department of Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, and Maj. Gen. A. W. Betts, Director of the Division of Military Application of the Atomic Energy Commission, as well as numerous other Government and non-Government technical witnesses, testified during these hearings.

On March 11, 1963, the status of the test ban negotiations, including a ban on tests in the atmosphere, outer space and underwater, was discussed with the Disarmament Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations by Secretary Rusk accompanied by Mr. Adrian S. Fisher, Deputy Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

On May 7, 1963, hearings on the nuclear test ban before the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee were resumed with the appearance of Mr. Foster. During succeeding months a long list of military and technical witnesses appeared before the subcommittee including representatives of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Atomic Energy Commission, the Defense Atomic Support Agency, the Air Force Technical Application Center, the AEC Weapons Laboratories, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The initial focus of these hearings was upon the U.S. proposal for a comprehensive treaty banning all nuclear weapons tests. However, repeated discussions of a limited test ban were included, and the focus of the investigation was shifted to the limited treaty once it had been initiated in Moscow.

As previously indicated, the specific series of negotiations, which finally achieved agreement on the limited treaty now before the Senate, began in Moscow on July 15, 1963. Key Members of the Senate were advised informally of the status of the negotiations and asked for advice during their course. On July 23 and 24, 1963, Secretary Rusk, accompanied by Mr. Foster, appeared before the Armed Services, the Foreign Relations, and the Joint Atomic Energy Committees to report on the status of the negotiations and secure the advice of those present on the draft as it then stood. These hearings occurred prior to the initialing of the treaty by Under Secretary Harriman in Moscow on July 25. The draft treaty which was discussed with the committees at that time still had not been agreed, and the outstanding differences, as well as the nature and effect of the agreed parts of the text, were pointed out and discussed.

On August 5, 1963, following initialing of the text of the treaty on July 25 and prior to signature of the treaty in Moscow by Secretary Rusk, Under Secretary Harriman, accompanied by Mr. Foster, appeared before a joint session of the Armed Services, Foreign Relations and Joint Atomic Energy Committees. The purpose of this appearance was to receive the advice of the members present before the treaty was signed.

Thus, the views of the Senate were formally solicited prior to reaching a decision within the executive branch concerning the predecessor proposal of the present treaty of August 27, 1962. The appropriate com-

mittees were also consulted before the treaty was initiated and before it was signed.

In addition to formal hearings, numerous informal contacts with various Senators and their staffs on the subject of the nuclear test ban negotiations in general and a three-environment ban in particular have occurred. A particular effort has been made to keep Senators who were members of the committees having an interest in arms control matters fully informed. In addition to individual contacts, a series of breakfasts specifically to discuss arms control and nuclear test ban matters were held. All members of the Armed Services, Foreign Relations and Joint Atomic Energy Committees were invited to attend one or more of these breakfast briefings. The views of Senators who have expressed an interest in the subject have also been sought on an informal basis.

The only possible conclusion from the foregoing is that the advice of the Senate was repeatedly sought by the executive branch before and during the course of the negotiations which culminated in the treaty before the Senate.

ADJOURNMENT UNTIL MONDAY,
SEPTEMBER 23, 1963, AT 10 A.M.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, is there further business to come before the Senate?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further business?

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, if not, I move that the Senate stand in adjournment until 10 o'clock on Monday morning next, in accordance with the unanimous-consent agreement entered into on Wednesday, September 18, 1963.

The motion was agreed to; and (at 4 o'clock and 29 minutes p.m.) the Senate adjourned, in executive session, under the order of Wednesday, September 18, 1963, until Monday, September 23, 1963, at 10 o'clock a.m.

NOMINATIONS

Executive nominations received by the Senate, September 20, 1963:

IN THE MARINE CORPS

The following-named officers of the Marine Corps for temporary appointment to the grade of lieutenant colonel, subject to qualification therefor as provided by law:

Barton, LeRoy C.	Maloney, John H.
Carlson, William C.	Wilder, Charles S.
Culp, William E.	Harrison, Joseph B.
McKittrick, Rodney D.	Glenn, Jack
Morris, Roger A.	Kerr, Melvyn H.
Shanks, William, Jr.	Pomeroy, William D.
Fraser, Robert M., Jr.	Von Der Heyde, Henry A. F., Jr.
Salsar, Charles A.	Beer, William J.
King, Robert, Jr.	Hickman, Edwin L., Jr.
Fine, Dail D.	Nelson, Arthur A., Jr.
Bryant, William W.	Hart, Lawrence P.
Poppa, Chester J.	Selleck, Lawrence M., Jr.
Cobb, Thomas L.	McPherson, Gordon D.
Kirkland, John W.	Stott, Harry D.
Dempster, Donald R.	Heflin, Bruce A.
Heywood, Ralph A.	Beal, Samuel G.
Rixey, Palmer H.	Cook, Bertram E., Jr.
Persac, Walter L.	Christopher, Willard N.
Oltmer, Lavern J.	Ksycowski, Casimir C.
Stoneman, Russel H.	Boulware, John C.
Keller, Gordon H., Jr.	Evans, Robert C.
Millette, Eugene	Reese, Robert V.
Van Campen, Hiel L.	Harris, William D.
Lewis, Robert, Jr.	Tunnell, Robert J., Jr.
Landrum, James, Jr.	Van Dalsem, Robert R.
Taub, Samuel, Jr.	
McArthur, Raymond	

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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

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Dillon, James W.	Terry, John M., Jr.	Lahr, Robert J.	Worley, Kermit M.	Ludwig, Verle E.	Coffman, Raymond P., Jr.
Kelly, Walter C.	Chambers, George G., Jr.	Hagarty, Patrick J.	Owens, Thurman	Owens, Owen L.	Wilson, Robert H.
Hall, Clifford D.	Little, Eldon L., Jr.	Hargett, Ernest C.	Derning, Edmund G., Jr.	Willey, Robert L.	Eastman, Robert E.
Hoch, Kurt L.	Whitehead, Arthur T.	Powell, David D.	Warshawer, Alan J.	Coffman, John W.	Edwards, Roy J.
Haynes, Albert B., Jr.	George, Marshall E.	Clark, Allen B.	Mader, John F.	Wessel, Wallace	Woodruff, Paden E., Jr.
Burch, Carol B.	McClanahan, Paul G.	Lewis, Elmer M., Jr.	Dixon, Frank L., Jr.	Fegley, James E.	Ives, Merton R.
Metcalf, Robert B.	Wilson, James J.	Cashman, James G.	Kleppsattel, F. M., Jr.	Stowers, Robert M.	Peabody, Clifford J.
Shelby, Alfred C., Jr.	Molsberry, Dale M.	Breckinridge, James T.	Critchett, Edward W.	Corn, Clifford D.	Rogers, Harry L., Jr.
Bonds, William E.	Wafyek, Henry	Walden, Denzil E.	May, Donald L.	Grier, Samuel L.	Hall, William D.
Hunter, Glenn R.	Will, Kenneth E.	Keith, John H., Jr.	Buchanan, Fitzhugh L., Jr.	Witkowski, Henry J.	Markham, Edward J., Jr.
Wann, Charles M., Jr.	Hill, Twyman R.	Johnson, Russell E.	Meeker, Ermine L.	Leidy, Alfred L.	Richards, Wayne E.
Usher, Edward G.	Solze, Robert L.	Dindinger, Jack W.	Wachter, John A.	McCain, Gene M.	Meyer, Edward B.
Dayvault, Nevin E.	Burns, Edwin A.	Jones, Edward H.	Showalter, Charles E.	Brent, Joseph M.	Parrott, Robert E.
Fox, Jean T.	Hollier, Louis S., Jr.	Merrill, George A.	Stephens, Reuel W., Jr.	Miller, Richard R.	Arford, Jack O.
Harpe, Lilburn L.	Karie, Douglas T.	Hicks, Norman W.	Eschholz, Theodore S.	Harris, William A.	Plaskett, William Jr.
Rumble, Gerould M., Jr.	Mitchell, John F.	Harmon, Autrey B.	Coon, Elvin R., Jr.	Marusak, Andrew V., Jr.	McCarty, Stewart B., Jr.
Weber, Raymond J.	Carrubba, Harry D.	Smith, Robert A.	Hillmer, Donald F.	Wilson, Harold B.	Discus, William A., Jr.
Pates, Bruce A., Jr.	Schoen, James R.	Winn, Robert D.	Rump, William S.	Stephenson, Charles R., III	Hanfin, Robert T., Jr.
Groome, Roland C.	Baker, Edward S., Jr.	Dresbach, Earl C., Jr.	Beverly, Arthur C.	Gilman, Donald E.	Hecker, James S.
Cunard, Earl M., Jr.	Butner, John C., III	Dillard, Jack N.	Reese, Howard E.	Blaha, Herbert J.	
Novak, Anthony	Spicer, Raymond B.	Harris, Robert G.	McNicholas, Robert J.	Patton, William C.	
Crowley, John F.	Dowd, John J., Jr.	Killian, Edwin W.	Baeriswyl, Louis, Jr.	Moak, Stanley T.	
Anthony, William S.	Mosher, Charles M.	Morin, Donald E.	Taylor, Roma T., Jr.	Rapp, David A.	
Roberts, Clyde R.	Rann, Louis A.	Miles, Jack L.	Macklin, William H.	Walker, William T.	
French, Harry D.	Peck, William H.	Wood, Ralph C.	Webb, Lewis R.		
Unger, William T.	Westcott, Charles T.	Spencer, Donald E.	McClelland, William A.		
Riggs, Thomas W.	Kietzker, Robert L.	Johnston, Howard J.	Hickman, William T.		
Stone, Earnest H., Jr.	Meyers, George F.	Jones, David G.	Flood, James H. A.		
Walker, Emerson A.	Cummings, James M.	Green, Melvin K.	Selmyhr, Garlen L.		
Ziegler, Paul E.	Easlinger, Dean E.	Badger, Guy O.	Martin, Lee D.		
Leeseberg, Phillip K.	Dzialo, Edward W.	Russ, Donald M.	Blyth, Charles W.		
Johnson, Corbin J.	Rorter, Robert H., Jr.	Selvitelle, Benjamin B., Jr.	Montague, Paul B.		
Brierton, Thomas J., Jr.	Overmyer, Gerald D.				
	Gelger, Edward D., Jr.				
	Hayes, James M.				
		Thomas, John C.			

The following-named officers of the Marine Corps for permanent appointment to the grade of lieutenant colonel, subject to qualification therefor as provided by law:

Amos, Raymond L.	Yezierski, Peter P.
Valentour, James V.	Leach, Robert D.
Wahrer, Maurice S.	Lindfelt, Haldon E.
Stamps, Clyde H.	
Keenan, Lawrence W.	

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM			
UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL	
		SECRET	
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP			
TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	Mr. Elder 7D5617	<i>AE</i>	<i>f-20</i>
2			
3			
4			
5			
6			
ACTION		DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL		DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT		FILE	RETURN
CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION	SIGNATURE
<p>Remarks: Attached are excerpts from the Congressional Record of 19 September containing the continuation of debate on the nuclear test ban treaty. We have not identified any references to the Agency or the Director, however, you may wish to have them available.</p> <p><i>No need for D to see — is he or is he not tired of this? JSW</i></p> <div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 150px; height: 50px; margin: 10px auto;"></div> <p style="text-align: center;">Assistant Legislative Counsel</p>			
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER			
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.			DATE
Assistant Legislative Counsel, 7D01			20 Sept
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